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Alison Louise Miles 
Abstract 
The global financial crisis (2007-2009) caused the most severe global economic downturn 
since the Great Depression and in the 10 years since, the global banking sector has witnessed 
an onslaught of banking scandals such as: LIBOR, FOREX, money laundering, and tax 
avoidance. In the wake of these ongoing issues, there is a clear need to explore alternative 
methods to tackle failures and scandals in the banking sector. 
A key weakness in the current discourse is the lack of analysis of the leadership 
characteristics and styles of board members of leading banks. 
This study responds to this weakness, contributing in three principle ways. Firstly, by 
extending the use of grounded theory, it investigates the leadership characteristics and styles 
of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation with 
autonomous boards (taken from the Banker Top 1000 banks 2017), and those of the 17 
largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999 –
2017) and presents a substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’. 
Secondly, it adds to the strategic leadership debate finding successful leaders exhibit 
characteristics and traits of more than one leadership style. Thirdly, the research adds to the 
conversation on shared leadership by analysing the relationship between the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, which is found to be an influencing factor in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. 
In highlighting the influence of leadership characteristics and styles in banking failure, the 
research also provides a useful risk analysis tool for policy makers and regulators as they 
attempt to avoid future banking collapses. 
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Part I  
Introduction and Review of Literature 
Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Thesis 
 
‘Banks do not create money for the public good. They are businesses owned by 
private shareholders. Their purpose is to make a profit.’ 
(Rogers, Scotti and Wright, 2014) 
1.1 Introduction 
The banking sector is complex, volatile and significant to the global economy (topping 7.7 
trillion Euros in the 4th quarter of 20171). Despite the recovery from the global financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2008–2009,2 ongoing scandals and the fear of future crises continue to be of concern 
to the UK Government, regulators and the Banking Standards Board.3 
In 1997, a conference was organised by the Federal Bank of Chicago and the 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank. It included 120 participants from 36 
countries, representatives from central banks, experts from the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Its purpose was to learn lessons from the previous 15 
years of banking failures in order to avert future crises. It failed. Fast forward 10 years and 
the sector saw the greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression (Wilmarth, 2009, 
2016). In the 10 years since, it continues to be embroiled in scandal including LIBOR, 
FOREX, ISDAfix, mis-selling, money laundering, tax avoidance and industrial espionage. 
An attempt to improve banks’ market discipline (Claessens, 2006) has led to reforms by 
international agencies, i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Report on the 
                                                          
1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/265135/market-capitalization-of-the-banking-sector-worldwide-since-2004/ 
2 https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-banking-outlook-2018/$File/ey-global-banking-outlook-2018.pdf 
3 http://www.westminsterforumprojects.co.uk/publication/financial-services-17 
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Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). However, it is clear that past reforms have done 
little to curb future banking losses and scandals.4 This research calls for an alternative lens 
through which to view banking failure (Ball, 2009). 
The academic and policy work concerning the GFC predominantly focusses on the 
role and complicity of the banking sector (Crawford, 2011; Kakabadse et al., 2010a; 
Wilmarth, 2009), together with the complexity of the financial markets (McFall, 2009). The 
dominant theme suggests the causes of the crash were a combination of globalisation, 
financial sector innovation, moribund regulation, short termism and interconnectivity 
(Crawford, 2011). There was a genuine belief by banks and regulators that they had 
overcome the problems of past crashes with the development of new financial products 
allowing the distribution of risk. This was ultimately proved wrong and instead the world saw 
a classic credit and asset boom with excessive lending and leverage (Buiter, 2007). 
Governments and regulators, rather than giving a helping hand to ease market failures, 
are often seen as giving a grabbing hand for political gain (Shleifer, 1998). Regulation is 
needed (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002), but as recent events suggest, 
regulation and recapitalisation measures do not curb banking failures (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker, 2009) and instead result in increased complexity of decision making, as 
vocalised by Jes Staley (CEO Barclays 2015 to date) at the World Economic Forum 2016 in 
his statement: ‘Which law to do you want us to break?’ In this context, it is hard to believe 
that regulatory reform will succeed when it has failed so enormously and repeatedly in the 
past (Boone and Johnson, 2010). 
This thesis calls for an alternative perspective on banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout arguing a key weakness in the current discourse is a lack of understanding of the 
                                                          
4 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/economy-public-
finances/regulating-banks/ 
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influence of leadership characteristics and styles of board members leading banks pre -, 
during and post failure, recapitalisation or bailout. There is a need to open the debate on this 
issue, finding support from the World Economic Forum 2017, which focussed on responsive 
and responsible leadership. 
Banking collapses, bailout and recapitalisation are nothing new. There have been over 
400 documented since the Medici bank was the first to be recorded in 1494 (Laeven, 2011). 
Following the GFC and fuelled by subsequent scandals over the mis-selling of PPI insurance 
and manipulation of LIBOR, media attention has focussed on blaming the bank leaders, 
condemning them as greedy ‘banksters’ and giving them nicknames and monikers such as 
‘Fred the Shred’ (Sir Fred Goodwin, former CEO of RBS (Martin, 2013)) and ‘Mack the 
Knife’ (John McFarlane, after his cost-cutting days at Citibank5). It is therefore strange that 
the leadership characteristics and styles of those at the top of the banks has not been the 
subject of academic scrutiny. This thesis addresses this major gap in both the literature and 
empirical studies. 
Emerging literature, including parliamentary6 and treasury reports into the banking 
sector (McFall, 2009) start to explore the issues of leadership influence. The Parliamentary 
Review into HBOS states that ‘managers bear a disproportional share of the responsibility for 
what transpired’7 and Mintzberg (2009) argues that the GFC was not so much a financial 
crisis, as a management one. However, the focus of those tasked with averting future crises 
remains on prescriptive, adapted historical policy measures in an attempt to secure financial 
stability and protect shareholder interests, rather than looking more closely into the influence 
of the board leadership as a potential cause of failure. 
                                                          
5 http://www.wsj.com/articles/john-mcfarlane-barclays-braced-for-mack-the-knife-1426172628 
6 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/../144.pd; 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/.../144.pd 
7 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201213/jtselect/jtpcbs/.../14402.htm 
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The subsequent review of literature (Chapter 2 below) to date shows no robust 
academic studies addressing board leadership influence in banking failures, recapitalisations 
or bailouts. There is also a dearth of research considering whether large banks differ from 
other global corporations and if so, whether they require a different set of board leadership 
characteristics or styles. 
This lack of research represents a major gap in the literature and this thesis argues that 
unless issues of board influence in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout are considered, 
it is impossible to say whether the current regulatory reforms will be effective or just result in 
‘ring jumping’ by boards to avoid regulatory restrictions. Until this is addressed, we are likely 
to move forward into the next crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate the leadership characteristics and styles of the 
board members (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) leading the world’s largest banks, and to 
consider their influence in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout in order to develop a 
substantive theory of the strategic leadership influence on banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout. Further aims are to contribute to the existing literature on strategic, heroic and post 
heroic leadership theories, and grounded theory methodology. Specifically, the research 
objectives are: 
To review the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO in the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation (the Banker Top 1000 banks 2017) and 
those in the 17 largest  banks by market capitalisation to fail, need recapitalisation or bailout 
(1999–2017) in order: 
i. To increase knowledge and understanding of the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the 30 largest banks. 
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ii. To develop and test a theoretical model to explore leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in these organisations. 
iii. To explore whether specific leadership characteristics and styles are influencing 
factors in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout during the research period. 
iv. To develop a substantive theory of strategic leadership influence in the banking 
sector. 
1.3 Methodology and Data Collection 
This thesis addresses the gap in extant studies through the longitudinal analysis of the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO of the 30 largest 
banking institutions (by market capitalisation) with board autonomy, as identified by the 
Banker Top 1000 banks 20178 from 1999–2017, and the 17 largest banks to fail, need 
recapitalisation or bailout during the same time period using a grounded theory approach. 
The Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are identified using secondary data from 
annual reports. Speeches, triangulated with analyst transcripts, parliamentary, treasury and 
federal inquiry reports are then collected longitudinally from 1999–2017. The same process is 
carried out for 17 of the largest banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or were bailed out 
during the same time period. 
The data is then analysed using systematic, line by line content analysis combined 
with open, axial and selective coding units adapted from grounded theory (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994) which is then linked to traditional and emergent leadership theories in order to 
determine the leadership characteristics and styles of the board members in the study. Content 
analysis was chosen at this stage as it increases credibility (Krippendorff, 2012) and enables 
large amounts of data to be analysed in a systematic fashion (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). The 
                                                          
8 The list of banking institutions are listed in Appendix 1 
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results are then tabulated to form a picture of the leadership characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the banks during the research period (1999–2017). The 
resulting substantive theory of strategic leadership influence on banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout captures the complexities of real life by providing a structure where 
the leadership phenomenon is embedded in the context of the sector and takes account of the 
actions and interactions of the global banking environment. 
 
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into ten chapters. 
Chapter 1 (above) outlines the thesis in terms of the research problem, the nature of 
the phenomenon and the research objectives. It briefly highlights the research methods and 
outlines the building of the substantive theory. 
Chapter 2 presents the integrative literature review and is divided into two parts: Part 
A provides an overview of the banking sector and then reviews the literature covering reasons 
for banking failures and crises. This part highlights the special features of banks and the 
complex issues faced by policy advisors tasked with preventing and dealing with banking 
failures, recapitalisations or bailouts. In Part B, extant theoretical and empirical leadership 
research is reviewed and shows the influence of strategic leadership, together with the shared 
leadership dynamics between the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout is a key but neglected issue. 
Chapter 3 (the first chapter in Part II) identifies the research problem within the 
complexity of the banking sector. It justifies the use of grounded theory as an appropriate 
methodology to answer the research question before discussing the development of the 
substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’. 
25 
 
Chapter 4 explains the rationale of the selection of the Strauss and Corbin method of 
grounded theory, selected as it provides flexible strategies that may be adapted as the inquiry 
proceeds. The chapter details how grounded theory was developed at the data analysis stage 
to allow for the incorporation of extant leadership theories in the development of the 
substantive theory. 
Chapter 5 identifies the research propositions and presents the building of the 
grounded theory model. It outlines the data collection and analysis process which in grounded 
theory is carried out simultaneously but is shown in this thesis sequentially for clarity. The 
chapter justifies the use of secondary data sources (annual reports, analyst conference 
transcripts, parliamentary, treasury and federal inquiries and press releases) to answer the 
research question and outlines the sampling process, which in grounded theory is used for 
theory construction rather than for ensuring a representative sample as per other 
methodologies. 
Chapter 6 represents the first chapter in Part III of the thesis and considers data 
analysis. The chapter begins with a discussion of methods appropriate for dealing with 
secondary data before justifying the use of discourse and document analysis. The chapter 
finishes with details of the open coding process and category development. 
Chapter 7 justifies the axial coding process together with the link between the open 
and axial coding stages. It describes how the data, which was fractured in the open coding 
stage, is reassembled to form the paradigm model. The chapter outlines this process, detailing 
the causal conditions, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies and 
consequences that make up the paradigm model of strategic leadership influence in banking. 
It then explains the next stages of theoretical sampling – relational and variational (outlined 
in Chapter 5) – before finishing with the details of how the leadership characteristics and 
traits were coded. 
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Chapter 8 shows the selective coding process which focusses on refining and 
integrating the categories determined at the axial coding stage (above) and represents the 
final stage of the grounded theory analysis. The chapter begins with the identification of the 
properties of the core category, outlining the process used to link it to the subcategories by 
further use of the paradigm model. In the selective coding stage, the axial coding categories 
of ‘banks’, ‘leaders’ and ‘decision making’ are linked to leadership characteristics through 
the paradigm model. The chapter details the final stage of the adapted grounded theory 
process, verifying how the findings from the analysed statements are linked to extant 
leadership theories. The chapter presents the findings of the data analysis together with the 
identification of the core category which is found to be ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in 
Banking’, and verifies it within the context of paradigm model. The chapter finishes with an 
outline of the substantive theory of the influence of strategic leadership on banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout which answers the research question ‘Are the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017)? The findings show a prevalence of 
leadership characteristics and styles within the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the 
sample banks, and find this is different in those banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or 
bailout. They also highlight the importance of the mix of leadership styles within the shared 
relationship between the leaders in each bank. 
Chapter 9 explores the relevance of the substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership 
Influence in Banking’ in the light of the extant leadership theories. Explaining the substantive 
theory in this way does not make a formal theory but formalises the substantive theory. The 
substantive theory is interpreted in terms of extant leadership styles, showing prevalent 
leadership styles in the sample banks. Significantly this interpretation finds leaders with 
characteristics suggesting a dominant style but also characteristics suggesting a secondary 
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style. For example, Jamie Dimon (Chair/CEO JP Morgan) is found to have dominant 
characteristics found in charismatic leadership and secondary ones found in transactional 
leadership. This pattern of dominant and secondary styles is replicated through the data set. 
The interpretation of the substantive theory with existing literature shows a clear difference in 
the leadership styles of those leaders in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, 
and those that did not. The chapter finishes by restating the substantive theory within the 
existing literature. 
Chapter 10 is the final chapter of the thesis and provides an overall summary together 
with the contributions and limitations of the study. The significance of the influence of the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout is found to be a significant and hitherto neglected issue in 
academic and policy discussions alike. The chapter argues that this thesis extends the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning strategic leadership by contributing to the 
‘heroic’ theories of charismatic, transformational, transactional, and significantly providing 
an empirical, longitudinal study of authentic leadership characteristics. It significantly 
contributes to the ‘post heroic’ theory of shared leadership through the analysis of the shared 
relationships at board level. It is also shown to contribute to the leadership and corporate 
governance literature showing the significance of the relationship between the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO when looking at risk factors for banking failure, recapitalisation 
or bailout. 
The thesis has practical and policy contributions showing the significance of 
leadership styles in the risk of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout and provides a new 
lens through which policy makers and regulators can view the issues of banking regulation 
and risk. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter covers the review of literature used to inform this study. Part A outlines the 
methodology for the review together with the context of the banking sector. It covers the causes 
of banking failures, financial crises and leadership in banking. Part B evaluates extant literature 
informing the theoretical basis of the research, covering strategic leadership/upper echelon 
theory and trait-based leadership perspectives. It finishes with the identification of the initial 
research question. 
 
Part A The Context of the Banking Sector, Banking Failures, Financial Crises and 
Leadership in Banking 
2.1 Introduction 
This part lays the foundation for the research. It begins by discussing the context of the banking 
sector before evaluating the extant literature concerning the causes of banking failure and 
financial crises. It presents the methodology for the review and identifies the influence of board 
leadership in the banking sector as an important but neglected issue. 
 
2.2 Methodology of the Literature Review 
The purpose of this part is to complete an integrated review of literature in order to understand 
the current scholarly and policy narrative concerning the reasons for banking failure. 
An integrated literature review systematically reviews, critiques and synthesises the 
representative literature on a topic in such a way that new frameworks and perspectives are 
generated (Torraco, 2005). It is characterised by a concentrated focus on a broad topical area 
(Callahan, 2014). 
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As this thesis is concerned with the influence of leadership characteristics of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, a broad 
review of literature covering streams of work on banking failures, banking crises and 
leadership in banking was conducted using an interdisciplinary approach (Shuck, 2011). As 
the narrative concerning banking failure is formed from both policy and academic sources, 
documents from both areas were considered. 
The search utilised the ScienceDirect, JSTOR, and Academy of Management 
databases, together with an independent search of key journal and policy publications using 
the keywords ‘banking failure’, ‘financial crises’, ‘leadership risk’, ‘strategic leadership in 
banking institutions’, ‘leadership in financial services’, ‘strategic leadership’ and ‘leadership 
characteristics and styles’. 
Articles were identified with the keywords in the abstracts, title, introduction and 
conclusions. The search was conducted in 2013 and again in 2017 to ensure currency of the 
literature. 
2.2.1 Article Identification 
The initial search of the databases generated several hundred articles for review. These were 
then screened for relevance by reviewing each against the keywords above (Torraco, 2005). 
Conference papers and those relating to specific industries outside financial services and 
banking were discarded and relevant articles saved for further reading. Screening of abstracts, 
introductions and conclusions for relevance to the study was completed and those papers 
found to be useful to the research were then analysed. For this stage, the collected literature 
was read and organised using open coding and constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) in order to identify distinct characteristics (Merriam, 2002). Influential works, 
definitions and contributions were noted in a field notebook (Shuck, 2011). The articles were 
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then synthesised and the following categories developed: ‘banking failure and causes’, 
‘leadership and risk management in banks’, ‘financial crises and causes’, ‘strategic 
leadership’, ‘trait-based leadership perspectives’ and ‘leadership theories’. 
The details of the search and findings are found in Table 2.1 below: 
Table 2.1: Details of the literature review search findings 
 
Categories from keyword search Reviewed 
number 
of 
articles 
Academic journals 
 Banking and financial 
institutions literature: 
  
1 Banking failure and causes 118 Organisational Studies; 
International Journal of Banking 
and Finance; Journal of Banking 
and Finance; Journal of 
International Financial Markets; 
Journal of Finance; Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking; 
Corporate Governance an 
International Review. 
2 Leadership and risk management 
in banks 
24 Journal of Finance; Journal of 
Financial Economics; Journal of 
Financial Services Research; 
Journal of Banking and Finance; 
Journal of International Money 
and Finance; Management 
Science; Journal of Financial 
Stability.  
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Categories from keyword search Reviewed 
number 
of 
articles 
Academic journals 
 Banking and financial 
institutions literature: 
  
3 Financial crises and causes  89 Journal of Banking and Finance; 
Journal of International Money 
and Finance; Journal of Monetary 
Economics; Journal of Financial 
Economics, Economic Policy; 
American Economic Review; 
Journal of Risk and Insurance; 
European Accounting Review; 
Corporate Governance an 
International Review. 
 Leadership literature:   
4 Strategic leadership  90 Leadership Quarterly; Academy 
of Management Journal; Journal 
of Management; Journal of 
Business Ethics; International 
Journal of Business; Strategic 
Management Journal; 
Leadership; Leadership and 
Organisational Studies. 
5 Trait-based leadership perspectives 162 Journal of Applied Psychology; 
Academy of Management 
Perspectives; Harvard Business 
Review; Leadership Quarterly; 
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Categories from keyword search Reviewed 
number 
of 
articles 
Academic journals 
 Banking and financial 
institutions literature: 
  
Organisational Culture; 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 
6 Leadership theories 352 Leadership Quarterly; Journal of 
World Business; Journal of 
Applied Psychology; International 
Review of Management and 
Business Research; Journal of 
Management. 
 Total 835  
 
2.3 Findings 
The review finds the current theoretical and empirical work covering board leadership 
influence on banking failure is scant. Articles covering banking failure rarely cover leadership 
influence, and empirical articles covering banking performance are limited by a narrow focus 
(i.e. the investigation of one leadership theory) or a narrow range (i.e. one country or a small 
sample of banks). Articles from leadership and management journals rarely review leadership 
in financial institutions, the literature from the financial journals consider regulation and moral 
hazard, the law journals consider corporate governance issues surrounding boards in financial 
institutions, but not specifically the influence of leadership characteristics. This highlights the 
need for a greater understanding of the influence of board leadership on banking failure. 
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Consistent with the integrated nature of this review, the following parts give a critical 
evaluation of the literature (Torraco, 2005). Part A considers the categories: banking failure 
and causes; leadership and risk management in banking failures; and causes of financial 
crises. Part B considers: strategic leadership; trait-based leadership perspectives and 
leadership theories. 
2.4 Context and Environment of the Banking Sector 
The basis of the banking and finance industry is the taking of risks in conditions of uncertainty 
(Carey, 2001). Banks are financial institutions licensed to receive deposits and make loans. The 
term ‘banking’ can be applied to a large range of financial institutions from those offering 
savings and loans to large money centre commercial banks in the USA, from smaller mutually 
owned building societies to the big four shareholder-owned banks in the UK to the 
regional/cooperative banks found in many European countries. The provision of savings and 
loans normally distinguishes banks from other financial institutions with the banks acting as 
intermediary between depositors and borrowers. Deposits are paid out on demand or at short 
notice and are liabilities for banks. Banks also manage assets created by lending. 
 
2.4.1 Types of Banks 
Changes in regulation around the world have led to the creation of different types of banks, 
distinguished by their by offerings. These include: 
Commercial/retail banks: These are concerned with managing withdrawals, receiving 
deposits, personal and business loans. Retail divisions deal directly with retail customers and 
include personal and savings accounts, credit cards, mortgages and other financing (such as 
cars), while corporate divisions deal with business and corporate clients offering loans and 
credit products, cash management, customised loans/leases, trade finance and commercial 
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real estate. Notably for this study, they include Lloyds bank (UK), Group BPCE (FRA) and 
Bank of Nova Scotia (CAN). 
Investment banks: The term ‘investment bank’ originated in the US and, under one of 
the four Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act (1933), they were separated from 
commercial banks. Commercial banks were not allowed to underwrite securities (with the 
exception of government and mutual bonds) and investment banks were prohibited from 
offering commercial banking services. Since its repeal in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, banks such as HSBC (UK) and BNP Paribas (FRA) offer both types of services. 
Investment banks provide corporate clients with services such as underwriting, 
assistance with mergers and acquisitions, brokers or financial advisors for institutional clients 
and act as financial intermediaries between securities issuers and the public. They also 
provide financial products such as equities, commodities and derivatives. They were involved 
in the development of financial products such as the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) in the 2000s, and more recently carbon emission 
trading and insurance-based projects. Their clients include corporations, pension funds, other 
financial institutions, governments and hedge funds. Many also have some retail operations. 
In this study, they include JP Morgan (US), Goldman Sachs (US), Credit Suisse (SUI) and 
Deutsche Bank (GER). 
Financial conglomerates: Deregulation of the stock market and financial sector in the 
UK on the 27 October 1986 ended the separation between those trading stocks and shares, 
and those who advised on them. It also allowed foreign firms to own UK brokers with 
resulting increases in competition. These changes led to the creation of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) which regulated the industry between 2001 and 2013 before the Financial 
Conduct Authority took over. This deregulation trickled around Europe and allowed the 
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creation of the financial conglomerates that now dominate the sector as a whole (Briault, 
2000). 
Financial conglomerates offer a range of services including: acting as intermediaries, 
providing insurance services, securities/corporate finance, fund management and investment 
products. Given this range, virtually all conglomerates are global (Heffernan, 2013). 
Multinational banks: These are defined as having cross-border, legally dependent 
branches or subsidiaries. Leading UK, French, US, German, Japanese and Chinese banks 
have a major presence in international banking. Swiss banks are also of international 
importance due to the leading position of the Swiss Franc coupled with the financial centres 
in Basel, Zurich and Geneva. Canadian banks also have extensive overseas coverage. These 
banks largely operate in the commercial/wholesale sector (with some retail presence, e.g. 
Citigroup). 
These institutions diversify their financial functions with global branches/subsidiaries. 
This, it was imagined, would make them less vulnerable to a downturn in one economy or 
region. The diversification of services also spreads risk as, for example, a decrease in 
securities may be accompanied by a rise in banking activity (Briault, 2000). However, 
diversified firms encountering problems may ‘go for broke’ adopting high-risk/return 
strategies (Staikouras and Wood, 2003). If their size and interconnectedness means a failure 
could trigger the collapse of other financial institutions worldwide, it is likely that they will 
be bailed out by governments. This in turn can lead to moral hazard, i.e. excessive 
expenditure due to eligibility for insurance benefits (Marshall, 1976, p. 880) with the result 
that systemic threat to the global financial system is increased. 
Universal banks: These offer a full range of banking services together with non-
banking offerings such as insurance, under one legal entity. Their activities include acting as 
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financial intermediaries, trading financial instruments (such as bonds, equity, currency) and 
their related derivatives, corporate advisory services, investment management and 
stockbroking. 
Germany is the home of universal banking with Deutsche Bank offering all the 
services above along with major shareholdings in Daimler-Benz and Allianz among others 
(Bank, 2013). Regulation is in place to restrict their activities in other countries; for example, 
in the UK, Italy and Switzerland banks are not allowed to hold major shareholdings in other 
corporations. 
Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions: In 2011, the Financial Stability 
Board, in consultation with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and national 
authorities identified a number of global systemically important financial institutions (G-
SIFI’s). To determine this cohort, a sample of banks reported a set of indices to their national 
authorities. These figures were then used to calculate scores for each bank with a ‘cut off’ 
identified. Banks above the cut off are deemed globally systemically important. The list is 
updated on a yearly basis. In this project, banks considered globally systemically important in 
2017 included: Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, Groupe Credit Agricole, HSBC, ING, JP Morgan Chase, 
Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe Generale, UBS, 
Unicredit and Wells Fargo. 
In sum, the banking industry is complex and dominated by large organisations. This 
thesis is concerned with leadership influence in the largest banks by market capitalisation 
(The Banker, 2017) and as such covers banks offering many of services identified above.  
2.5 Literature on Causes of Banking Failures 
2.5.1 Introduction 
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As seen above, banks have a critical role to play in the economies of every country and 
consequently the world economy as a whole (Carey, 2001). Banking failures leading to 
financial crises such as the GFC are both disruptive and costly with the 2008 banking crash 
wiping out more than US$11 trillion in household wealth (Commission and Commission, 
2011). Post the GFC, calls for better understanding of the causes and conditions of banking 
failure have led to a resurgence of the topic as a research domain (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Pretorius, 2009). The rest of this chapter considers the current academic and policy 
debate concerning the causes of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
 
2.5.2 Overview of the Causes of Banking Failure, Recapitalisation or Bailout 
The 1970s and 1980s saw a ‘sea change’ in banking theory, practice and regulation (Bryce et 
al., 2016) with globalisation, technological change, deregulation and growing competition 
bringing further evolutionary changes to the industry (Lee, Sameen and Cowling, 2015). Banks 
fail because they are unable to meet their financial obligations but the reasons for this are varied 
with existing academic studies unable to identify a standard reason. As the section above 
shows, there are many different types of banks from regional to multinational with a variety of 
offerings. The existing literature considers banking failures pre- the GFC, and reasons for 
failure during and post the GFC. While not giving an overall reason as to why banks fail, it 
does attempt to provide an independent analysis of what went wrong and what to do about it. 
Experts greet the news of failure with post mortems of what could have been done and the 
literature is predominantly quantitative, concerned with financial prediction models (using 
bankruptcy as an independent variable) based on past events (Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and 
Hamman, 2009; Ooghe, Spaenjers and Vandermoere, 2005). However, the credibility of these 
studies can be questioned for taking a normative view (about how banks ought to behave to 
avoid failure in the future), from a positive, descriptive account of what happened in the past. 
The rest of this section considers the nature of the banking and whether banks are different 
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from other organisations, before looking in detail at the existing reasons given for banking 
failures. 
 
2.5.3 Are Banks Different? 
Although financial institutions are broadly similar to non-financial firms in terms of having 
shareholders, debt holders and executives, banks differ from other industrial firms in terms of 
their capital structure, the composition of their balance sheets, and the complexity of their 
business structures (De Haan and Vlahu, 2016). Banks are further distinguished due to their 
central position in the economy and the resulting deposit guarantees given to them by their 
governments. 
In terms of differences of capital structure and composition of balance sheets, the 
simple theory of banking is that banks act as intermediaries between depositors and 
borrowers (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) so the banks’ asset side of the balance sheet consists 
of loans funded by deposits, non-deposit debt and equity. Investment banks and those 
offering financial products such as securitisation are intermediaries between investors and 
borrowers (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). 
Banks also differ due to their central position in the economy, both domestically and 
globally. After the recessions of the 1990s, and as the financial markets recovered, banks 
dealing in financial products began to extend their range such as using mortgage 
securitisation models for other more risky assets. Risk was transferred to the wider capital 
markets including pension funds, hedge funds and insurance companies. Structured security 
grew from US$767bn in 2001 to US$1.4 trillion in 2004 and US$2.7 trillion at the height of 
the market in December 2006 (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010). Guarantees by governments, 
regulation and deposit insurance of banks, while establishing confidence in the banking 
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system, also created issues with moral hazard with some banks engaging in excessive risk 
taking (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). 
The literature also suggests that financial institutions tend to be more opaque and have 
greater information asymmetries than non-financial companies (Furfine, 2001). Banks can 
change the mix and hide the quality of their assets quickly compared to non-financial firms 
and the opacity of banks during the financial crisis was found to be different compared to the 
ones before the crisis (Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran, 2013). 
Given that financial institutions are highly connected and the failure of one large bank 
can spread insolvency to other banks (Farhi and Tirole, 2012), the shocks in the banking 
system tend to be correlated and associated with bank runs, systemic crisis and 
macroeconomic uncertainty. 
2.5.4 Causes of Banking Failure 
Modern studies of institutional failure began with the use of financial ratios to predict 
bankruptcy (Beaver and Engel, 1996) with early warning prediction models using multivariate 
techniques to predict failure. However, the criterion for identifying banking failure can be an 
issue as many failure situations are resolved by merger or bailout (Martin, 1977). Alternative 
approaches compare the characteristics of the banks that failed with those that did not, and 
include a wide range of policy and formal reports to try to identify what went wrong (Jones 
and Pollitt, 2016). These reports often involve individual banks, such as Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and give some insight into the inner 
working of the banks and the decision makers within them (Salz and Collins, 2013; Walker, 
2009). 
On a macro level, recent literature is concerned with the economic conditions 
contributing to banking failures during the GFC, macro policies affecting liquidity and issues 
40 
 
with regulatory frameworks (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson and Lee, 2008). There is almost 
universal agreement that the causes of banking failures since 1999 were due to expansive 
monetary policy from 2000, together with falling interest rates, the housing boom and low 
interest rates (sending investors to look for yield elsewhere) (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; 
Kirkpatrick, 2009) but notably, Acharya also argues that the behaviour of the banks during 
this time was a significant factor. Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2012) consider why 
banks are prone to performing poorly during crises and look at stock returns linked to 
performance during 1998 as a predictor of performance and the probability of failure, 
questioning whether there is something unique that makes banks perform worse in a crisis 
(Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2012). 
Much of the literature is quantitative, using accounting and audit variables to consider 
the contributory role of sub-prime lending and loan securitisation (see section 2.5.6) with 
reliance in risky assets as causes of failure (Jin, Kanagaretnam and Lobo, 2011; Oshinsky and 
Olin, 2006). 
 
2.5.5 Financial Deregulation and Regulation 
The years preceding the GFC from 1999–2007 were the latest phase in the evolution of 
financial markets under de-regulation which began in the 1970s and finished with the repeal of 
the Banking Act (1933) by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999). More specifically, 
deregulation in the US, which continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, allowed banks to 
expand into neighbouring cities and to offer financial products and services that were 
previously reserved for non-banking financial institutions resulting in growing competition in 
the sector (Crotty, 2009). 
Recent UK policy focus has been on initiatives to rebuild trust and confidence in 
banks (Wheatley, 2012) including the ‘treating customers fairly’ initiative, but ‘given the 
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behaviour of rogue individuals, the inadequacies of large organisations such as RBS and 
HBOS and failings of the industry as a whole, as evidenced by scandals such as PPI and 
Libor’ (Bryce, Cheevers and Webb, 2013) there is need to go beyond risk culture and 
consider the influence of the leadership of the board. 
Cycles of deregulation accompanied by rapid financial innovation result in the growth 
of individual banks. This in turn stimulates ‘booms’ which threaten society when they end in 
financial crises (Crotty, 2009; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). The complex relationship 
between innovation and regulation is the subject of a growing body of work (Power, Ashby 
and Palermo, 2013) with innovation seen as a root cause of the banking failures during the 
GFC (Brummermeier, 2009). 
2.5.6 Innovation 
Financial innovation reduces costs, reduces risks and provides improved products and services 
(Frame and White, 2004). Deregulation from the 1970s–1990s saw many banks diversify into 
insurance and mutual fund sales, private banking and asset management (Tett, 2009) and this 
created an environment for financial innovation with the 1980s and 1990s seeing the 
development of derivative trading teams and the growth of financial products. This 
combination of innovation and deregulation led to ‘excessive risk taking’ (Commission and 
Commission, 2011) which was a major cited cause of the GFC (Crawford, 2011). It is a 
fundamental feature of financial innovation to focus on augmenting marketability. The more 
intertwined the banks and financial institutions are, the more opportunistic decision making 
and herding behaviour is seen, resulting in market forces at odds with financial stability (Boot, 
2011). 
Initially financial innovation in the form of derivatives were thought to be beneficial, 
improving efficiency by sharing risk (Merton, 1995) with Ben Bernanke suggesting that the 
increasing sophistication and depth of financial markets promotes economic growth by 
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allocating capital were it can be most productive (Bernanke, 2007). Since the GFC, however, 
‘financial innovation’ are two words that should strike fear into investors’ hearts (Krugman, 
2007). 
Despite an active academic and policy debate on the role of financial innovation in 
banking failures, there is a paucity of empirical studies investigating this issue mainly due to 
lack of data (Frame and White, 2004, 2014). 
True to form, the policy response to the GFC was to re-regulate, with proposed limits 
on the size of banks and capital structure (Thakor, 2012). Given how complex, global and 
interconnected financial institutions have become, this cycle of regulation, deregulation and 
re-regulation resulting in boom and bust represents a key policy issue (Gofman, 2017; 
Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
The post GFC crisis reforms have had the unintended consequences of spurring the 
rise of new financial technologies (i.e. Fintech 3.0) and the growth of the shadow banking 
sector (Arner, Barberis and Buckley, 2015). 
‘Fintech’ covers digital innovations and technically enabled business model 
innovations including crypto currencies such as bitcoin, blockchain, new digital advisory and 
trading systems, peer to peer (P2P) lending, crowdfunding and mobile payment systems 
(Philippon, 2016). Unintended consequences of the Basel III regulations (which require the 
upward revision of capital adequacy requirements), was a squeeze on capital for small-
/medium-sized companies who then turned to P2P lending platforms for credit. This area now 
plays a fundamental role in the functioning of finance and infrastructure (Arner, Barberis and 
Buckley, 2015). 
Shadow banking includes the market in residential mortgage originators which has 
shifted from traditional banks to non-depository institutions which fall outside the increasing 
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regulatory and legal burden on banks operating in this area. This is illustrated by the case of 
Quicken Loans (the third largest mortgage lender in 2015) who process online mortgage 
applications with no need for a loan officer using big data to screen borrowers (Philippon, 
2016). The main banks still hold c. 30–50% of originated loans on their balance sheets 
whereas the shadow banks work almost entirely through securitised loans and originate to 
distribute, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US playing a dominant role in 
guaranteeing the shadow banking loans (Buchak et al., 2018). 
‘Blockchain’ is a digital ledger of economic transactions that can be programmed to 
record financial transactions and also almost anything of value. Blockchain uses computer 
algorithms to validate transactions and notably major banks including Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Barclays now have blockchain labs. IBM 
suggest that 66% of banks will have commercial blockchain by 2020 and Goldman Sachs 
now see themselves as a technology company as well as a bank (Guo and Liang, 2016). The 
emerging literature on blockchain comments on the permission-less and self-governing 
characteristics of the industry with calls for alternative regulation to avoid the next banking 
crises (Guo and Liang, 2016; Philippon, 2016). 
As shown above, the literature concerning new financial innovations is scant and post 
the GFC, Fintech 3.0 is posing new challenges to regulators on the risk/benefit of new 
innovation (Arner, Barberis and Buckley, 2015). By considering the influence of the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on banking 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout, this thesis provides an alternative lens through which to 
view the banks’ response to Fintech 3.0, shadow banking and blockchain in the effort to avert 
the next set of banking failures and resulting systemic financial crises. 
These events followed deregulation of the UK financial services industry in 1986 (the 
Big Bang) and combined to allow the growth of the ‘mega’ banks in the US and Europe. 
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This review of the context of the banking sector together with extant causes of 
financial crises have identified the importance of regulation, deregulation and financial 
innovation on the growth of the banking industry. Although deregulation in the UK began in 
1986, the effect of the repeal of the Banking Act (1933) by the Financial Services 
Modernisation Act (1999) known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), led to growth 
strategies characterised by merger and acquisition post the recessions of the 1990s. It was 
also the year of the introduction of the European currency, together with the beginnings of the 
Financial Services Action Plan which proposed market freedom by 2005, both giving further 
stimulation to the integration of markets and increased competitiveness. This suggests 1999 
to be a sensible start point to consider the influence of leadership in the decisions that may 
ultimately lead to the bank’s failure or need for recapitalisation or bailout. The review also 
highlights a number of cited reasons for why banks fail, including excessive risk taking 
linked to deregulation and financial innovation. The next section considers the role of 
leadership in banking failures. 
2.5.7 Leadership and Banking Failure 
The previous section considered the macro approach and reasons for banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. This section looks at the literature concerning the leadership within 
the boards of banks and the effect on banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. On a micro 
level, the boards of large banks face challenging, competitive conditions where collapses and 
wrongdoing occur when good board governance is lacking (Alexander, Coleman and Li, 2006). 
The literature on leadership in banking in focussed mainly at management and team 
level, considering performance rather than failure and is narrow in its focus, e.g. the impact 
of the characteristics of members of the management board of German banks on portfolio risk 
is considered by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), and transformational leadership 
influence on 218 financial service teams in a multinational bank in Nigeria is considered by 
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Schaubroeck, Lam and Cha (2007). Emerging literature examines the relationships between 
board process and corporate financial risk with McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod (2013) 
interviewing 141 company chairs and finding board cohesiveness leading to less risk of 
corporate failure (McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod, 2013), but does not consider the influence 
of leadership characteristics on failure. The literature concerning board leadership in banks 
linked to failure is generally divided into two themes: literature considering the power of the 
board and the CEO; and literature considering the relationships between the board, corporate 
governance and risk. Each theme is explored below. 
The power of the board and the CEO: Emerging empirical literature begins to 
attribute banking failures to a failure of management (Birkinshaw, 2010) but the literature 
generally focusses on the interviewing of banking staff with notable contributions from 
Fleming and Spicer (2014) who report on the results of 57 interviews with frontline staff in 
11 retail banks, finding an aggressive sales culture to be a major contributor to the failure of 
the bank. Liu (2015) looks in detail at the behaviour of board members in failed bank 
Northern Rock, bailed out banks RBS and Barclays, together with Lloyds and HSBC in the 
period 2004–2009 and finds evidence of greed, recklessness and dishonesty being 
contributory factors in failure and bailout in both the retail and investment sides of the banks 
during the run up to the 2008 crisis (Liu, 2015). This behaviour is also found in the 
introduction of a sales-driven banking culture (Fortado and Fadil, 2014). 
Literature considering the power of the CEO and subsequent impact on corporate 
performance is found to be linked to the influence the CEO has over crucial decisions 
(Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005). This paper focusses on CEO power and organisational 
variables finding them to be an important factor in the consequences of firm performance, but 
does not consider leadership characteristics and only considers 336 US firms in the Fortune 
500 (1992–1999). Leader egos, together with the ambiguity and complexity that characterise 
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the tasks at the top of the organisation, are also found to impact performance (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2007). 
The quality of the bank management’s decision making as a key contributor to 
institutional collapse is acknowledged in early work looking at the rise in US banking failures 
during the 1980s (Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1994), but does not consider leadership styles. 
Later work looking at the influence of the CEO in banking culture is considered by Fraser 
(2015) who interviewed approximately 120 employees of RBS finding the bank was driven 
by the ambition and hubris of its CEO Fred Goodwin, which led to the unwillingness to listen 
to any voices raised against his strategy. This view is supported in Martin (2013) who 
discusses how a ‘previously modest, Presbyterian, cautious Scottish institution … went bust’ 
(p. 2) and again blames CEO Fred Goodwin, but also the (then) Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) for lack of regulatory control (Martin, 2013). While useful, the research only considers 
the role of the CEO up to the bank’s failure rather than post bailout and is confined to just 
one bank therefore limiting its usefulness in understanding the sector as a whole. 
In sum, the literature considering the power of the board concentrates on the role of 
the CEO and therefore misses the influence of other notable board members such as the Chair 
and the CFO. The literature is generally concerned with overall performance rather than 
failure and, due to access issues, is confined to empirical studies involving bank staff rather 
than board members. This supports the need for an empirical study into the influence of the 
leadership of the wider board on banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
Relationship of the board, corporate governance and risk: The literature shows 
general findings that financial institutions with efficient governance make better decisions 
and are less likely to fail in a crisis (Graham and Narasimhan, 2004). However, this view is 
challenged by emerging literature considering bank performance during the GFC which 
includes analyses of the influence of CEO incentives and finds no evidence of better 
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performance (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2012). Beltratti and Stulz (2012) consider the 
question: ‘Why did some banks perform better in the GFC than others?’ Their research is 
wide ranging in its use of an international sample of 98 banks, and found that those with more 
shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). 
However, Erkens, Hung and Matos’s (2010) study looked at 296 financial firms in 30 
countries finding those with independent boards and higher institutional owners performed 
worse, arguing that this is due to the board taking more risks (Erkens, Hung and Matos, 
2010). This view is supported by Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) who looked at compliance 
with the UK corporate governance code and found that board independence was the least 
effective monitoring mechanism and was negatively associated with the performance of the 
board (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012). 
Policy makers have recently started to question the appropriateness of corporate 
governance regulations applied to financial institutions with recent policy documents (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008; FSA, 2008; Walker, 2009) comparing risk 
management frameworks outlined in corporate governance structures (Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid, 2012). Financial institutions that are focussed on high rates of return may use 
structure to minimise managerial self-interest or employ obscure and sophisticated financial 
instruments to engage in risky lending activities without the appropriate risk assessment 
(Morgan, 2002; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015). 
The sector as a whole was criticised for its role in the GFC with weak corporate 
governance identified as a major cause (Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, most studies of board 
effectiveness exclude financial firms from their samples (De Haan and Vlahu, 2016) and as a 
result we know little about the effectiveness of governance within banking (Adams and 
Mehran, 2012). The literature that does exist is scattered in diverse journals lacking cross 
references (De Haan and Vlahu, 2016) with the IMF review (Laeven and Valencia, 2013) of 
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extant literature on bank performance finding the research is largely concerned with the 
impact of corporate governance and risk. This leads De Haan and Vlahu (2016) to call for the 
need for better knowledge on how banks are governed, arguing this to be crucial in order to 
evaluate recent changes in regulation. This thesis answers this call by providing a new lens 
through which to view and understand the way banks are governed. 
2.5.8 The Influence of Boards in Banks 
Board governance has received increasing global academic and policy attention in the 
aftermath of the GFC with the Walker Report (2009), the Netherlands Banking Code 
(Netherlands Banking Association, 2010), and the Federal Reserve (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2010) all considering the qualifications of the board members, and 
the alignment of director’s pay to protect bank stability. 
Collapses of financial institutions and misconduct within the financial sector illustrate 
that highly developed financial systems are exposed to systemic risks, weaknesses and 
wrongdoings when good governance is lacking (Alexander, Coleman and Li, 2006) with 
recent policy involvement from the regulators and central banks stressing the need for 
effective corporate governance practices to guard against future banking failures (Zagorchev 
and Gao, 2015). 
Existing studies on corporate governance focus on non-financial firms but there are 
limited studies concentrating on banks (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Caprio, Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; De Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 2005). Empirical studies explore the board as a 
governance structure (Beasley, 1996) and the effect of bank boards on corporate value (De 
Andres et al., 2012) suggesting board size, composition and activity affect bank effectiveness. 
This is contrary to findings in non-financial organisations which show a positive effect on 
overall value (Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
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Recently, banking regulators and central banks have stressed the need for effective 
corporate governance practices in order to avoid future financial crises (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2010; 
Kirkpatrick, 2009) with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) stating that 
better understanding and supervision of corporate governance is essential to guarantee future 
bank performance increasing the clear need for more research on bank boards and their 
linkages (Wilson et al., 2010) 
Corporate governance, with strong management oversight and better board practices, 
is required to avoid excessive risk taking linked to performance. In banks, this has important 
implications for society as a whole (Zagorchev and Gao, 2015). The literature concerning the 
influence of the role of directors and the relationship between the directors is scant, and 
generally confined to impact on profitability rather than failure (Erkens, Hung and Matos, 
2012). 
Bank governance has been the centre of a resurgence of literature and heated policy 
debate since the GFC (Fraser, 2015) with the IMF conducting a review of extant literature 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2013) and arguing that research largely looks at the impact of 
corporate governance on risk and considers board governance through a select few 
government mechanisms in isolation (Fund, 2014). 
2.5.9 Risk and Risk Culture 
The cited reasons for the GFC include failures of risk management systems due to inadequacies 
in corporate governance, moribund regulation and ineffective board oversight (Kirkpatrick, 
2009). The aftermath of the GFC has seen a growth in both academic and policy literature 
exploring the issues of organisational and risk culture (Ring et al., 2016). Many financial 
institutions are primarily focussed on higher rates of return, which can lead to an engagement 
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with risky lending or innovative activities without appropriate risk assessment (Morgan, 2002). 
The literature considering risk taking in banks is scant, mainly analysing governance, 
share ownership, CEO compensations and operational risk control (Chernobai, Jorion and 
Yu, 2011; Fortin, Goldberg and Roth, 2010), but does not consider the influence of leadership 
characteristics on risk-taking behaviour and its relationship to banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In sum, the dominant theme of the extant literature covering banking failures suggests that 
dominant causes are a combination of global complexity, financial innovation and moribund 
financial regulation (Crawford, 2011). While these issues are undoubtedly a factor, they do not 
tell the whole story. The mainly quantitative studies focus narrowly on failure, rather than 
including recapitalisations and bailouts. The further weakness is the failure to look in detail at 
the influence of board leadership in the banks at the time. Emerging literature (Dewing and 
Russell, 2014; Liu, 2015),  begins to explore these issues, but there is no comprehensive, robust 
study to date. This lack of research is a barrier to understanding the nature of banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. 
This thesis takes the view that if each crisis is met with the same pattern of popular 
fury with financiers, increased regulation, followed by deregulation and ‘back to business as 
usual’ then the cycle of boom and bust will be repeated (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). It is 
only by looking at the causes of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout through a different 
lens that new paradigms to avoid future banking crises can be formed. 
The review finds that leadership influence in banking failures is a neglected issue. 
Having considered the extant literature to date, an initial research question is: ‘Are the 
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leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing 
factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
As such, Part B of this literature review will consider the extant leadership literature 
relating to boards. 
Part B Leadership Literature 
2.7 Leadership Literature: An Overview 
Part A of this chapter has outlined the methodology for this integrative literature review, 
provided the context for the study, considered the extant literature on banking failures and 
proposed the initial research question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout?’ 
This section deals with the leadership literature and covers: strategic leadership, 
leadership characteristics and traits, and extant leadership theories. As such, it begins with an 
overview of leadership and conceptual issues. 
2.7.1 Evolution of Leadership Theories and Conceptual Issues 
The theoretical study of leadership began over a hundred years ago when Thomas Carlyle’s 
‘Great Man’ theory argued that the concept that leadership was for people with extraordinary 
traits and characteristics taking a leader-centric view that the characters and personality of the 
leader are central to the matter (McCleskey, 2014). Since then, a vast and bewildering array of 
literature has evolved, through the consideration and development of leadership as learned 
behaviours (Yukl, 2008) with the traditional theories of trait, behavioural, contingency and 
situational approaches focussing on the traits and behaviours of leaders (Carsten et al., 2010). 
This led to arguments of a ‘cult’ of leadership, whereby leaders seek to benefit themselves 
rather than their followers (Bones, 2012) and the outcomes of the organisation can be over 
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attributed to the one ‘heroic’ leader at the apex of the organisation (Meindl, Ehrlich and 
Dukerich, 1985). From the late 1990s, this model was challenged by a ‘post heroic’ perspective 
on the basis that changes in technology and regulation made it increasingly difficult for one 
person to have all the answers (Cohen, Chang and Ledford, 1997; Dutton, Glynn and Spreitzer, 
2008; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Tichy and Cohen, 1997). 
Conceptualising strategic leadership has been a constant challenge (Pye, 2005) with 
Bennis noting that leadership is like the Yeti, with tracks everywhere but it being nowhere in 
sight (Bennis and Nanus, 1985). However, when talking about leaders, we intuitively 
describe them in terms of characteristics, traits and skills (Achua and Lussier, 2013) with 
Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) stating that ‘in leadership, character matters’ (p. 193). 
The above literature review on banking failures finds that leadership influence in this 
area is a neglected issue and suggests the initial research question: ‘Are the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ As such, the literature concerning strategic 
leadership, characteristics and traits of leaders, and extant leadership theories will be 
considered. 
2.8 Overview of Strategic Leadership 
Boal and Hooijberg (2000) argue that since the 1980s, leadership literature has undergone a 
rejuvenation and metamorphosis (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000). This coincided with the growth 
in the major economies of the world and the subsequent development of global companies 
including financial institutions. The leadership literature of the time shows an emphasis on the 
changing environment and a requirement for a new set of skills, considering a more strategic 
view. This thesis is concerned with the board leadership influence in large banking institutions 
pre-, during and after failure, recapitalisation or bailout, as distinct from crises leadership. Its 
contribution is to look for prevalent leadership characteristics and styles in board members, 
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consider the interactions between differing leadership styles within the shared leadership of the 
board, and identify whether the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO are different in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and those 
which did not, during the research period (1999–2017). This is undertaken through the lens of 
leadership. 
As such the review of leadership literature begins with a consideration of leadership 
styles at board level and the development of strategic leadership and upper echelon theories. 
It then goes on to look at the leadership theories in general, starting with the ‘heroic’ theories, 
which seek to identify a universal theory of what leadership is, focussing on leadership traits 
(Stogdill, 1974) and the characteristics of the leaders. Within the ‘heroic’ tradition, the review 
considers: ‘trait theories’, due to the recent resurgence in literature (Colbert et al., 2012; 
Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka, 2009; Nichols and Cottrell, 2014); ‘transactional leadership’ 
(Forrester and Clegg, 1991); ‘transformational leadership’ (Bass and Riggio, 2006); and 
‘charismatic leadership’ (House and Howell, 1992). 
The behaviour of ‘rogue traders, the requirement for bailout and recapitalisation of 
banks during the financial crises and subsequent scandals over mis-selling PPI and market 
manipulation (LIBOR) have renewed calls for a more ethical approach, and a wish to put the 
trust back into banking.9 In response to this, this literature review also considers the 
‘charismatic dark side’ of leadership (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Conger, 1990). 
In further response to these calls, and in analysing the leadership characteristics of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO at the top of the organisation, this review then considers 
the literature on ‘authentic leadership’ where the pattern of leader behaviour draws upon 
positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate (Walumbwa et al., 2008). 
                                                          
9 rumprojects.co.uk/publication/financial-services-17 
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The theories above are all based around the ‘heroic’ concept of leadership, and are 
essentialist in their outlook (Bolden and Kirk, 2009) and largely positivist in their approach 
(Grint, 1997). Alternatively, the emerging ‘post heroic’ theories see leadership in terms of 
collaboration between two or more persons (Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007). As 
this research is concerned with the leadership characteristics and styles of a triad of board 
members (Chair or Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) within the complex, uncertain, volatile and 
demanding context of the banking sector, the review then moves on to consider the emerging 
literature, challenging the perspective of unitary command (Pearce and Manz, 2005) and 
arguing that leadership is too demanding and complex to be undertaken by one person 
(Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007). The concept of shared leadership as it applies to 
top management teams is considered in order to understand leadership in terms of 
collaboration between two or more people (Pearce and Sims, 2000). In considering those 
banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, it contributes to the work of Lambert 
(2002) who argues that shared leadership can help prevent immoral actions as co-leaders can 
control each other. 
2.8.1 Strategic Board Leadership 
Since the 1980s, the corporate world has changed significantly, but fundamentally much still 
rests on human relationships and human judgement, with the relationship between the Chair 
and the CEO standing out as critical to effective board conduct (Pye, 2013). In the decades 
following the deregulation of financial markets in the UK and the enactment of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (1999) (repealing the Banking Act 1933), leading a bank has become a more 
demanding, unrelenting job with enormous pressures and responsibilities (Kirkpatrick and 
Locke, 1991). The effectiveness of the leadership at the top of the company is considered to be 
the central reason why some perform better than others (Hewitt, 2012) with Grint (2011) wryly 
suggesting that the leader is also responsible for steering the corporate ship ‘straight onto the 
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rocks of catastrophe’ (p. 5). 
The concept of ‘strategic leadership theory’ and its antecedent, ‘upper echelon’ 
theory, focus on executives who have overall responsibility for the organisation (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick and Cannella, 2009) and are based on the principle that they ultimately account for 
what happens to the organisation (Hambrick, 2015). It has grown in importance in recent 
years, with early researchers attempting to understand the role of human factors in strategic 
choice, organisational design and performance (Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney, 2005). 
The literature is generally concerned with ‘what a leader does’, rather than how leadership is 
conceptualised (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000) and with the leadership ‘of’ organisations rather 
than the leadership ‘in’ organisations (Hunt, 1991). Roe (2014) considers strategic leadership 
to be a field in its own right and separate to the other leadership theories experienced within 
organisations (Roe, 2014), while Boal and Hooijberg (2000) consider how ‘new’ and 
‘emergent’ leadership theories can be integrated within the ‘essence’ of strategic leadership 
(p. 515). 
Literature questioning whether strategic leadership matters began in the late 1970s 
and 1980s (Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985; Pfeffer, 1977) with Day and Lord (1988) 
undertaking a comprehensive review of the empirical research to date, concluding that top-
level leaders have a direct and significant impact on organisational performance (Day and 
Lord, 1988), although Hunt (1991, p. 545) suggests ‘some do, some don’t and more should’. 
However, the traditional focus has been on demographic and background characteristics of 
CEOs with limited success in predicting a firm’s performance (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000; 
Cannella and Monroe, 1997; Crossan, Vera and Nanjad, 2008; Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2009), and there has been limited integration between theories with the exception 
of ‘charismatic’ and transformational leadership (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999). This lack of 
research has prompted a special edition of Leadership Quarterly designed to address the 
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critical weakness seen in the lack of integration connecting strategic leadership theories, and 
in particular how leader character impacts strategic decision making, risk-taking initiatives 
and firm performance.10 
The literature considering executives personalities and how they can affect 
organisational outcomes is considered (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). In Western societies, our 
leaders are often seen as either heroes or villains lauded as part of the solution or for the 
success of the organisation and blamed for the failure (Collinson, 2011). The banking crises 
and scandals over the last 18 years have led to greater interest and scrutiny of those leading 
the banking organisations, with a public fascination with the vilified characters, such as Fred 
(the Shred) Goodwin (Royal Bank of Scotland CEO 1999–2008) and Dick Fuld (Lehman 
Brothers CEO 1994–2008). The early critics (Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985) suggest 
this is an exaggerated view of what leaders can achieve, arguing that in complex 
organisations, the contribution of leaders is inevitably constrained and closely tied to external 
factors outside their control, with Miller and Dröge (1986) suggesting that ‘no insights into 
the degree of challenge will affect the task conduct, strategic actions or performance’ (p. 
472). Bones (2012) questions that if strategic leaders are not capable of making the right 
decisions, then is strategic leadership needed at all, and argues that the modern leader is 
‘egoistical, blind to their own faults and surrounded by people created in their own image’ (p. 
7). 
By analysing the leadership characteristics and styles of the board leaders in banks 
and contextualising them in terms of extant leadership theories, this research addresses these 
issues and makes new advances in the field of strategic leadership, shedding light on the 
                                                          
10 https://www.journals.elsevier.com/the-leadership-quarterly/call-for-papers/strategic-leadership-and-strategic-management 
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currently unanswered question: ‘Why do some strategic leaders in banks lead more 
successfully than others in the same highly complex environment?’ 
Strategic leadership is typically the role of a dominant coalition of people who occupy 
positions at the top of an organisation (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 2002). As financial institutions exist in a volatile, dynamic and 
complex environment, the make-up of the board varies considerably; some boards include 
chief operations officers, some chief risk officers. In order to ensure consistency across the 
subject area, this study looks at those members who appear on every banking group board; 
namely, the Chair (or Chair/CEO combined), the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
Chief Finance Officer (CFO). The shared influence of this ‘leadership triad’ is the leadership 
powerhouse behind the direction of the company. 
With this power comes responsibility and a unique ability to be able to change or 
reinforce existing action patterns within organisations. There is an assumption in the early 
literature that executives largely understand their strategic situations and will logically pursue 
actions from the context of the situation they face (Porter, 1996). This is challenged by 
emerging literature suggesting that executives now have too many stimuli and are under too 
much pressure to comprehensively, objectively and accurately weigh up situations 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney, 2005). In this case, the Chair–CEO relationship 
becomes pivotal for effective board performance (Boal and Schultz, 2007; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Pye, 2013). 
The extant strategic leadership literature shows three competing views: The first sees 
it as a product of a leader’s values, experiences and personalities (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
Hambrick, 2015; Miller and Dröge, 1986); the second suggests models and frameworks 
through which the strategic leaders can practise their craft (Ansoff, 1969; Drucker, 2012; 
Porter, 2005); and the third concentrates on what strategic leaders do (Kotter and Cohen, 
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2012; Mintzberg, 1987). There is agreement that strategic leaders influence the organisations 
they run, but the literature is ‘incomplete’ with ‘inconsistent explanations of strategic 
behaviour’ (Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney, 2005, p. 472) which largely ignore the links 
between strategic leadership, leadership theories and the role that styles play in the success 
and failure of the organisations, leaving important issues unaddressed. 
There is agreement that the complexity, turbulence and extraordinary changes during 
the 1980s and 1990s led to the rapid development of an ultra-competitive global economy 
(Hitt, Ireland and Santoro, 2004). As early as 1963, Cyert and March argued that executives 
face too many stimuli and are under too much pressure to objectively weigh up situations 
(Cyert and March, 1963) with Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff (2010) suggesting that a 
collective approach to leadership is more practical (Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 
2010). Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that leaders rely on personal experiences, and so 
the direction of the company becomes a direct function of the values, experiences and 
cognitive abilities of those at the top. They suggest that a complex and unknown world is 
interpreted differently by different people. This can be seen in the differences in perception of 
what it takes to succeed in global banking between John Strumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo in 
2007, who stated: ‘In financial services, if you want to be the best in the industry, you first 
have to be the best in risk management and credit quality’ (Fargo, 2007) and the statement by 
Chairman Marcel Ospel of UBS in 2005 suggesting that ‘success in the financial services 
industry depends on expertise and the talent of human beings’.11 
For Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) ‘upper echelon theory’, the leader’s perception of 
the situation ‘combines with his/her values to provide the basis for the strategic choice’ (p. 
195) and it is the leader’s biases and perception of the ‘right thing to do’ that creates the 
strategic decision. This was later expanded to examine the psychological make-up of top 
                                                          
11 UBS Annual report and accounts 2005 
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managers and how this influences strategic decision making (Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2009). 
The findings from Part A above suggest the banking industry is more complex than in 
other industries therefore requiring more than the experience combined with biases and 
perception advocated by Hambrick (2007). Experience in the sector does not always produce 
the ‘right’ strategy; for example, Dick Fuld (Chair/CEO Lehman Brothers, 1994–2008) 
started his career as in intern in 1969 and only ever worked in the one bank, taking over as 
Chair/CEO in 1994. His experiences led to successful strategic decisions for 14 years 
returning over US$4bn in earnings at the end of 2006. If making the ‘right decision’ was 
based just on biases and perceptions then there is no explanation for why he then made 
‘wrong’ decisions which led to the collapse of Lehman in 2008. Alternatively, Jamie Dimon, 
CEO and Chairman of JP Morgan, has been in post since 2005. Although JP Morgan have 
been embroiled in scandal, their strategic choices centre on risk evaluation and the need for a 
‘fortress balance sheet’ (Tett, 2009) which may have contributed to their successes over the 
last 13 years. 
This review therefore suggests that ‘strategic leadership’ is not enough on its own to 
determine the leadership influence on success and failure in organisations, and that more 
detail on the leadership characteristics and styles of those at the top of the organisation also 
play a key role. 
2.9 Leadership Characteristics and Traits 
The leadership characteristics and traits of those at the strategic apex of the organisation are 
considered in the literature with activities focussing on making decisions, creating and 
communicating a vision and infusing ethical value systems (Mintzberg, 1987; Selznick, 2011; 
Zaccaro, 1996). 
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The literature is generally confined to consideration of the ability and power of the 
executives to make important decisions, and focusses on the vision of executives on a 
fundamental level, suggesting their characteristics and mind set play a key role in these 
decisions (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). For Gill (2011), strategic leadership 
involves ‘showing the way through strategies, informed by shared values, in the pursuit of a 
vision and purpose’ (p. 227), whereas for Rowe (2001) this must incorporate both visionary 
and managerial leadership behaviours with the CEO, in particular, seen as pivotal to the 
success of the company (Rowe, 2001). Notably, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (1999) suggest 
that ‘visionary leadership is transformational by nature and as such quite different from 
planning which is a managerial or a transactional process’ (p. 9). It is apparent, however, that 
strategic leaders need to be capable of wearing many hats and performing multiple roles for 
their organisation, together with the ability to recognise and exploit opportunities, all of 
which can add considerable value to an organisation (Boal and Schultz, 2007; Yukl, 2008). 
Hamburger (2000) argues that the vision of the strategic leader is a false one, 
suggesting it is a narrative aimed at producing the most efficiency from the organisation as a 
means of motivation, ultimately resulting in a dysfunctional relationship between the leader 
and organisation (Hamburger, 2000). However, Rouse (2015) cited in Haycock (2012) 
notably suggests that the vision created by the strategic leader varies according to the 
leadership style and these differences allow the organisation to adapt or remain competitive 
in a changing economic and technological climate. 
The influence of strategic leaders on the long-term performance of the organisation is 
generally considered to be a key determining factor (Wheelan and Hunger, 2012), with 
motivation of both employees and executives found to be linked to the successful 
performance of companies (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983; Rowe, 2001), although Hambrick, 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2005) find that aspirations vary widely arguing this is due to 
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personality factors, such as the need for achievement (Hambrick, Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2005; Miller and Dröge, 1986). Performance-related bonus culture is considered in part A 
above to be a causal factor in banking failures and the alignment between motivation and 
executive rewards are also shown to be influencing factors in performance through stock 
options and bonuses (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Raviv and Landskroner, 2010). Roe (2014) 
argues that this can lead to the ‘tsunami of greed’ (p. 36) seen in the run up to the GFC. From 
a performance view, there was an element of ‘winning the game’ which can be seen in the 
competition between Bob Diamond (CEO Barclays) and Fred Goodwin (CEO RBS) during 
the sale of ABN AMRO in 2006, but this does not explain why some leaders take more risks 
than others, and why some joined in with the ‘games’ while others watched from the side 
lines. Bass (2008) argues that the role of the CEO in the 21st century is about ‘defeating the 
competition’ (p. 682), but Hamburger (2000) suggests that the era where CEOs possess 
dominance over a company has passed. 
What is clear from the literature is that an environment such as the banking sector, 
which is characterised by hyper-competitiveness combined with a focus on innovation, needs 
leaders with flexibility in order to take advantage of future opportunities (Sanchez and Heene, 
1997). 
The contextual reviews of leadership in the literature consider characteristics and 
traits but when focussed on executive board level, attention to the personal characteristics of 
the Chair and CEO, along with board relationships has been sparse, with the studies that do 
exist taking only ‘charismatic’, ‘transformational’ and ‘visionary’ perspectives in isolation 
(Crossan, Vera and Nanjad, 2008; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010b). The 
comprehensive study of 850 CEOs in the largest US corporations by Khurana (2002) found 
that CEOs of corporates are specifically sought for their charisma, fame and force of 
personality (Khurana, 2002). They need to be able to impress analysts and the business 
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media. This can been seen by contrasting the media and analyst coverage of Bob Diamond 
when he took over as the CEO of Barclays to that of Antony Jenkins, his successor, a so-
called ‘Captain Mainwaring’12 bank manager. The banking leader favoured by politicians and 
the public may not be the same as those required by the financial markets and shareholders. 
By considering the influence of board leadership characteristics and styles in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout, this research makes a contribution to academic work in this area. 
As outlined above, board characteristics in general have featured in the extant 
research into corporate governance (Musteen, Datta and Kemmerer, 2010) with the 
characteristics of CEOs thought to contribute to success (Wood and Vilkinas, 2005). 
However, due to changing business environments and partly due to an evolution of thinking, 
the leadership role of the CEO has arguably entered a new era (Conger and Hunt, 1999) 
requiring CEOs with character, integrity, courage, tenacity, learning ability and HR skills (De 
Vries and Florent-Treacy, 2002). Brower, Schoorman and Tan (2000) argue that this new era 
calls for more rational dialogue with new skills needed to cope with a fiercely competitive 
global economy, a highly educated workforce and rapidly changing business technology. 
However, the strategic leadership literature focusses on demographic and background 
characteristics of CEOs, which has limited success when linked to corporate performance 
(Boal and Hooijberg, 2001; Cannella and Monroe, 1997). A key factor for this research is 
how this can and should be applied to the global economy’s largest banks. 
In sum, the extant literature takes the view that strategic leadership is more than the 
direct function of the values, experiences and cognitive abilities of those at the top argued by 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Mason (2007). Complexity and chaos in 21st-century 
organisations suggest that strategic leaders need to take an approach that considers strategic 
definition, strategic thinking, strategic alignment and strategic enactment (Finkelstein and 
                                                          
12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/dadsarmy/ 
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Peteraf, 2007), interestingly combined with a transformational leadership approach (Bass, 
1985) to be successful. As this thesis is concerned with the influence of the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout, it will not consider the ‘how’ approach of strategic leadership but 
will instead concentrate on the influence and prevalence of differing leadership 
characteristics and styles on the success or failure of the banks. 
Boal and Hooijberg (2000) argue that for real progress to be made in strategic 
leadership theory, researchers must be ‘willing to learn from other theories and streams of 
research and incorporate them into their own work’ (p. 524) and include trait theory 
(Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991), ‘new’ theories (Bryman, 1992) such as ‘charismatic’ (Conger 
and Kanungo, 1987, 1992; House and Howell, 1992) and ‘transformational leadership’ (Bass, 
1985) as areas where a contribution to the literature can be made. 
This research therefore stands on the shoulders (Howard, 1999) of extant and 
emerging leadership theories by developing a substantive model that is applicable for 
explaining first the leadership characteristics and styles of the board members in the largest 
banks by market capitalisation, and, secondly, the influence of those leadership 
characteristics and styles on the success or failure of the bank. 
2.10 Trait Theory 
In psychology, trait theory is an approach to human personality, which is seen as habitual 
patterns of behaviour, thought and emotion. As with leadership, there are many definitions of 
‘traits’ but they are broadly psychological or biological characteristics that are measurable and 
vary with individuals (Antonakis, 2011; Day and Antonakis, 2012). They can be used to predict 
attitudes, decision of behaviours and consequently outcomes (Ashton and Lee, 2009). 
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Early studies into personality traits sought to identify and categorise them, with 
Allport and Odbert (1936) identifying over 4000 words linked to ‘traits’ which are further 
defined as: cardinal, i.e. those that define a life (such as Machiavellianism); those that are 
central to the person’s values, i.e. honesty, intelligence; and those which are secondary, i.e. 
relate to performance and approach to certain situations. Research that followed sought to 
distil the number of traits with Cattell and Cattell (1995) developing a 16 factor model, 
consisting of primary and secondary traits based on a measure of normal personality and 
Eysenck and Eysenck (1987) who finally identified universal traits of 
introversion/extraversion, neuroticism/emotional stability and psychotism (i.e. hostility, 
tendency to be antisocial). These traits were incorporated into the five factor model (Fiske, 
1949) and expanded by Goldberg (1981) and McCrae and Costa (1987). The ‘big five’ 
personality traits are: extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, consciousness and 
neuroticism (Digman, 1989; Goldberg, 1990) with Ashton and Lee (2009) adding ‘honesty-
humility’. 
Interest in traits linked to leadership began in the 19th century with Carlyle’s ([1840] 
1887) study of great men, and with it the idea that the ability to lead comes from the 
inheritance of certain personality characteristics (Galton, 1869). Systemic studies mainly 
involving military leaders followed leading to the identification of physical qualities and 
intelligence (Kohs and Irle, 1920). However, conflicting results and inability to distinguish 
between the leader and non-leader led to a fall from favour (Lord, de Vader and Alliger, 
1986; Zaccaro, 2007) with early studies plagued with methodological errors and meta-
analysis unable to synthesise results (Zaccaro, Kemp and Bader, 2004). 
Hogan, Curphy and Hogan (1994) distinguish between personality traits and 
leadership traits, arguing that leadership can be conceptualised into the broad categories of 
‘leader emergence’ and ‘leader effectiveness’, which they suggest ‘refers to a leader’s 
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performance in influencing and guiding activities ... towards the achievement of goals’ (p. 
797), and Judge et al. (2002) arguing that together the big five will predict both the 
‘emergence’ and ‘effectiveness’ of leadership. Personality traits have informed the study of 
leadership over a number of decades, with links between personality traits and leadership 
traits investigated by Bono and Judge (2004) whose meta-analysis of the big five showed 
links to ‘transformational leadership’. However, notable oversights include traits such as 
power and achievement, which are not explicitly measured (Winter et al., 1998) despite 
‘power’ being shown to be an important antecedent for leadership (Antonakis and Atwater, 
2002). Leadership models such as ‘charisma’ and ‘transformational’ (considered below) 
recognise the importance of situation, but also incorporate traits as determinates of 
effectiveness (House, 1977, 1988). 
Emotional intelligence is our ability to recognise emotions in ourselves and others. 
Developed by Goleman (2006) from research by Salovey and Mayer (1990), it is practitioner 
liked but with limited tests linking it to performance, notably from Van Rooy and 
Viswesvaran (2004) which measured work performance but not leadership, leading to 
criticism that it has ‘undue reliance on popular ideas and fads without sufficient consideration 
given to the validity of those ideas’ (Zaccaro and Horn, 2003, p. 779). 
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is another popular model for testing personality 
traits but its psychometric properties have been criticised (McCrae and Costa, 1989; 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993), in particular for weak results linking it to leadership types 
(Zaccaro and Horn, 2003). 
Psychologists have shown that situations can influence behaviour (Milgram, 1963 
then redone by Burger, 2009). Research in the early 2000s began to consider context, with 
studies from Antonakis, Avolio and Sivasubramaniam (2003), Antonakis (2004) and 
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Antonakis, Day and Schyns (2012), with calls for more research identifying contextual 
constraints that operate on the leadership phenomena (Day and Antonakis, 2012). 
Lord, de Vader and Alliger’s (1986) meta-analysis looking at the relationship between 
personality traits and leader emergence finds variability across studies, which they argue 
misrepresents the leadership effect on performance. Findings show variability across studies 
could be explained by methodological factors. 
Comprehensive reviews of qualitative studies including Mann (1959) and Bass and 
Stogdill (1990) concluded that the traits found are all different, leading Judge et al. (2002) to 
suggest that ‘if you ask 5 different researchers in general which traits are valid, you will get 
five different answers’ (p. 766). 
It is clear that leadership includes complex patterns of behaviour, likely to be linked 
to attributes, but rarely do studies consider how the combination of particular leader 
characteristics influences behaviour. As this research is investigating the influence of 
leadership characteristics on banking failure, it needs to address this reality (Yukl, 2008; 
Zaccaro, Kemp and Bader, 2004). Accordingly, the next section considers the relationships 
between leadership characteristics and traits in order to inform the theoretical perspective of 
the thesis. 
2.10.1 Leadership Characteristics and Traits 
Extant research concentrates on measurable and quantifiable traits and their relationship with 
effective leadership. This approach dominated leadership literature in the first half of the 20th 
century (Colbert et al., 2012) before falling out of favour ‘followed by years of scepticism and 
disinterest’ (Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka, 2009, p. 871). A recent resurgence in the approach 
(Burch and Anderson, 2008) sees Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka (2009) arguing that it is the ‘most 
venerable intellectual tradition on leadership research’ (p. 855) and that it is an individual’s 
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traits that provide a reason ‘why leaders are not like other people’ (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 
1991, p. 49). 
Notably, Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey (2007) note that the conditions in which 
leaders lead can change quickly, posing new and complex requirements on the leaders and 
causing differences and a potential mismatch of required traits (Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka, 
2009; Uhl-Bien, Marion and McKelvey, 2007). 
Effective leadership linked to personality traits was identified by Hogan, Curphy and 
Hogan (1994) with the big five traits being surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness and 
emotional intelligence (Hogan, Curphy and Hogan, 1994) with Bentz (1990) finding 
correlations between leadership effectiveness in ‘surgency, emotional stability, 
conscientiousness and agreeableness’ (Bentz, 1990). However, for Kirkpatrick and Locke 
(1991), in order to become a leader, people need to possess a talent that can be nurtured and 
for those leaders to be successful they need to possess the ‘the right stuff’ and that ‘stuff is 
not equally present in all people’ (p. 59). 
Conversely, Kassin (2003) defines a trait as a habitual pattern of behaviour, thoughts, 
and emotion. Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991), while noting that possession of traits alone does 
not guarantee successful leadership, argue that key leaders’ traits include: drive 
(achievement, motivation, ambition, energy, tenacity and initiative); leadership motivation 
(desire to lead but not to seek power as an end in itself); honesty; integrity; self-confidence; 
cognitive ability; and knowledge of the business. 
From the review above, it seems that the literature considering the influence of traits 
linked to why leaders fail is scant (Horner, 2003). Notably, Hogan and Hogan (1994) argue 
that success depends on both exhibiting positive traits, and not exhibiting negative traits, i.e. 
arrogance, untrustworthiness, moodiness, insensitivity, compulsiveness and abrasiveness 
(Bentz, 1990). 
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It seems that the literature is stronger when arguing for essential characteristics of 
leadership, with Sternberg (2007) citing ‘creativity’ as an essential characteristic of 
leadership and Bennis (2007) arguing that leadership is a ‘performance art’ (p. 4) which is 
necessary to convey and share a vision with followers (Ladkin and Taylor, 2010). 
The literature concerning board leadership is also considered in psychology literature, 
with intelligence regarded as the most important trait in this field (Sternberg and Ruzgis, 
1994) and Mann (1959) describing it as one of the greatest traits of leadership. Judge and 
Piccolo (2004) acknowledge it to be a critical trait and argue that it must be possessed by all 
leaders. Certainly a lack of understanding of the complexity of banking is a much cited 
reason for the banking crises (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011) and the lack of 
understanding of investment banking is one of the reasons given for the sacking of Antony 
Jenkins as CEO of Barclays (Jones and Pollitt, 2016). 
Judge et al. (2002) argue that traits of ‘extraversion’, ‘openness’, ‘conscientiousness’ 
and ‘neuroticism’ are required for organisational effectiveness, with Brunellet al. (2008) 
adding the need for ‘power’, ‘self-confidence’ and ‘energy’. Arguing later, Judge, Piccolo 
and Kosalka (2009) consider both the positive and negative traits of leadership in their Leader 
Trait Emergence Effectiveness model which includes: ‘extraversion’, ‘agreeableness’, 
‘conscientiousness’, ‘emotional stability’, ‘openness’, ‘core self-evaluation’ (self-esteem), 
‘locus of control’, ‘generalised self-efficacy’ and ‘emotional stability’, ‘intelligence’, 
‘charisma’, ‘narcissism’, ‘hubris’, ‘dominance’ and ‘Machiavellianism’ (Judge et al., 2002). 
Summing up the extant literature in a comprehensive review linking core traits and 
executive leadership, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) note that executives who have an internal 
locus of control and who feel in control of their fates are associated with strategies involving 
innovation and product differentiation. Interestingly, Matthew Barret (the ‘flamboyant CEO’ 
of Barclays in 1999) is found to comment that if the ‘stars are right, he might move into 
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mortgages’.13 High levels of core self-evaluation in CEOs are also found to lead to faster 
decision-making processes and a greater number of large stake initiatives (Hiller and 
Hambrick, 2005). 
Interestingly, the resurgence of research in this area is predominantly quantitative, 
focussing on middle managers and supervisors. Judge et al. (2002) conducted a quantitative 
study analysing 222 correlations from 73 samples finding that the traits of ‘extraversion’, 
‘conscientiousness’, ‘emotional stability’ and ‘openness to experience’ were directly 
correlated to leadership effectiveness. However, quantitative studies on the ‘big five’ 
personality traits are criticised on the validity of the size of the coefficients (Murphy, 
Dzieweczynski and Zhang, 2009), with Kaiser, Hogan and Craig (2008) arguing that while 
personality traits may reveal whether a leader is perceived as ‘leader like’, personality traits 
do not show whether a leader is successful in ‘helping organisations prosper’ (p. 102). 
Bennis (2007) states that after studying leadership for six decades, he believes that 
exemplary leaders have six ‘competences’: to create a sense of mission; to motivate others to 
join them; to create an adaptive social architecture for followers; to generate trust and 
optimism; and to develop other leaders and get results. Interestingly, all of these 
characteristics can be seen in Dick Fuld14 18 months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
so it seems that the competences on their own are not enough to ensure success and avoid 
failure, at least in the global banking sector. It is clear that more research is required to 
understand the influence of characteristics and traits of the leaders of those banks that failed, 
required recapitalisation or bailout and those that did not. 
                                                          
13 https://www.managementtoday.co.uk/andrew-davidson-interview-matt-barrett/article/407273 
14 https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ceo-richard-fuld-on-lehman-brothers-evolution-from-internal-turmoil-to-
teamwork/ 
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By considering the influence of leadership characteristics of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO in those banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, this research also 
addresses the gap identified by Judge, Piccolo and Kosalka (2009) that ‘despite empirical 
support for the perspective, conceptual work in this area lags behind’ (p. 855). 
There has also been a recent resurgence in the trait personality approach to strategic 
leadership theory (Burch and Anderson, 2008). The majority of research in this area is 
aligned to Goleman’s big five personality traits (Cherniss et al., 1998) with Judge et al. 
(2002) finding a positive correlation between the traits of extraversion, openness, 
conscientiousness and negative relation to neuroticism, while Hoffman et al. (2011), found 
that the need for power, self-confidence and energy were linked to leaders’ effectiveness 
(Hoffman et al., 2011). 
In sum, as the review of literature has shown, the recent resurgence in trait theory and 
developing frameworks has sparked renewed interest in trait approaches to understand 
leadership effectiveness (Judge et al., 2009). However, the literature is predominantly 
focussed on middle managers and supervisors with exceptions from Hiller and Hambrick 
(2005), and there are a few studies (Judge et al., 2002) addressing the links between traits and 
other leadership theories. However, ‘To this day, psychologists have not sorted out which 
traits define leaders or whether leadership exists outside of specific situations, and yet we 
know with absolute certainty that a handful of people have changed millions of lives and 
reshaped the world’ (Zacarro, 2007, p. 3). 
2.11 Strategic Leadership Theories 
As identified above, ‘traits’ continue to inform our understanding of leadership theories. The 
next section considers the extant leadership theories in terms of traits and characteristics, 
together with their relevance to this study. 
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2.11.1 Charismatic Leadership 
Weber (1947) was the first to apply the concept to leadership, defining it as: ‘A certain quality 
of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from other men and is treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional power or qualities’ 
(p. 358), and despite representing a key component of strategic leadership, it still remains ‘an 
elusive target’ (Potts, 2009, p. 3). 
The last century has seen differing theoretical approaches to the concept of charisma 
with House and Howell (1992) and Conger (1989) seeing it as a theory, and Judge, Piccolo 
and Kosalka (2009) seeing it as a ‘trait’. It was largely overlooked by organisational theories 
arguably due to lack of a systematic conceptual framework (Conger and Kanungo, 1987) and 
is still an elusive factor in organisational effectiveness (Conger, 1989). What is clear, as 
Bennis (2007) points out, is that since Joan of Arc miraculously recruited French soldiers to 
follow her into battle, ‘charismatic leadership’ is an essential and unsolved part of the puzzle 
of great leaders. 
Theories of charisma stress the personal identification of the followers with the leader 
(Boal and Hooijberg, 2000). For House (1977), charisma operates on an individual level, with 
empirical studies from Shamir, House and Arthur (1993) focussing on the leader– follower 
relationship, defining charisma as a self-referential concept whereby the leader creates self-
mental images and seeks to affirm self-identity linked to the achievement of a vision. Weber 
(1947) also argues that charismatic leaders influence by articulating a compelling vision of 
the future. The leader focusses on the intrinsic values rather than extrinsic rewards (Conger 
and Kanungo, 1992), and followers identify with this shared mental picture creating a 
dominant belief that only by working together can the objective be achieved (Conger, 
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Kanungo and Menon, 2000). This can be seen in the comments of Dick Fuld, CEO of 
Lehman Brothers, commenting ‘that no one individual can deliver a whole firm to a client’.15 
For Conger and Kanugo (1998), the ‘trait’ of charisma is an observable and 
behavioural process, whereby followers attribute it to a person whose behaviour appeals to 
them, through experience, and the situation facing them. Bass et al. (2003) address the 
criticisms of a lack of situational context, arguing that charismatic leaders must have abilities 
relevant to the situation with Jensen (2009), arguing that having the trait of ‘charisma’ is not 
sufficient in itself, a leader needs to understand both the needs of followers and the demands 
of the situation. However, for Conger and Hunt (1999) the definition is not important, as long 
as the follower attributes the characteristics to the leader (Conger and Hunt, 1999). 
Later literature focusses on providing process maps for the development of 
attributional and relational aspects (Conger, Kanungo and Menon, 2000; Shamir, House and 
Arthur, 1993), but Bennis argues that more leaders have been made by accidental 
circumstances, sheer grit or will than all the leadership courses put together (Bennis, 2007). 
So it seems that traits are an integral part of what it means to be charismatic (House, 
Hunt and Larson, 1977), with the charismatic leader showing dominance, a desire to 
influence, self-confidence and strong moral values. Friedman et al. (1980) include verbal and 
non-verbal signals, with Bass (2008) observing that charismatic leaders show ‘complete 
confidence in their position’ (p. 585). This conviction can be seen in the approach of Fred 
Goodwin during the takeover of ABN AMRO keeping his determination to buy the bank 
even though the markets had ‘cracked’16 with the ‘desire to influence’ seen in Hank Poulson 
                                                          
15 https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ceo-richard-fuld-on-lehman-brothers-evolution-from-internal-turmoil-to-
teamwork/ 
16 https://www.ft.com/content/dbcc20aa-02a0-11de-b58b-000077b07658 
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(Goldman Sachs), Sam Weill (Merrill Lynch) and Charles Prince (CitiCorp) (McDonald, 
2009). 
The success of the charismatic leaders has also been linked to environmental 
conditions, rather than the leaders themselves, with followers attributing ‘charisma’ to leaders 
as a result of the need for hope in times of change and uncertainty (Bryman, 1992). The 
success or failure of an organisation is often attributed to a dynamic, charismatic leader rather 
than other environmental factors and economic cycles (Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985; 
Pfeffer, 1977). 
Useful to this research is the distinction made by Boal and Bryson (1988) who suggest 
two forms of charismatic leadership: ‘visionary charismatic’ leadership, and ‘crises 
responsive charismatic’ leadership. ‘Visionary charismatic’ leadership is similar to that 
outlined above, where the leader creates a world that is intrinsically valid for the follower 
with behaviours linked to values through the articulation of goals. ‘Crises responsive’, 
however, is extrinsic, with outcomes that are linked to behaviours. Boal and Bryson (1988) 
argue that in times of crisis, these links are severed and need to be re-established by the 
leader. It is ‘crisis’ that distinguishes between the sociological theories of charisma, which 
see it as a key condition (Beyer, 1999; Weber, 1947), and the psychologically orientated 
theories of Conger and Kanungo (1998) and Shamir, House and Arthur (1993), who see it as 
a facilitating, but unnecessary condition (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000). 
Charismatic theories generally focus on individual-level outcomes, i.e. loyalty, 
identity, commitment, motivation and performance (Holtzblatt and Beyer, 1993; Hunt and 
Dodge, 2000; Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993), and Yukl (1999) suggests that personal 
identification with the leader is a key variable in the charismatic theories. 
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Conger (1990) argues that charismatic leaders are usually skilled and animated public 
speakers, often using rhetoric, imagery and anecdotes such as those seen in Bob Diamond, 
ex-CEO Barclays, when talking of his new venture in Africa. He is described as ‘frequently 
leaping to his feet, grabbing a golf club or a wad of bills from his wallet. He’s theatrically 
dismissive of past failings and resolute about a future that will prove him right’.17 
Bryman (1992) and House and Aditya (1997) treat ‘charismatic’ and 
‘transformational’ theories as interchangeable, with Bass and Riggio (2006) arguing that 
‘charisma’ is not a separate theory but the ‘idealised influence’ dimension of 
‘transformational’ (Bass and Riggio, 2006). Bass’s original concept of ‘transformational 
leadership’ combined with ‘transactional’ leadership to include seven leadership constructs: 
‘charisma’, ‘inspirational/motivation’, ‘intellectual stimulation’, ‘individual consideration’, 
‘contingent reward’, ‘management by exception’ and ‘laissez faire’ (Bass, 1985). In 1998, 
Bass noted that although ‘charisma’ and ‘inspirational leadership’ were unique constructs, 
empirically it is difficult to distinguish between them. Conger and Kanungo (1998) suggest 
‘there are far more similarities overall between the two than there are differences’ (p. 1) and 
argue that transformational leaders should aspire to charisma. Yukl (1999) and Diaz-Saenz 
(2011) disagree, finding a distinction hard to define due to the lack of correspondence 
between the two theories. Roe (2014) suggests the difference can be seen in ‘charismatic’ 
leadership’s focus on the attributes of the leader, and ‘transformational’ leadership’s focus on 
the influence of the leader on the follower. 
Hunt and Dodge (2000) argue the crucial contribution of transformational/charismatic 
leadership has been its rejuvenation of the leadership field, regardless of the content of the 
contributions made. 
                                                          
17 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-10-11/bob-diamond-s-misadventures-in-africa 
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Important to this research is the work carried out by Waldman et al. (2001) who 
conducted a quantitative analysis of 48 Fortune 500 firms, assessing both ‘transactional’ and 
‘charismatic’ CEO leadership as predictors of financial performance in environmentally 
uncertain environments. The findings show that ‘charisma’ predicated performance in 
uncertain conditions but not those of certainty. 
As this research is concerned with analysing the influence of leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout, it will consider both ‘charismatic’ leadership and ‘transformational 
idealised influence’ characteristics. 
2.11.2 The Dark Side of Leadership 
Despite ‘charismatic’ leadership’s positive capability, it can show a ‘dark side’ (Mayo, 2017) 
which can diminish organisational potency and curtail its likelihood of producing successful 
organisational outcomes (Ciampa, 2016). 
Yukl (1999) and Kakabadse et al. (2010a) argue that certain leadership traits found in 
‘charismatic’ and ‘transformational’ styles can lead to negative, unethical and immoral 
direction, especially in target-driven environments. Research by Conger (2002) supports this, 
finding blind drive to create a personal vision can result in failure to see problems and 
opportunities. Leader behaviours become exaggerated and leaders can lose touch with reality 
(Conger, 1990). Characteristics and traits associated with dark side leadership include the 
triad of psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism (Khoo and Burch, 2008), with 
grandiosity, arrogance, self-absorption and entitlement found in many powerful leaders 
(Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006). 
However, the models of ‘dark side’ leadership are based in general on follower 
perceptions (Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Shaw, Erickson and Harvey, 2011). CEOs are 
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considered, notably showing the bright side linked to ‘transformational’ leadership and a 
‘dark side’ related to ‘transactional contingent reward’ when considering the effects of 
creativity, motivation and staff turnover (Liu, Liao and Loi, 2012; Mathieu et al., 2014; 
Resick et al., 2009). 
2.11.3 Contingency Theory 
The late 1960s and 1970s’ development in leadership theory, while still contextually 
essentialist, began to focus more on the organisational context and role of followers. Fiedler’s 
(1967) influential and controversial ‘contingency approach was the first to argue for a model 
dealing with both leader traits and situational variables’ (Vroom and Jago, 2007). Taking the 
view that leadership styles are effective in combination with the features of a given situation, 
performance becomes a function of leaders’ style together with key features of the context, 
i.e. leader–follower relations, task structure and position power. Fiedler did not believe the 
leader could change their style to suit the situation, but that certain styles would be effective 
in certain situations (Fiedler, 1964). In doing so, he moves ‘trait theory’ from the confines of 
the ‘one best way to lead’ by allowing analysis of leader traits within the context of a given 
situation (Horner, 2003). 
The influence of ‘personality traits’ are also considered by Fiedler, with leader 
effectiveness found to depend on ‘personality’ within the confines of the situation (Fiedler, 
1978). His model has two stages: 
The first seeks to find the ‘leadership style’ by the use of a self-completed ‘Least 
Preferred Co-worker’ (LPC) questionnaire which focusses on the people the leader would 
find most demanding to work with. 
The second stage measures ‘situational favourableness’ and is established by the 
interaction of the leader with ‘member relations’, ‘task structure’ and ‘positional power’ 
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(Fiedler, 1964). The outcome of the LPC scores is determined by the leader’s personality 
traits, which in turn suggests how a leader may fail in circumstances where their traits do not 
match the situation. The implication is for the leaders to be placed in a situation that is 
favourable to their style (Vroom and Jago, 2007). This controversial outcome was softened in 
later work with the argument that the leader can change the situation to suit their personality 
(Fiedler, 1978). 
Fiedler’s model advances the previous trait-based theories (Guerra et al., 2005) but is 
criticised for being difficult and misleading (Hunt, 1991), with Roe (2014) arguing that a 
highly task-focussed leader is likely to drive hard towards an output and resent anyone who is 
seen to obstruct this goal. 
Later developments in contingency approaches consider top management teams 
(upper echelons theory) who are responsible for self-leadership, and shared leadership, where 
the traits and characteristics of an elite group are considered in a particular context 
(Antonakis and Day, 2017; Houghton and Yoho, 2005). 
As the first stage of the contingency model requires self-completion of the Least 
Preferred Co-worker questionnaire by the leader, it is not practicable for use in this research. 
2.11.4 Situational Leadership 
‘Situational leadership’ considers there to be one consistently sound style for exercising 
leadership in different situations (Blake, Mouton and Bidwell, 1962) and effective leadership 
requires a rational understanding of the situation along with an appropriate response (Graeff, 
1997a). 
It differs from ‘contingency’ leadership by considering the maturity of the followers 
and asserting that the leader can change their style accordingly. Originally developed by 
Hersey and Blanchard in 1977, the ‘Life Cycle Theory’ of leadership moved the debate away 
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from a ‘one size fits all’ approach towards a consideration that leaders should adapt their 
style according to different environmental conditions. Their resulting ‘Situational Leadership 
Model’ (Hersey, Blanchard and Natemeyer, 1979) considered the behavioural traits of 
successful leaders, suggesting that the leader–follower relationship goes through different 
phases according to the maturity of the followers. Leadership is based on the interplay and 
extent of the leader’s directive (task) behaviour, socio-emotional (relationship) behaviour and 
the followers’ readiness/maturity for performing a certain function (Blanchard, Zigarmi and 
Nelson, 1993; Hersey and Blanchard, 1982). 
Situational leadership develops around the leader’s task orientation mentality rather 
than a people-oriented continuum (Bass, 2008) with effective leadership seen as the ability to 
adapt leadership styles to manage particular situations (Giltinane, 2013). It is essentialist in 
its outlook, considering idealised and universal personality traits which match the leader’s 
orientation to organisational situations, with the conclusion that specific contexts require 
specific leadership traits (Grint, 1997; Kezar and Eckel, 2005). 
The model is practical in its focus and lacks the theoretical justification of how the 
components of maturity combine (Graeff, 1983). The ‘task-oriented’ leaders define roles for 
subordinates, give definite instructions, create organisational patterns and establish formal 
communication channels, whereas ‘people-oriented’ leaders have a concern for reducing 
emotional conflict (Bass, 2008). However, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive 
(McCleskey, 2014) and effective leaders can engage in a mix of both (Graeff, 1983). Howell 
(1999) considers how leadership can be affected by organisational factors, arguing that if 
delivered inappropriately it can make situations worse, with Grint (2011) taking the view that 
effective leadership requires a rational understanding of the situation together with an 
appropriate response. 
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The review of the literature finds that although much has been written on situational 
leadership, the lack of a sound theoretical foundation for the hypothesised relationships 
between the variables make studies into its robustness rare (Thompson and Vecchio, 2009). 
In sum, the extant research into ‘contingency’ and ‘situational leadership’ attempts to 
answer the criticisms of previous ‘trait-based’ approaches by highlighting the relationship 
between leadership traits and ‘situations’ (Zaccaro, Kemp and Bader, 2004), but the empirical 
research is still confined to investigating the micro relationships between leaders and their 
employees. The models tend to look for simple answers to complex questions, and the ability 
to adapt is still due to combination of traits (Yukl, 2008; Zaccaro, 2007). While a ‘situational’ 
approach at board level may be possible in some circumstances, in complex global 
corporations which are subject to volatile environments, by the time the leader has gained 
sufficient detail to think about adapting, the situation will have changed (Grint, 2010). 
As this research is concerned with the influence of leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on the success and failure of banks, the 
‘situational approach’ does not offer a model that can be applied retrospectively due to issues 
with access and historical bias, so will not be used. 
2.11.5 Transactional Leadership 
The development of ‘transactional leadership’, like ‘contingency’ and ‘situational’, is 
concerned with followers, but focusses on the social process of leader influence (Bass, 1985). 
Forrester and Clegg (1991) originally looked at the relationship in politics classifying 
‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ leaders and arguing that ‘transactional’ types motivate 
followers by ‘exchanging one thing for another, jobs for votes or subsidies for campaign 
contributions’ (Forrester and Clegg, 1991, p. 28). 
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‘Transactional leadership’ is framed in terms of characteristics and traits with 
Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) including those of: practicality, resistance to change, emphasis 
on corporate structure, and rewarding performance. Avolio and Locke (2002) also included 
egoistic behaviour with Yukl (2008) arguing that it may also involve values, such as honesty, 
responsibility and reciprocity, but only where they are relevant to the exchange process. 
The relationship between leaders and followers is a series of exchanges of 
gratification designed to maximise both organisational and individual gains, with the 
‘transactional leader’ initiating the contact with subordinates in an effort to exchange 
something of value. 
Bass (1985) identified factors in ‘transactional leadership’ which differ according to 
the leader’s activity, and the interaction of followers (Howell and Avolio, 1993). ‘Contingent 
reward’ is seen as an active exchange between leaders and followers, whereby followers are 
rewarded for accomplishing agreed objectives. These rewards include recognition and bonus 
payments. The banking sector has a culture of bonus payments with executive board 
members’ pay including bonuses linked to objectives such as increased shareholder value. 
This has formed much of the UK policy debate following the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
UK press has also highlighted issues with payments being made despite the objectives not 
being met. Bonus payments linked to performance are also made to employees in investment 
banks, and can be seen in trading teams in both banks that survived (e.g. HSBC) and banks 
that failed (e.g. Lehman Brothers). By considering the characteristics of ‘contingent reward’ 
leadership as part of the ‘transactional’ leadership style, this research will add to the 
academic and policy debate on bonus payments linked to the success and failure of banks. 
Hater and Bass (1988) looked at leaders who only focus on mistakes (management by 
exception – active) and those who delay decisions or avoid intervening until something has 
gone wrong (management by exception – passive). ‘Management by exception – passive’ can 
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been seen in the cases of ‘rogue traders’; for example, Nick Leeson, who was blamed for the 
failure of Barings Bank (Barings no. 2, 1995). Leeson was allowed to trade in excess of his 
trading limits in a leadership environment where risk was rewarded (Carter and Protess, 
2011). It is interesting that in the cases of Baring, UBS and Credit Suisse, the action of the 
traders in question was not motivated by personal gain, but by a risk reward culture. 
So it seems that ‘transactional leaders’ show distinct leadership traits, such as a focus 
on short-term goals, favouring structured policies and procedures, following rules and doing 
things correctly (Spahr, 2016) and appeal to subordinates’ traits of self-interest by 
establishing exchange relationships with them (Forrester and Clegg, 1991; Sadeghi and Pihie, 
2012) allowing the theory to evolve for the marketplace of fast, simple transactions in search 
of gratification (McCleskey, 2014). 
Forrester and Clegg (1991) argue that ‘transactional leadership’ can tend to produce 
shallow, temporary exchanges of gratification with Ames and Flynn (2007) suggesting the 
lack of charisma in the relationship can lead to resentment. Bass and Stogdill (1990) go 
further, stating that organisations whose leaders are ‘transactional’ are less effective than 
those whose leaders are ‘transformational’. Notable to this study is the work of Odumeru and 
Ifeanyi (2013) who suggest that ‘transactional’ leaders are most effective in crisis situations. 
This research study will contribute to this debate by investigating the existence and 
influence of ‘transactional’ leadership traits in the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
2.11.6 Transformational Leadership 
Bass (1985) extended Burn’s (1978) qualitative work on ‘transactional’ leadership and 
argued for the dichotomy, i.e. the transformational leader (Bass, 1985), where the leader 
‘raises followers to transcend their own self-interests for the good of the group or 
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organisation, and to work harder than they originally expected they would’ (Bass, 1985, p. 
29). In this case, the leader does more than set up simple exchanges or agreements (Bass and 
Riggio, 2006). This marked a paradigm shift in the development of leadership theory away 
from the exchange processes of the ‘behavioural’ and ‘transactional’ approaches to one of 
leader influence (Roe, 2014). In contrast to Forrester and Clegg (1991), Bass (1985) did not 
see ‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership at opposite ends of a continuum, but 
instead argued that characteristics or traits of both can be displayed by the same leader (Bass 
and Stogdill, 1990). 
‘Transformational leadership’ has attracted much academic interest over the last few 
decades (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe and Gardner, 2001). Useful to this research are a number 
of studies looking at the relationship between ‘transformational’ leadership and the efficacy 
of organisations (Avolio and Bass, 1995; Avolio, Bass and Jung, 1999; Bass et al., 2003) 
with meta-analytical reviews from Judge and Piccolo (2004) considering positive correlations 
between transformational leadership traits and the performance of followers, and studies by 
Bono and Judge (2004) and Judge et al. (2002) finding relationships between intelligence, 
personality traits and transformational leadership. 
In order to measure transformational/transactional leadership, Bass developed the 
‘Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire’ (MLQ) which uses seven scales of ‘characteristics’ of 
‘transformational’ leadership (Avolio, Bass and Jung, 1999; Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Hater 
and Bass, 1988). These include: 
 ‘Idealised influence’, closely linked to charisma (above), with associated 
characteristics of trust, confidence in others, and a strong sense of mission and 
purpose. 
 ‘Inspirational motivation’, associated with characteristics of vision, confidence, 
enthusiasm and fostering team spirit. 
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 ‘Intellectual stimulation’ which includes encouraging innovation. 
 ‘Individualised consideration’ which gives personal attention and makes followers 
feel valued. 
‘Transformational’ leadership has grown to become the most researched style of leadership 
with Lowe and Gardner (2001) finding that it accounts for a third of articles published in 
Leadership Quarterly and Howell and Avolio (1993) suggesting that research on it ‘expanded 
the range of leadership characteristics being systematically developed’ (p. 891). 
Characteristics such as trust, admiration and respect seen in a leader which cause followers to 
do more than expected (Bass and Riggio, 2006) can be seen in the development of the 
derivative trading teams during the late 1980s (Tett, 2009). The MLQ had been examined in 
over 75 research studies by 1995, in several countries and in a variety of organisations 
(Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam, 1996), but although popular in the US and UK, this is 
not the case in Asia (Blunt and Jones, 1997). 
The extant studies generally report significant relationships between leader 
effectiveness and the transformational scales (Yammarino and Bass, 1990). However, it is 
difficult to assess the connection between leadership and performance when the respondents 
are the source of the information about both leader behaviour and effectiveness (Geyery and 
Steyrer, 1998). 
Useful to this study is the work of Geyery and Steyrer (1998), which used the MLQ to 
look at transformational leadership and objective performance in banks. Despite being 
comprehensive in its use of reports from 116 branches of 20 Austrian banks, the study was 
limited to reports by branch managers rather than an investigation of board members, and 
was narrow in its focus, only considering characteristics found in the MLQ and linked to 
financial performance in Austrian banks. 
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In sum, the review shows that although ‘transformational’ leadership has been 
empirically tested, there is little research testing the linkages between its components. By 
using the characteristics and traits described in the theory to analyse the leadership of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, this research study will contribute to the extant literature 
in this area. 
2.11.7 Transformational and Transactional Leadership Combined 
The traits that make up ‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership are described 
together as ‘dimensions’ (Bass, 1991), with ‘transformational’ leaders being those who focus 
on increasing performance by creating a supportive environment (individual consideration). 
This can be seen in the Deutsche Bank model of staff development in 2000–2001 which 
encourages leaders to communicate a vision of the future and create team spirit (inspirational 
motivation), encourage creativity and innovation (intellectual stimulation) and act as role 
models who are admired and respected by followers (idealised influence).18 
 Bass (1985) describes ‘transactional’ leaders as those who reward the delivery of 
objectives (contingent reward), either by monitoring progress towards the goal, taking 
corrective action where necessary (managing by exception – active), or waiting for an 
exception to be found before correcting behaviour (managing by exception – passive). 
Bass and Riggio (2006) argue that ‘every leader displays each style to some amount’ 
(p. 9) but ‘transformational’ leaders are seen more frequently than ‘transactional’, with Bass 
(1995) suggesting that while ‘transformational’ leadership does not substitute for 
‘transactional’, the ‘best leaders are both transformational and transactional’ (p. 474). 
However, he does not clarify in which areas of the continuum this is. By considering the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest 
                                                          
18 https://www.db.com/ir/en/annual-reports.htm 
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banks (by market capitalisation), this study will show any relationships between the 
leadership styles and contribute to the knowledge in this area. 
 
2.11.8 The Relationship between Charismatic and Transformational Leadership 
The issues surrounding the link between ‘charismatic’ leadership and ‘transformational’ 
leadership have been the subject of much academic focus. Bass (1995) found that during his 
research leading to the four components of ‘transformational’ leadership (idealised influence, 
inspirational motivation, individual consideration and intellectual stimulation), the original 
factor of ‘idealised influence’ seems to be ‘consistent with charismatic in its trust of the 
leader and its identification of the leader with the follower’ (p. 471). His study was 
quantitative and found that repeated factor analysis ‘never supported the extraction of 
“inspiration” from charismatic’ (p. 471). Ready to abandon the ‘charismatic’ tag for a single 
factor of ‘idealised influence’ he was persuaded by Abe Zaleznick to keep it. Despite the 
separate bodies of literature on the two theories, the research found some leaders to be 
‘charismatic’ and others to be ‘inspirational’ with different behaviours, attributions and 
effects involved. He goes on to argue that for qualitative study, a single use ‘idealised 
influence’ encompassing both should be used (Bass, 1996; House and Howell, 1992). As 
‘charisma’ represented flamboyant, celebrated and existing traits, it was also linked to the 
darker side of leadership found in the dictators Hitler and Mussolini. For these reasons, Bass 
dropped the ‘charismatic’ term and substituted it with ‘idealised influence’. 
As this research analyses the influence of leadership characteristics and traits of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banks, it will consider the leadership traits found in 
‘charisma’ in its own right (see para 2.11.1 above), and will also consider the four ‘I’s of the 
transformational approach. 
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2.11.9 Authentic Leadership 
In response to repeated lapses in ethical judgement by highly visible leaders, there is growing 
public demand for greater accountability of organisational leaders (Dealy and Thomas, 2006). 
Corporate boards are being held more accountable (Aguilera, 2005) and executives who fail 
to display consistency between their words and deeds can expect to lose the trust of followers 
(Simons, Mintzberg and Basu, 2002). 
The concept of ‘authentic leadership’ is a relative newcomer to the leadership 
literature (Ladkin and Taylor, 2010), first appearing in the fields of sociology and education 
(Chan, 2005) with work on defining the concept still ongoing (Avolio, Walumbwa and 
Weber, 2009). Authenticity as a construct, however, dates back to at least the ancient Greeks, 
captured by admonition to ‘be true to oneself’ (Harter, 2002). Over the last decade, the theory 
of ‘authentic leadership’ has been developed, originally from the intersection of leadership, 
ethics and positive organisational behaviour (Walumbwa et al., 2008). As a theory, it also 
defines leadership in terms of traits and characteristics with its roots in both 
‘transformational’ and ‘charismatic leadership’ (Yammarino et al., 2008). The research to 
date is seeing an emergence of multiple practitioners as well as the academic conceptions of 
the concept (Gardner et al., 2011). 
Authenticity as a concept was related to organisations and defined as a process which 
comes from both positive psychological capacities, and a highly developed organisational 
context. This results in greater self-awareness, self-regulated behaviours and leads to positive 
self-development (Luthans, Norman and Hughes, 2006). Avolio and Gardner (2005) argue 
that while leadership has always been more difficult in challenging times, the unique issues 
facing global organisations today call for a renewed focus on what constitutes genuine 
leadership. The increase in corporate scandals, management malfeasance and broader societal 
challenges facing organisations has also contributed to the recent attention placed on 
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authentic leadership (Walumbwa and Schaubroeck, 2009), with George (2003) suggesting 
that in the global, complex world, ‘we need leaders who lead with purpose, values, and 
integrity; leaders who build enduring organizations, motivate their employees to provide 
superior customer service, and create long-term value for shareholders’ (p. 9). 
Following the global banking crisis of 2008, political and media attention turned to 
blame ‘greedy banksters’ and requirement for leaders with values and integrity was a central 
theme in the media coverage of the time and is also considered in emerging literature (Salz 
and Collins, 2013). This can be seen in practice with the recruitment of Antony Jenkins as 
CEO of Barclays, who was given the role due to his high ethical values and integrity (and 
dubbed ‘Saint Antony’ by the analysts) following the sacking of Bob Diamond over  the 
LIBOR scandal. 
The literature focussing on authentic leadership converges around several underlying 
dimensions (Walumbwa et al., 2008) and this lack of a unified, agreed definition is the 
current issue with the theory (Cooper, Scandura and Schriesheim, 2005). Ladkin and Taylor 
(2010) suggest that these definitions are centred around themes of ‘the true self’, requiring 
self-awareness and moral leadership, while Luthans and Avolio (2003) see it as resulting in 
greater self-awareness and self-regulated behaviours from leaders and followers. 
Avolio et al. (2004) suggest it is seen in leaders: ‘who are deeply aware of how they 
think and behave and are perceived by others as being aware of their own and other 
values/moral perspectives, knowledge, and strengths; aware of the context in which they 
operate; and who are confident, hopeful, optimistic, resilient and of high moral character’ (p. 
4). 
Bringing these earlier theories together, Walumbwa et al. (2008) offer the definition 
of authentic leadership as: 
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‘A pattern of leader behaviour that draws upon and promotes both positive 
psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, an 
internalised moral perspective, balances processing of information and relational 
transparency on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self-
development’ (p. 94). 
One of the main intentions in the initial development of the theory was to make it 
multidimensional, answering criticisms levelled at earlier theories of not recognising the 
complexities of context. However, this has led to perspectives varying from leader to leader 
(Luthans and Avolio, 2003) and makes measurement difficult, with the initial 
conceptualisation including traits, behaviours, contexts and attributions (Cooper, Scandura 
and Schriesheim, 2005). 
In their study of over 1000 leaders with over 3000 pages of transcripts, George et al. 
(2007) failed to identify any universal characteristics, traits, skills or styles that led to 
success, but instead found leadership to emerge from life stories (p. 2) which they concluded 
to be a major part of the development of authentic leaders (Shamir and Eilam, 2005). 
Authentic leadership requires self-awareness together with unbiased processing, 
authentic behaviour/acting and authentic relational orientation (Ilies, Morgeson and 
Nahrgang, 2005) leading to an integration of the components into the self-based model 
focussing on self-awareness and self-regulatory components (Gardner et al., 2005). Avolio 
and Gardner (2005) argue that ‘authentic’ is a root construct underlying all positive forms of 
leadership, suggesting that authentic leaders foster the development of authenticity in 
themselves and followers by increased self-awareness, self-regulation and positive modelling. 
They argue that for leadership to be authentic, a self-referential viewpoint should be taken, 
focussing on being true to oneself. Erikson (1995) agrees that authenticity is defined ‘wholly 
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by the laws of its own being’ (p. 25) and this is a central issue in the analysis of authentic 
leadership within a strategic concept. 
From a practical viewpoint, leaders should take an emergent view adopting the most 
appropriate style in the circumstances (George, 2010). He suggests a model where leaders 
pursue purpose with passion, practise solid values, lead with the heart, establish enduring 
relationships and demonstrate self-discipline. 
Useful to this research is the work of Shamir and Eilam (2005) who suggest that 
characteristics of authentic leaders include being true to themselves rather than conforming to 
the expectations of others, being motivated by personal convictions rather than status or 
personal benefits, leading from their own personal point of view, and actions that are based 
on personal values and convictions. 
Avolio and Gardner (2005), however, suggest that this is linked to the development of 
authentic leaders rather than authentic leader development and propose the Authentic Leader 
Development (ALD) theory, which also includes the characteristics of moral capacity, 
courage and resiliency (Avolio and Gardner, 2005; May et al., 2003). The ALD includes the 
self-awareness trait seen in the definitions above which also includes the concept of values, 
cognitions of identity, emotions and motives/goals together with the leader self-regulation 
seen in self-control. In its development, the authors argue that authentic leadership can make 
a fundamental difference in organisations, and the focus of the ALD will help them to 
understand how authentic leadership can promote ‘sustained and veritable performance’ (p. 
332). 
The authentic leaders also show traits of confidence, hope and optimism which stem 
from their strong belief in themselves and in their positive psychological capital (Luthans, 
Norman and Hughes, 2006). Such leaders recognise that they have weaknesses, which they 
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accommodate by surrounding themselves with capable followers building an inclusive, 
engaged and positive organisational context. 
In recognition of the self-referential nature of authenticity, the authentic leader does 
not need any explicit consideration of others, nor are they entirely authentic or inauthentic; 
rather they achieve levels of authenticity (Erickson, 1995). 
So, it seems that ‘authentic’ leadership is a normative collection of characteristics 
concerned with how a leader ‘should’ act. Zaleznick (1992) argues the ability to lead is 
directly linked to personality traits with leaders seeking to transform what is into what should 
be. Leaders, he argues, differ from others in their motivation, personal history and how they 
think and act. A clear problem with this normative argument is the subjective differences in 
ideas of what ‘should be’. For example, the US and UK listed banks operate in an outsider-
dominated market with the owners of the businesses being predominantly large institutional 
shareholders. Shareholder theory dictates that the board should act and make decisions that 
are in the interests of the owners of the business (Friedman, 2009). Where these owners are 
seeking a high short-term return on their investment, the board can be driven to making 
decisions that are not always seen as ‘right’ by the public and the regulators. For example, the 
‘ethical champion’ Antony Jenkins was sacked by Chairman John McFarlane as investor 
disappointment grew with the return of capital of 5.1% against the target of 12.5%.19 
The concept of inauthenticity was considered by Seeman (1982) who developed a 
scale for its measurement when looking at the increasing ‘plasticity’ of a leader when coping 
with the pressures of public office (Seeman, 1982), and these ideas were developed to define 
a leader as ‘inauthentic’ when they are overly compliant with a stereotype and the demands 
                                                          
19 https://www.managementtoday.co.uk/exclusive-interview-new-barclays-ceo-antony-jenkins-save-banks-
reputation/article/1164616 
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related to the role. It involves a lack of accountability, manipulation of subordinates and the 
salience of the role over the self (Henderson and Hoy, 1982). 
By considering the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO in banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, and comparing with 
those that did not, this research will identify any authentic or inauthentic leadership 
behaviours, thereby contributing to the scant literature in this field. 
2.11.10 Overlap between Authentic Leadership and Other Theories 
Notable for this research, Avolio and Gardner (2005) compare their authentic leadership 
development (ALD) theory with the traits described in ‘transformational’, ‘charismatic’, 
‘servant’ and ‘spiritual’ leadership theories, finding an overlap with ‘transformational’ but 
finding authentic leadership ‘may or may not be charismatic’ (p. 329). 
Walumbwa et al. (2008) also consider their findings in context with other theories, in 
this case ‘transformational’ and ‘ethical’, finding an overlap between ‘authentic’ traits and 
those found in ‘idealised influence’, with Bass and Avolio (1993) suggesting such leaders 
become role models. Although Walumbwa et al. (2008) agree that ‘authentic’ leadership is 
closely related to ‘transformational’ leadership, they suggest that it is the ‘sense of self-
awareness’ that is the key distinction; an authentic leader knows ‘where they stand on 
important issues, values and beliefs, and they are transparent with those they interact with and 
lead’ (p. 104). 
By considering the leadership characteristics and traits of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation), this research can make a significant 
contribution to this area, heeding the call by Avolio and Gardner (2005) to ‘facilitate 
comparisons with other theoretical perspectives’ (p. 322). 
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A distinction within the literature is the relationship between the leaders and their 
followers. ‘Transformational leaders’ are described as developing followers into leaders 
whereas authentic leaders develop followers to achieve their best, which may not be to 
become leaders (Avolio and Gardner, 2005; Walumbwa et al., 2008). Followers are drawn to 
the character, personal example and dedication of the authentic leader rather than the 
transformational characteristics of ‘vision’ and a ‘clear sense of purpose’ (Gardner et al., 
2005). Interestingly, Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) use the term ‘authentic’ to distinguish 
between pseudo and genuine transformational leadership arguing a ‘manipulative’ element is 
needed if the leader considers it to be for the common good (p. 186). 
Useful for this research is the distinction between ‘charismatic’ and ‘authentic’ 
leadership. While charismatic leaders employ rhetoric to persuade, influence and mobilise 
followers, an authentic leader energises followers by creating meaning and a positive, 
socially constructed reality for themselves and their followers (Avolio and Gardner, 2005), 
with Bennis (2007) noting that, although it offends our notion of ‘authenticity’, leadership 
involves ‘acting as if one were a leader’ (p. 4). 
This research is concerned with analysing the leadership characteristics and styles of 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation). In order 
to do this, collected data will need to be analysed in the context of the traits used to 
contextualise extant theories, rather than to look specifically for certain leadership styles in 
the industry. This removes any biases to pre-existing theories, allowing the researcher to 
consider overlaps between them, adding to the debate concerning inherent ‘authentic’ 
leadership traits, and making a major contribution in this area. 
It will consider the call from Walumbwa et al. (2008) for longitudinal studies using 
qualitative and quantitative data collection looking at the integration of authentic leadership 
with other related literature (see Chapter 3 below). From a design viewpoint, the call is for 
93 
 
new ways to analyse the causal effects and consequences of ‘authentic’ leadership, and 
include the use of ‘content coding of speeches, email, scenario, videotapes and other 
correspondence’ (p. 119) to examine the impact on the performance of the overall 
organisation. 
2.12 Post Heroic Leadership Theories 
This research is concerned with whether the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout and, as such, it considers leadership from a strategic perspective, i.e. is concerned 
with leadership ‘of’ not ‘in’ organisations (Bryman, 2013). The review of literature above 
represents the ‘heroic’, unitary command approach (Pearce and Conger, 2002). The following 
section considers the emerging ‘post heroic’, collaborative view of ‘shared’ leadership. 
 
2.12.1 Shared Leadership 
The traditional approach to leadership discussed above takes a narrow view, focussing on 
those individuals who occupy formal leadership positions (Pearce and Manz, 2005). In recent 
years, there has been an emerging debate away from the ‘heroic’ ideal of a lone leader 
(Eicher, 2006) who ‘single handed, saves followers’ (Pearce and Manz, 2005, p. 130), and is 
seen as a ‘hero’ or ‘villain’ solely responsible for organisational success or failure (Collinson, 
2011). The ‘post heroic’ ‘shared’ leadership perspective disagrees with this top-down 
approach and, rather than focus on a set of personal traits of one leader, conceptualises 
leadership as a set of shared practices which can be enacted by people at all levels of the 
organisation (Kouzes and Posner, 2006). Leadership is seen as a ‘social process’ of human 
interactions through networks of influence (Fletcher, 2004) with the post heroic leader taking 
responsibility, gaining knowledge, encouraging innovation, seeking input and aims for a 
consensus in decision making (Eicher, 2006). 
94 
 
As this research is concerned with the influence of the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO on banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, 
this ‘relational’ element looking at the interaction between two or more people can provide 
some useful insights (Carson, Tesluk and Marrone, 2007). The quality of the relationship 
between the Chair and CEO plays an increasingly important role in decision making, 
information sharing, resource mobilisation and employee well-being (Wheatley, 2012), but is 
still under researched, especially where leadership influence occurs in the context of the team 
member relationships (Bedeian and Hunt, 2006; Yukl, 2008). 
Emerging literature calls for more research considering ‘shared’ leadership as the 
world is seen as too complex for one ‘heroic’ leader to be able to make effective decisions 
(Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007), and for more academic attentiveness to the 
interplay between the Chair and CEO (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010b) as the 
most important factor in ensuring long-term corporate success is deemed to be an effective 
executive team, i.e. one not dominated by a single voice and where open challenge and 
debate can occur within a cohesive board (Walker, 2009). There is still much to be learned 
about board dynamics, highlighted by the response of the board of Barclays to the LIBOR 
fixing scandal when, during the aftermath, Marcus Agius, the Chairman, stepped down, 
prompting suggestions that he was not tough enough to stand up to the headstrong CEO Bob 
Diamond (Brummer, 2015). 
As this research is concerned with the triadic relationship between the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, the shared leadership influence will be reported if found, adding 
to greater understanding in this area. 
 
2.13 Conclusion 
The aim of this part of the thesis was to review the literature relevant to the research question: 
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‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an 
influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ As such, it was divided into 
two parts: Part A explored the nature of banking failure, and Part B explored the literature 
covering strategic leadership, trait theory and extant leadership theories. 
In sum, this literature review has shown that the extant research on leadership uses 
‘traits’ to describe and identify leadership theories including: ‘charismatic’, ‘transactional’, 
‘transformational’, ‘authentic’ and ‘shared leadership’ (Cherniss et al., 2006). These are also 
shown as areas where the contextual research into board leaders in financial institutions is 
lacking. The trust in business leaders, especially those in financial institutions, is ‘low at 
present’ (Pye, 2013, p. 10) so there may be a requirement to postulate a different style of 
board leadership within financial institutions. 
This thesis is concerned with the influence of leadership characteristics and styles of 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the failure, recapitalisation or bailout of banks 
during the research period (1999–2017). The review of literature shows: 
1. There is agreement that strategic leaders influence the organisations that they run, and 
their role is concerned with leadership ‘of’ not ‘in’ organisations (Hitt, Ireland and 
Hoskisson, 2012), but the literature largely ignores the links between strategic 
leadership, leadership theories and the role traits play in success and failure, leaving 
important issues unaddressed. 
2. The review of the literature concerning leadership theories from trait theory through 
to authentic leadership finds that although the theories differ in terms of their view on 
what makes an effective leader, all the theories are described in terms of 
characteristics, traits and competences of the leaders under investigation. Trait theory 
itself is undergoing a renaissance with emerging literature examining the traits 
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required to be an effective leader, but it does not consider board leadership per se, and 
rarely links to other theories (Judge et al., 2002). 
3. The literature examining leadership focusses on the development of individual 
theories mainly in isolation, resulting in the loss of valuable connections between 
leadership styles which could advance our understanding of the intrinsic nature of the 
subject. 
4. The extant literature is predominantly review based (Gardner et al., 2010; Graeff, 
1997a) or empirical, testing an extant theory in context (Cavazotte et al., 2012). It is 
almost all quantitative with notable exceptions (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 
2006) leading Bennis (2007) to suggest there is a ‘need for longitudinal studies of 
leaders’ (p. 4). 
5. The literature on leadership in banking is sparse and narrow in focus, generally 
considering single leadership theories, confined to small numbers or countries. When 
directed at financial crises and failures, the extant literature considers failures in 
corporate governance and regulations but not in leadership. Emerging literature (Salz 
and Collins, 2013; Walker, 2009) begins to consider the possibility of board 
leadership in banks being a contributory factor in failure, but there is no robust study 
to date. 
6. There is agreement that the banking sector today is complex and volatile. Emerging 
‘post heroic’ views concur that such environments are too complicated to be run by a 
single leader (Collinson, 2011) and call for a shared, relational approach (Fletcher, 
2004), but the literature does not consider the strategic leadership perspective which is 
seen as fundamental in the post-crisis inquiries (Walker, 2009). The literature 
concerning the shared relationship between the CEO and Chair is considered by 
corporate governance literature (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; 
Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010b), but does not examine the relationship 
97 
 
between the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO or their shared influence on failure, recapitalisation or bailout. This represents a 
significant neglected issue. 
7. It is also clear from the review that people in the financial industry need leadership,  
but this has been largely overlooked by bankers, regulators, policy makers and 
scholars, especially when trying to discern the causes of the global financial crisis 
(McCalman and Paton, 2010), with the current analysis failing to consider executive 
leadership as a factor in averting future crises (Board, 2010). One issue hindering 
research in this area is access to data. Failed firms disappear and leaders rarely want 
to talk about their experiences, and when they do the explanations are likely to have a 
self-reporting and retrospective bias (Shepherd, Wiklund and Haynie, 2009). 
In sum, following the review of literature above, there is a clear need for a longitudinal, 
qualitative investigation which does not seek to contextualise a particular theory but instead 
considers the influence of the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO in the failure, recapitalisation or bailout of the largest banks (by market 
capitalisation) from the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) until saturation is 
reached (2017). 
The next stage of this thesis considers the research design required to answer the 
research question and related propositions. This will be considered in Part II below. 
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Part II 
Research Methodology and Data Collection 
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The first part of the thesis has defined and discussed the concepts, theories and practices of 
leadership relating to large banking institutions as defined in Chapter 2. This chapter marks 
the start of Part II and is concerned with the methodology used for the study. 
Research methodology covers the overall approach to the research process and 
includes the theoretical underpinning, collection and analysis of data (Collis and Hussey, 
2013). The main aim of this chapter is to identify the appropriate methodology to answer the 
research question defined in the literature review as: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
Part II provides a review of research design and strategy, considers appropriate 
paradigms of inquiry and finishes with the rationale behind the methodology chosen for the 
study. 
3.2 Research Design 
The literature review in Chapter 2 above identified the need to answer the research question 
‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an 
influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ and as such, the research is 
concerned with understanding ‘how’ and ‘why’ leaders within banks, as organisations within 
an industry context, make decisions in the way they do. In doing so, the research needs to 
consider the biases and dispositions of their top executives (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). 
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Therefore, the primary aim of this research is to discover the interaction between the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO within the bank, 
and to analyse the influence of this on whether the bank failed, needed recapitalisation or 
bailout. 
As such, the research design process starts with the identification of procedures that 
will allow the research to move from broad assumptions to a detailed method of data 
collection and analysis (Creswell and Clark, 2007). The process conceptualises the research 
question above and moves towards the development of an appropriate research methodology. 
This then guides the data collection, analysis, interpretation (Taylor, Bogdan and Devault, 
2015) and contextualisation of the research (Cheek, 2008). 
In terms of research design, this thesis will follow the sequential steps suggested by 
Schwandt (1994) starting with ‘leadership’ as its field of inquiry. It will select a research 
paradigm that is capable of informing and guiding the research process, linking it to the 
empirical world of the banking sector through an appropriate methodology. The chosen 
methodology then guides the process of data collection and the subsequent techniques for 
analysis. 
3.3 Research Strategy 
The first consideration is whether to use a quantitative or qualitative strategy. As this research 
is concerned with the analysis of the characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO in the banking industry, the review of literature was concerned with extant theories 
of strategic and organisational leadership. These were shown in Chapter 2 to be 
predominantly quantitative in design (Judge et al., 2002). 
Usefully, Bryman (2004) conducted a review of leadership literature prior to 2004 and 
found that qualitative research also made important contributions in areas such as leadership 
in the change process (Bryman, 2004). 
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Generally, researchers consider themselves to belong to either the qualitative or 
quantitative camp, which traditionally employ different paradigms (Layder, 1993). As this 
thesis covers board leadership in banking institutions, either a quantitative or qualitative 
approach could have been used. This section deals with an analysis of each before justifying 
the chosen strategy. 
3.3.1 Quantitative Methods 
Quantitative strategies were originally developed to quantify phenomena in the natural world 
and include surveys, experiments and statistical/numerical modelling (Creswell and Clark, 
2007). Notably for this research, a quantitative strategy using ratio analysis to consider 
corporate bankruptcy was used by Altman (1968). Quantitative models also proved 
successful in identifying potential bankruptcies in distressed companies (Agarwal and 
Taffler, 2008) and in exploring the relationship between environmental and organisational 
variables (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Quantitative methods were 
used for research underpinning management accounting control systems (Otley and Berry, 
1980) and a quantitative contingency theory approach was used to explore links between 
management control systems and performance (Chenhall and Chapman, 2006). However, 
although this strategy can produce models which are statistically correct, the approach and 
subsequent theories can result in weak underpinning theory, i.e. in terms of ratios (Smith, 
2017), and technical inconsistencies (Luft and Shields, 2003). 
Despite these criticisms, in an examination of leadership characteristics and styles in 
banking, a quantitative approach would be possible as it emphasises the measurement and 
analysis of causal relationships between variables, not processes (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
However, as this research requires analysis of the characteristics and traits found in 
leadership styles, a purely quantitative methodology in isolation could miss the nuances of 
language and the valuable connections within the nature of leadership (Ospina and Sorenson, 
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2006) which is ‘intrinsically relational and social in nature’ (p. 188). This finds support from 
Kaplan and Maxwell (2005) who argue that the goal of understanding a phenomenon from 
the point of view of the participants in a particular social and institutional context is largely 
lost when textual data is quantified. 
3.3.2 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative research takes place in the natural setting, and uses multiple research methods that 
are both interactive and humanistic (Creswell et al., 2003). The researcher views ‘the social 
phenomena holistically … reflects on who he or she is in the inquiry ... (and) uses complex 
reasoning that is multifaceted, iterative and simultaneous’ (pp. 181–182). 
The qualitative methodological approach was developed to enable researchers to 
study social and cultural phenomena (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). The emphasis is 
on process and meaning which are not rigorously examined or measured in terms of quality, 
amount, intensity or frequency. Instead, the researcher seeks answers to questions that stress 
how social experience is created, and the strategy allows an emphasis on process and 
meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). This makes it effective for studying attitudes and 
behaviour over time (Babbie, 2013). 
It involves the assumptions and use of theoretical frameworks that inform the study of 
research problems, addressing the measurement of individuals or groups assigned to a social 
or human problem (Creswell and Clark, 2017). It is capable of accepting the background of 
the study in the context of the information, but can lead to differing interpretations and a lack 
of generalisability (Corbin and Strauss, 2014). 
The design of qualitative research is influenced by the topic under investigation, and 
the rules for doing the study in general (Blackmon and Maylor, 2005). There is a clear need 
for robust data collection techniques which should include: the procedure for documentation, 
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detailed information about how the study was designed and how it was conducted (Collis and 
Hussey, 2013). 
The decision to undertake qualitative research is related to the nature of the research 
problem, the degree of uncertainty surrounding it and the researcher’s theoretical assumptions 
(Trauth, 2001). This research is concerned with board leadership in banking and, as shown in 
the literature review above, the predominant strategy used in leadership research is 
quantitative (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe and Gardner, 2001). However, in their 
comprehensive review of leadership literature from 2001–2009, Gardner et al. (2010) call for 
‘more qualitative papers to provide meaningful insights and enhance our understanding of 
leadership processes’ (p. 22). This finds support from Parry (1998) who argues that a 
qualitative strategy is important for dealing with human behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, values 
and actions, as it allows the researcher to concentrate on the words and actions of the people 
being studied (Corbin and Strauss, 2014) resulting in a holistic account of the area under 
study (Creswell and Clark, 2017). 
Qualitative research was developed in the social sciences and can be positivist, 
interpretive or critical (Crotty, 1998). For example, case study research can be positivist (Yin, 
2011), interpretive (Walsham, 1993) or critical, just as action research can be positivist (Clark 
and Chase, 1972), interpretive (Elden and Chisholm, 1993) or critical (Carr and Kemmis, 
1986). A strength of qualitative research design in analysing leadership within organisations 
includes its ability to generate rich descriptions (Creswell and Clark, 2017; Gardner et al., 
2010). 
As this research considers the influence of leadership in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout, the appropriateness of using qualitative methods in accounting 
research is also considered. Accounting researchers have voiced concerns over the quality of 
qualitative methods (Ali and Yusof, 2011), but recent trends in its use, especially in 
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management accounting, have confirmed it as both a credible and valid alternative to 
quantitative methods, particularly in theory development, where it can provide guiding 
principles (Vaivio, 2008). 
Qualitative research design characteristics have evolved over time. However, all 
forms occur within a natural setting, involve complex inductive or deductive reasoning and 
accept multiple forms of data methods, allowing researchers to reflect on the background to 
the study and how it informs their interpretation of the information (Creswell and Clark, 
2017). 
3.3.3 Choice of Research Strategy 
As discussed above, the nature of the research problem determines the choice of research 
strategy and the nature of what one wants to learn determines how one should go about 
learning it (Trauth, 2001). This research question is concerned with whether the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout and, as such, attempts to uncover the nature of the 
leadership phenomenon. Such cases lend themselves to qualitative design (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990) which can accommodate different theoretical lenses, paradigms or 
philosophies (Schwandt, 2001). The review of literature shows a clear need for more 
qualitative research (Gardner et al., 2010; Lowe and Gardner, 2001) and the need for a more 
balanced approach (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Accordingly, a qualitative strategy will be 
adopted. 
The selection of a qualitative design affects the decisions relating to the methodology 
and research methods (Trauth, 2001). The design of the research model is influenced by the 
topic being studied and the rules for doing that study in general (Maylor, Blackmon and 
Huemann, 2016). The following section therefore outlines the paradigm of inquiry, together 
with the research philosophy before giving the justification for the chosen methodology. 
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3.4 Paradigm of Inquiry and Research Philosophy 
A paradigm is a loose collection of logically related assumptions, concepts or propositions 
that orientate thinking and research (Bogdan and Biklen, 1998). It represents a shared 
worldview highlighting the beliefs and values in a discipline that guide how problems are 
solved (Schwandt, 2001). The paradigm is a way of describing the world and is informed by 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality, such as what we believe we can know 
about the nature of that reality (ontology), and the ways of knowing it (epistemology) (Patton, 
2002). The chosen paradigm then leads to the use of appropriate approaches in order to 
construct a systematic inquiry concerning how the world should be studied (methodology). 
The choice of the research paradigm therefore sets down the intent, motivation and 
expectations of the research (MacKenzie and Knipe, 2006). 
Qualitative research can encompass positivist, post positivist, 
constructionist/interpretivist and participatory paradigms (Heron and Reason, 1997; Lincoln, 
Lynham and Guba, 2011). The decision of which paradigm to adopt affects the final outcome 
of this research and its relevance to leadership issues. The choice of a paradigm therefore 
needs to suit the research objectives, research problem and also match the nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation, i.e. the importance of leadership characteristics and styles 
on the success or failure of banks. 
The paradigm of inquiry deals with the philosophical issues underpinning qualitative 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) and involves the framework of ideas, procedures and 
outcomes within which a piece of work is structured (Howell, 2012). Paradigms determine 
how members of research communities view the phenomena under investigation and the 
research methods that should be employed to study them (Knowles and Cole, 2008). 
Lincoln and Denzin (2000) argue that as knowledge is constructed and not 
discovered, the philosophical assumptions underlie the validity of the research and the choice 
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of an appropriate method. The three aspects through which the paradigm can be identified 
(ontological, epistemological and methodological) (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) are 
distinguishable and interconnected (Lincoln and Denzin, 2000). They are explained below. 
3.5 Paradigms of Inquiry in Qualitative Research 
The chosen strategy for this research is qualitative which, due to its interpretive nature 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000), places particular boundaries on the research in terms of the 
questions asked by the researcher and how the responses are interpreted. 
 
3.5.1 Ontology 
Ontology refers to the nature of reality and its characteristics (Creswell and Clark, 2017). It 
defines the social world and its structures as having an empirical, concrete existence which is 
independent of the individual (Hopper and Powell, 1985). As this research is concerned with 
the analysis of leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
in banks, the ontological nature of the questions asked will relate to what can be known about 
the form and nature of reality within the banking context. 
Positivist/post positivist: As stated above, ontological paradigms include positivist, 
post positivist, constructivist, interpretivist and participatory (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 
2011). Positivist/post positivist paradigms are based on rationalistic, empiricist philosophy 
originating from Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Comte and Kant (MacKenzie, 2003). The positivist 
looks for the discovery of universal truths (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011) independent 
from the knower, with the post positivist believing that truths cannot be known for certain, 
instead seeing the world as ambiguous, variable and with many realities (O’Leary, 2017). 
Both positivism and post positivism can be applied to the social world as the 
researcher observes and measures a theory or experience in order to predict or control the 
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forces that surround it (O’Leary, 2017). Traditional research in leadership with its 
questionnaires and surveys are based on positivism, but they pay insufficient attention to the 
role played by institutional contexts (Gronn and Ribbins, 1996) and lack depth when 
considering the essence of leadership (Grint, 2005). As a result, there has been a shift towards 
non-positivist paradigms as social science researchers have moved from quantitative methods 
to qualitative (Knowles and Cole, 2008) with Bryman calling for greater engagement with 
ideas and standpoints from different paradigms (Bryman, Stephens and Campo, 1996). 
As this research is a qualitative study concerned with the leadership styles and 
characteristics of the key board members in banks, the institutional context together with the 
essence of leadership are a key focus of this research and therefore the positivist/post-
positivist ontology outlined above is not considered to be the most appropriate (Grint, 2005; 
Gronn and Ribbins, 1996). 
Interpretivist: Alternatively, the constructivist/interpretivist paradigms are related 
concepts that address the world as others experience it. From an ontological perspective, 
interpretivists believe that the world is socially constructed with as many intangible realities 
as people constructing them (Creswell and Clark, 2017), so the reality is limited to context, 
industries or groups. It has grown in popularity for qualitative inquiries into leadership issues 
(Ospina and Sorenson, 2006) as the researcher seeks to understand the world of human 
experience (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007) within a socially constructed environment 
(MacKenzie and Knipe, 2006). It allows for accepting and seeing multiple perspectives 
(Willis and Jost, 2007) with the researcher relying on the views of the participants, 
recognising the impact of their background and their experiences on the research (Creswell et 
al., 2003). These experiences are then used to construct and interpret understanding from the 
gathered data. 
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The interpretivist starts with the assumption that access to perceived reality (given or 
socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness 
and shared meanings (Johari, 2009). Interpretivist studies generally attempt to understand 
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them and interpretive methods of 
research are aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the information system, 
and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the context 
(Walsham, 2006). Interpretivist research does not pre-define dependent and independent 
variables, but focusses on the full complexity of human sense-making as the situation 
emerges (Kaplan and Maxwell, 2005), with the emphasis on insight and in-depth information 
(Creswell and Clark, 2017). Interpretivists seek methods that enable them to understand the 
relationship of humans to their environment and the part these people play in creating the 
social fabric of which they are a part (McQueen and Zimmerman, 2006). 
So the interpretivist perspective is founded on the view that the social world is 
something constructed within individuals. People, including the researchers and participants, 
define their own meaning, their ‘subjectivities, interests and emotions’ (Sparkes, 1992, p. 25) 
within the social, political and cultural setting. What exists in the world is what we as 
individuals think exists (Coe, 2012) and the emphasis is on personal meaning making. 
Meaning is founded on social consensus, rules that guide the course of an individual’s life 
and come to be regarded as objective (Scott, 2012). This perception of reality can be 
influenced by political, cultural and social rules which then support the construction of shared 
meanings (Howell, 2012), but, crucially, this sense-making changes depending on 
individuals’ experiences (Sparkes, 1992). 
Social constructionism: Alternatively, social constructionism takes the view that 
people interpret and construct reality at the same time as these interpretations take place 
within granted industry norms (Giddens, 1984), and considers the interaction between people 
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and their environment. It is particularly useful for answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. The 
social constructionist approach takes the view that leadership is constructed in the social 
interaction between the individuals and the task of the research is to enhance our 
understanding of those interactions (Drako, 2007; Steyaert, 1997). The extant literature 
covering both leadership styles and banking failures is preoccupied with deductive, 
quantitative, hypothesis testing research which depicts this as being caused by certain 
variables and affected by others, therefore reducing its capacity to enhance understanding of 
the context within society or the economy. Leadership characteristics in particular are 
reduced to simplistic models focussing on psychological or leadership traits, rational decision 
making, and economic exchange. This thesis argues that this approach represents leadership 
in a much simplified world. 
Social constructionism is accepted as a major research perspective in organisational 
and gender studies (Gergen, 1999), but is still underused in both leadership research and 
particularly research considering the reasons for banking failure. 
Having considered the options above, this thesis will adopt a social constructionist 
perspective as it will allow for the conscious and critical treatment of the basic research 
assumptions, i.e. that the leadership characteristics of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
within the boards of banks are influencing factors in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout. Its approach is to focus on the individual actors, but crucially the interaction between 
them (Drako et al., 2007). By using this approach, the thesis argues that leadership 
characteristics emerge dynamically in the social interactions between people and it is 
therefore insufficient to talk about single leaders. Instead, it takes the view that leaders create 
the leadership process together (Hitt, Ireland and Santoro, 2004) and even where one leader 
has performed the ‘leadership act’ (i.e. Fred Goodwin’s decision to buy ABN Amro), the 
interaction between the board members in a social context has still taken place. Previous 
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literature considering leadership styles takes the ‘heroic’ view that a leader is a special kind 
of individual (Sorensen, Iedema and Severinsson, 2008). Even if different people have 
differing impacts and importance to the process, the leadership process is still part of a 
complex web of reciprocal interaction between culturally embedded actors who are closely 
connected (Lindgren and Packendorff, 2003). Consequently, the single leader cannot be seen 
to influence on their own, but instead as part of this social interaction. While the empirical 
source of knowledge of leadership is still the individuals, the focus of this research is how the 
leaders interact and create meaning together and over time. 
This makes social constructionism particularly suitable for this research study as it is 
concerned with the nature of leadership characteristics and styles within a group of 
individuals (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) within the banking industry setting. Their 
actions are seen as a result of external influences within a structure of rules that bind the 
participants (regulation and markets) (Howell, 2012; Smith, 2017). Therefore, a social 
constructionist paradigm is deemed most effective for this inquiry. 
3.5.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology refers to the relationship between the knower and what can be known. The 
answer to this question is already constrained by the research strategy and ontology above 
(Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011). Epistemology considers the nature of knowledge, the 
justification of how we know what we know (Creswell and Clark, 2017), what form it takes 
and how it can be obtained (Hopper and Powell, 1985). It is an alternative way of expressing 
knowledge which it assumes can be found by objective observation (i.e. through reason and 
logic, or subjective observation, where the standards of rational belief are those of the 
individual believer or those of the believer’s community) (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2009). The goal of the social constructionist is to embrace and value the subjectivity (Willis 
and Jost, 2007). 
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As this research is a qualitative study considering whether the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, the knowledge created will be subjective (i.e. 
expressed as a standard of rational belief) and assumed to be true as it is developed as the 
investigation progresses (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011) rather than the objective view 
adopted more generally by quantitative, positivist/post positivist studies that the findings 
‘are’, or ‘are probably’ true. 
In sum, this thesis takes the view that leadership is a socially constructed phenomenon 
(Grint, 2005), a product of socio-historical and collective meaning (Fairhurst and Grant, 
2010) with multiple rather than single socially constructed realities (Lincoln, Lynham and 
Guba, 2011). Its aim is to explore the influence of the leadership styles and characteristics of 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout with 
emphasis on the specific cultural and historical contexts that underpin the phenomena and, in 
doing so, generate new understanding of the world in which they are embedded (Howell, 
2012). Following the consideration of possible research methodologies discussed above, a 
qualitative strategy using a subjective, social constructionist paradigm is considered the most 
appropriate method to answer the research question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
3.5.3 Paradigm of Inquiry for this Research 
Leadership as a phenomenon is a process with the emphasis on the dynamic nature of social 
reality (Fairhurst and Grant, 2010; Grint, 2005; Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985), and so 
the issue here is to choose the paradigm that best suits both the research objectives and the 
research problem, while at the same time being suited to the nature of leadership as a 
phenomenon. As outlined above, this thesis adopts a subjective, social constructionist 
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paradigm for the following reasons: 
Firstly, the nature of leadership is a social construction and is context specific. 
Secondly, as board leadership is a ‘neglected issue’ (Edwards and Clough, 2005), the 
researcher needs to understand the phenomenon from the perspective of actors who inhabit 
the particular context and who are in the best position to view the construction of the 
phenomenon. As this research uses leadership theory as a basis, the social constructionist 
approach is appropriate as it uses theory to provide explanations of human actions (Taylor 
and Trujillo, 2001). This research is concerned with understanding the subjective nature of 
leadership within the context of board members of global banking institutions, as defined in 
Chapter 2 above, while at the same time maintaining an open mind about the context so as 
not to place any constraints that obstruct discovering the nature of the phenomenon. 
3.6 Research Approach 
The choice of research approach is tied to the philosophical assumptions of the researcher and 
the research strategy (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009), and can be deductive or 
inductive. 
Deduction starts with a general or abstract concept and considers how it applies to 
specific circumstances (Charmez, 2006), so the inferring of particulars from a general 
statement is a matter of logic and the approach in establishing a causal relationship between 
two variables is scientific (Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013). It involves testing a theoretical 
proposition by employing ‘a research strategy specifically designed for the purpose of its 
testing’ (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009, p. 590). The limitation that this places on 
permissions for alternative explanations are important for business and management (Sekaran 
and Bougie, 2016) and, together with the potential for the construction of rigid methodology, 
have led to it being generally associated with the positivist paradigm (Creswell and Clark, 
2017). As this research considers the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
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Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the banking industry using a qualitative, subjective social 
constructionist design, the deductive approach is not considered suitable for this research. 
Alternatively, the inductive approach is rooted in qualitative research where data is 
often generated in a non-standard fashion. The emphasis is on the individual’s interpretations 
and the experiences of the participants, with a concern for the relationship between theory 
and research (Bryman, 2004). The inductive approach allows the researcher to make 
informed decisions about research design and the appropriateness of the strategies that could 
be used, while also catering for likely constraints (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2012). This gives a more flexible approach than deductive reasoning, allowing the researcher 
to make changes during the research process, permitting facts to be discovered and 
conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the collected data. It will therefore be used in 
the analytical process of this thesis. 
3.7 Research Methodology 
Research methodology is concerned with how the researcher can find out what they believe 
can be known and is constrained by the chosen ontology and epistemology above (Ospina 
and Sorenson, 2006). Methodology is an overall approach in the research process (Collis and 
Hussey, 2013) and is a strategy of inquiry which moves from the underlying philosophical 
assumptions to research design and data collection thereby reflecting the ontological and 
epistemological premises of the research (Schensul and Lecompte, 2012). It guides the 
researcher in carrying out the research within the constraints already identified (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2009) and the knowledge, strategies and methods used by the researcher 
determine the methodology, suggesting a causal link between the paradigm of inquiry and the 
adopted methodology (Creswell and Clark, 2017). The purpose of social constructionism in 
research is to understand people’s experiences and as such, the research takes place in the 
environment in which the participants work (Creswell et al., 2003). Positivist paradigms tend 
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to use experiments and surveys, whereas the social constructionist paradigm chosen for this 
study typically uses action research, ethnography, case studies or grounded theory (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). The choice of methodology is constrained by the objectives and research 
questions that have been established (Collis and Hussey, 2013) and those choices are outlined 
in the following section. 
 
3.8 Choices of Methodology 
3.8.1 Action Research 
Action research is generally used to find an effective way of bringing about a conscious 
change in a partly controlled environment (Collis and Hussey, 2013). The inquiry is 
completed through a cycle of planning, acting, observing and reflecting (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009), relying on the researcher and client collaborating in the diagnosis of a 
problem and development of a solution (Coghlan and Shani, 2005) in the belief that the 
actions or behaviour can only be changed by testing them (Fisher and Phelps, 2006). 
Action research is accepted as a valid research method in applied fields such as 
organisation development and education (Kemmis and McTaggart, 1988) as it answers the 
practical concerns of people and is often used to resolve organisational issues, such as 
change, by consulting with those who are experiencing them (Eden and Huxham, 1996). It 
adds to the goals of social science research by enlarging the stock of knowledge (Clarke and 
Egan, 1972) and promoting joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical 
framework (Rapoport, 1970). 
As this research is concerned with analysing the leadership characteristics and styles 
of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation) that 
failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017), the collaborative nature of this 
methodology makes it inappropriate for this study. 
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3.8.2 Ethnography 
‘Ethnography’ means the study of people (Howell, 2012) and comes from the disciplines of 
social and cultural anthropology where an ethnographer is required to spend a significant 
amount of time in the field. Ethnographers immerse themselves in the lives of the people they 
study (Lewis and Russell, 2011) seeking to place the phenomena studied in its social and 
cultural context. The focus is on the manner in which people interact and collaborate in 
observable, regular ways (Gill and Johnson, 2010) with the aim of looking beyond what 
people say to identify a shared system of culture (Goulding, 2005). Ethnography has become 
widely used in the study of information systems in organisations (Hughes et al., 1993) and 
can include any system which fully or partially describes a group by identifying common 
threads such as management style (Goulding, 2005). It allows for multiple perspectives to be 
incorporated (Holtzblatt and Beyer, 1993) providing a general approach for exploring beliefs 
and contextual factors, particularly in the investigation of information systems (Pettigrew, 
Fidel and Bruce, 2001) and document analysis (Bowen, 2001). A key feature is direct contact 
with group members (Goulding, 2005) with the voices of the participants heard in the end 
narrative (Boyle, 1994). 
As the research question for this thesis is concerned with the leadership styles and 
characteristics of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market 
capitalisation) from 1999–2017, the embedding of the researcher would not only be too hard 
to accomplish, but would also not be possible during the research period. For these reasons, 
an ethnographic approach is not appropriate for this study. 
3.8.3 Case Studies 
The case study methodology involves empirical investigation of a particular phenomenon 
within its real-life context and involves the systematic investigation of a single individual 
event or situation (Yin, 2011). As it does not start with a set of questions or ideas about 
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limits, it requires a high degree of energy at each stage of the process (Bennett and Elman, 
2006) and can either result in massive, unreadable documents or report only the researcher’s 
findings (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). 
Case studies are widely used in organisational studies, especially in the social science 
disciplines of sociology, industrial relations and anthropology (Hartley, 2004). A study 
consists of detailed investigation of one or more organisations, or groups within 
organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and processes involved in 
the phenomenon under study (Meyer, 2001). 
Case studies are tailor-made for exploring new processes or behaviours that are little 
understood (Hartley, 2004), hence the approach is particularly useful for responding to ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions about a contemporary set of events with the main aim of exploring and 
understanding the phenomena within a particular context (Yin, 2011). 
Accordingly, case studies are pertinent to descriptive research questions such as 
‘What is happening or has happened?’ or explanatory questions such as ‘How or why did 
something happen?’ (Bromley, 1986). By emphasising the study of a phenomenon within its 
real-world context, the case study method favours the collection of data in natural settings. 
However, the credibility of case study methodology has been criticised for a perceived lack 
of procedural trust which may not sufficiently protect against biases such as a researcher 
seeming to affirm what she or he had set out to find. There is also a perceived inability to 
generalise case study findings to any broader level (Zainal, 2007). 
Case study research can be positivist, interpretivist or critical depending upon the 
underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher (Yin, 2011), and is particularly 
favoured for in-depth interpretative studies (Walsham, 1993). 
Despite the apparent applicability to this study, as the research is concerned with the 
study of leadership styles and characteristics of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO of the 
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largest banks (by market capitalisation) (1999–2017), it is likely that the research project 
would generate too much data and take too long to be a viable method (Yin, 2011). 
3.8.4 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a methodology that seeks to construct theory about the issues of 
importance in people’s lives (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The researcher has no preconceived 
ideas to prove or disprove (Mills, Bonner and Francis, 2006) and the methodology seeks to 
develop a substantive theory, grounded in data, which is systematically gathered and 
analysed. Grounded theory is inductive and allows the researcher to develop a theoretical 
account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in 
empirical observations or data (Martin and Turner, 1986). It is a general method of 
comparative analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1997) which focusses on the development of a new 
theory, identified by people who have experience of the phenomena in question (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008), allowing the researcher to give accounts of these personal experiences while 
explaining why they may have impacted the study (Creswell and Clark, 2007). It therefore 
stands out as a theory that allows investigation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ problems in a systematic 
way (Jones and Noble, 2007). 
The approach uses ‘categories’ to highlight the data, which are then saturated to 
demonstrate their importance allowing a general framework to be developed (Silverman, 
2013). As such, it allows for flexibility of data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1967). 
However, predetermined sample sizes are argued to be inappropriate as the level of sampling 
can determine the findings (Sandelowski, 1995). 
The grounded theory process develops context-based descriptions and explanations of 
the phenomena (Orlikowski, 1993), making it increasingly important in qualitative research 
within the social science and management fields (Altheide et al., 1998) and for inductively 
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generating deep insights into leadership processes (Bryman, Stephens and Campo, 1996; 
Parry, 1998). 
The major difference between grounded theory and other methods is the specific 
approach to theory development – grounded theory suggests that there should be a continuous 
interplay between data collection and analysis (Charmez, 2006). However, without a 
theoretical framework, the researcher can stray into providing description without meaning 
(Hartley, 2004). 
In sum, grounded theory is a primarily inductive methodology (Howell, 2012) 
through which the researcher pursues the interpretations of those involved in the situation 
under investigation in relation to the data. It is particularly suited to a social constructionist 
approach as it allows the researcher to address the ‘why’ questions, enabling the researcher to 
generate new understandings and novel interpretations of the studied lives (Charmez, 2006). 
In order to explore the question ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout?’ a grounded theory methodology is consistent with a social constructionist approach 
which will allow the actions of the board members to be a central focus within socially 
created situations and social structures. This will offer a consistent and appropriate 
methodology for investigating the research question. 
3.9 Methodology Chosen: Grounded Theory 
As the review of methodology shows, researchers do not reach a conclusion about their view 
of the nature of truth and reality quickly or easily (Mills, Bonner and Francis, 2006). In 
seeking to analyse whether the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, this 
research has chosen an social constructionist ontology, acknowledging that there can ‘exist as 
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many such constructions as there are individuals’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p. 43). 
Epistemologically, the research is subjective with the researcher being part of the process 
rather than an objective observer (Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011). In seeking a research 
methodology that fits with this position, grounded theory has been chosen as it provides both 
a methodology and mode of analysis for this study allowing the researcher to delve into an 
unknown area of human nature and behaviour (Nwanji, 2006). The theoretical explanations 
of behaviour can allow for process, thereby recognising context and change (Goulding, 
2005). This becomes important when studying human behaviour as, in many cases, although 
people may be calculated and rational when making decisions, they typically turn to 
established routines to attain their purposes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). 
Given the identified need in the literature review to understand the influence of the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout, a grounded theory methodology allows the data to emerge 
from the accounts and statements of those leaders involved in the particular situational 
context (Strauss and Corbin, 1997) and also allows for a wide range of data sources to be 
used in the gathering of various perspectives on the problem (Strauss and Corbin, 1967). 
Grounded theory starts from a point of exploration rather than a specific research 
question, with the research question coming instead from this initial exploration (Charmez, 
2006). The research is an emergent product of certain times, social conditions and 
interactions (Bryant, 2002). Grounded theory also provides a powerful argument that 
legitimises qualitative research as a credible methodological approach in its own right, rather 
than simply as a precursor for developmental qualitative studies (Charmez, 2006). 
As this research is concerned with investigating the influence of board leadership 
characteristics and styles within banks, a grounded theory methodology was adopted as it 
involves research ‘about’ and ‘with’ people (Howell, 2012). It has been used to examine 
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organisations and cultures (Turner, 1983), organisational change (Dunn and Swierczek, 
1977), financial reporting practices (Hussey and Ong, 2005) and corporate growth (Johnson, 
1981). However, the majority of these studies are concerned with findings and discussions, 
devoting little time to the methodological approach adopted (Martin and Turner, 1986). Using 
previous, well-formulated leadership theories would have made it possible for this project to 
concentrate on collecting data (Martin and Turner, 1986) using only one or two theories, such 
as ‘charismatic’ or ‘transformational’ leadership (Suddaby, 2006). However, it was felt that 
this would not allow for any variation in leadership styles, nor would it allow the richness of 
the theories to develop from the data. 
Using a grounded theory approach, this study is therefore concerned with the 
generation of a substantive theory of leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banks. In its original form, the theory comes from data that has 
been ‘systematically obtained and analysed’ (Glaser and Strauss, 2009, p. 1) in areas where 
the researcher ‘does not know what they are looking for’ when they start (Glaser, 2001, p. 
176) and aims to provide a fresh slant on existing knowledge (Charmez, 2006; Goulding, 
2005; Locke, 2002). The conceptual theory is then developed to account for patterns of 
behaviour that are relevant to those involved (Glaser, 2003). In this approach, a literature 
review prior to data collection is not required (Heath and Cowley, 2004) as it can derail the 
process by leading to assumptions of what the data might present (Glaser, 2003). Grounded 
theorists code data as it is collected allowing categories and properties to emerge through the 
process of consistent comparison of incident with incident and incident with concept (Glaser, 
2003). Coding is iterative and interactive, carried out ‘line by line’ so as not to impose the 
researcher’s beliefs on the data interpretation (Karim Sorour and Howell, 2013). 
This approach was criticised by Strauss, who argued that it results in a few concepts 
loosely strung together, and therefore cannot satisfy the requirements for formulating social 
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theory. He suggested an alternative approach using coding matrixes to conceptualise ideas 
beyond the immediate field of study (Strauss, 1987). The disagreements between Strauss and 
Glaser are based on the emphasis on deductive and inductive processes (Karim Sorour and 
Howell, 2013). For Strauss, induction, deduction and verification are the very basis of 
grounded theory (Strauss, 1987). Induction is based on the experience of the phenomena, 
which can include personal experience, previous theories or exploratory research, while 
deduction requires the ability to both think logically and draw on previous experience to aid 
success (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
This development of a formal structuring process for the coding of data and the 
generating of the substantive theory (Parker and Roffey, 1997; Suddaby, 2006) is suited to 
this research study as the areas to be studied (leadership characteristics and styles), together 
with the subsequent literature review, suggest a source of data which can lead to direct 
theoretical sampling (Charmez, 2006). Therefore the method proposed by Strauss and Corbin 
(1997) will be adopted. 
3.10 Conclusion 
In sum, this research is concerned with the influence of leadership characteristics and styles 
of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation) that 
failed, required recapitalisation or bailout. This chapter has considered the potential research 
strategies that could be used, deciding on a qualitative approach as it allows for flexibility and 
the opportunity to develop new ideas (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006). As leadership is a 
socially constructed phenomena (Meindl, Ehrlich and Dukerich, 1985), a social 
constructionist, subjective view is considered the most appropriate. These decisions then 
influenced the selection of research methodology which, following the review of possible 
methodologies above, resulted in the Strauss and Corbin approach to grounded theory being 
chosen. 
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The next chapter focusses on the data collection and analysis techniques to be used. 
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Chapter 4 
Adapted Grounded Theory 
The aim of this research is to analyse the influence of leadership characteristics and styles of 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation) that 
failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout. As outlined in the chapters above, it will use a 
qualitative strategy based on a subjective epistemology within a social constructionist 
ontology. Following the review of suitable methodologies, the Strauss and Corbin method of 
grounded theory was selected with the aim of building a substantive theory of leadership in 
the global banking sector (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Grounded theory was selected for its 
flexibility (Charmez, 2006) with the researcher having the latitude to create methods as the 
inquiry proceeds. It is important to note that grounded theory does not encourage research 
that ignores existing empirical knowledge, rather it should observe a direct and necessary link 
between the extant area (in this case ‘leadership’) and grounded theory (Suddaby, 2006). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3 above, grounded theory provides a way of generating a substantive 
theory through the collection of data, comparative study and coding. The social 
constructionist ontology chosen rests on the assumption that humans do not passively react to 
external reality but impose their own internal perceptions on the world, and in doing so, 
create their own realities (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Grounded theory is considered most 
appropriate to elicit fresh understandings of these realities in cases where researchers have an 
interesting phenomena (in this case banking failures) without explanation, e.g. why did some 
banks fail, need recapitalisation or bailout, and others not? (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It also 
allows for analysis of the meanings and concepts used by actors (in this case the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) in real settings (Gephart, 2004). 
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The Strauss and Corbin (2008) version of grounded theory uses analytic categories 
constructed from data (Charmaz, 2014), which are then coded in order to understand the 
contribution made to the participants’ lives. The methodology involves analysing actions 
together with processes, rather than topics or themes (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011), and 
requires persistence and creativity during the inquiry process (Karim Sorour and Howell, 
2013). 
Grounded theory has been consistently adopted by researchers working with 
qualitative data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). This research considers the fundamental 
question ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ and, as such, the 
Corbin and Strauss (1990) approach gives the structure needed to code and analyse the data, 
together with the flexibility to allow the procedures to vary according to the circumstances 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). However, the literature review identified the need for an 
assessment of the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO linked to the pre-existing leadership theories. The coding process will therefore need to 
be adapted in order to focus on links between the data and the pre-existing theories while 
allowing the nuances of the leadership characteristics and styles to emerge. Although the 
purpose of grounded theory is theory construction rather than application of existing theories 
(Charmaz and Bryant, 2011), it is more desirable and often necessary to start the quest for a 
formal grounded theory from a substantive one, as this gives initial direction in developing 
categories and properties (Suddaby, 2006). Notably, Charmaz (2006) took an approach that 
focussed on themes occurring within the data, rather than concepts and categories (Charmaz, 
2006), and Huxham and Vangen (2000) used a derivation of grounded theory to develop 
themes around leader collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2000). 
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By adapting the grounded theory approach to develop a substantive formal theory 
around leadership while using, but not being restricted by, extant leadership theories, this 
research adds to the literature ‘demonstrating the strengths of grounded theory as a tool for 
inductively generating deep insights into leadership processes’ (Gardner and Lowe, 2009, p. 
22). It provides a major contribution to the development of the use of grounded theory and 
heeds the calls for more open forms of inquiry (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006), more radical 
thinking of the relationship between data and theory construction (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012), and the need to address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions which are still missing from the 
process (Harry, Sturges and Klingner, 2005). 
4.2 Procedures and Adaption to the Strauss and Corbin Approach 
Grounded theory has grown to be a dominant data analysis model (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012). In spite of this popularity, questions over its promise to create new empirically based 
theories remain (Bryant, 2002; Charmaz, 2006), partly due to incomplete searches and a lack 
of well-articulated strategies (Suddaby, 2006). This has led to the call for radical re-thinking 
of the relationship between data and theory construction cited above (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012). This thesis heeds this call by adapting the Strauss and Corbin method to 
develop a more formal way to ‘find the middle ground between the theory laden view (of 
leadership) and unfettered empiricism’ (Suddaby, 2006, p. 635). 
In grounded theory methodology, the researcher systematically develops a theory 
from collected data. The Corbin and Strauss (1990) method requires that data collection and 
analysis occur simultaneously in order for the researcher to capture all the potentially relevant 
aspects of the study (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The data collection, analysis and conceptual 
theorising occur in parallel from the beginning of the process (Charmaz, 2006). It is the idea 
of beginning with an area of study and allowing a theory to magically emerge that has 
exposed grounded theory to ridicule (Wacquant, 2002). 
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In answer to this criticism, this thesis employs a strategy where the constant 
comparison of the data allows for conceptually similar incidences to be ‘grouped together 
under a higher level descriptive concept’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 73), i.e. extant 
leadership theories. This allows the researcher to identify ‘a higher level of abstraction, 
higher than the data itself’ (Martin and Turner, 1986, p. 147). The process keeps the validity 
of this type of research (Silverman, 2013) and allows for the generation of a theory that is 
integrated, consistent and plausible (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
4.3 The Coding Approach 
Coding of actions in grounded theory differs from coding used in other methodologies as it 
involves comparative methods, discerning meaning by the contextualisation of actions and 
events (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011). Coding is the initial phase (Charmaz, 2006) of basic data 
analysis carried out by the researcher (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). It provides the bedrock of 
grounded theory (Howell, 2012), the pivotal link between data collection and the 
development of the emergent theory (Charmaz, 2006). It allows for data to be broken down, 
conceptualised and put back together in new ways, and involves ‘open, axial, and selective 
processes’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 9) which are discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Open Coding 
Open coding is the ‘process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and 
categorizing data’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 61). Comparison is essential with the data 
continually compared, critiqued and questioned (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011). It begins with 
the use of memos, where the researcher assesses and re-assesses the phenomena under 
investigation. This differs from grounded theory in its original form, where the creation of 
codes comes from the interpretation of the data, rather than placing the data into 
predetermined codes (Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
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In the adaption to grounded theory used in this study, the researcher keeps the 
comparison, critique and questioning stages required for validity, without change. Data is 
broken down, examined and labelled without any limitations of scope or application of filters. 
Codes are then organised into patterns allowing the initial concepts to emerge. Labels are 
chosen by the researcher but can come from technical literature, interviews and documents 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 2003). This research project uses labels that reflect 
leadership characteristics and styles, which are taken from existing literature, but crucially 
allowed to emerge from the data. This allows a new theory to emerge, rather than an 
elaboration of an existing one (Suddaby, 2006). 
4.3.2 Axial Coding 
Axial coding is a set of procedures whereby open-coded data is put back together in new 
ways by making connections between the categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). This is done 
by relating and restructuring categories to subcategories through their properties (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1997). The purpose of axial coding is to sort, synthesise and organise data (Creswell 
and Clark, 2007). It is an extension of open coding, which may take place concurrently 
(Collis and Hussey, 2013), and includes: 
 The development of properties and categories of concepts. 
 The linking of those categories and subcategories to form relationships. 
 The linking of relationships with the development of mini theories about the 
relationships within the phenomenon. 
 The deduction of how the mini theories may come together to form major theories. 
As this research is concerned with analysing the influence of leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO of banks that failed, required recapitalisation 
or bailout, the adaption of grounded theory in order to link to the extant leadership literature 
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happens at this stage. There is a perceived danger that using prior knowledge in grounded 
theory will contaminate the researcher’s perspective or force the researcher into testing 
propositions, rather than directly observing them (Suddaby, 2006). To avoid this, the prior 
knowledge is drawn from several sources, i.e. leadership characteristics and styles in general, 
rather than a specific leadership theory (Spindler and Spindler, 1982). 
4.3.3 Selective Coding 
Selective coding is the integration of the categories used in the open and axial coding stages 
in order to form an initial framework. It is ‘the procedure of selecting the core category, 
systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in 
categories that need further refinement and development’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 116), 
and is the ‘analytic power that explains the whole’ procedure (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 
146). 
The process of selective coding allows themes to be developed by the identification 
and integration of concepts, focussing on how the subjective experiences of individuals can 
be abstracted to theoretical statements about causal relationships between the actors 
(Wimpenny and Gass, 2000); allowing the interpretation of a situation to inform the course of 
action, rather than calculation alone (Howell, 2009). 
4.4 The Adapted Grounded Theory Model 
This research is concerned with the influence of leadership characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banks. As detailed above, grounded theory provides the 
most appropriate method for addressing the research question but has been adapted to allow 
for the emergence of pre-existing leadership theories without forcing the data into those 
theories from the outset. 
128 
 
Table 4.1 below illustrates the difference in focus from the original model (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). 
Table 4.1: Difference in focus between the original grounded theory model and the 
adapted model 
Stages of 
theory 
building 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) 
model 
Model used in 
this research 
Adaption to 
grounded 
theory 
Stage 1 Open coding: Open coding: 
Use of line by 
line analysis to 
break down data 
into categories. 
Subjective,  
chosen by the 
researcher. 
Open coding: 
Use of line by 
line analysis to 
break down 
data into 
categories. 
Subjective, 
chosen by the 
researcher and 
includes banks 
that failed, 
needed 
recapitalisation 
or bailout and 
those that did 
not. 
 
Open coding: 
No adaption of 
coding at this 
stage. 
Stage 2 Axial coding: 
Procedure 
whereby data is 
put back 
together again 
in new ways by 
making 
Axial coding: 
Reconstructing 
data with the 
intention of 
revealing links 
and 
relationships; 
Axial coding: 
Adaption 
Adaption: 
Reconstructing 
the data 
revealing links 
and 
relationships 
which form 
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Stages of 
theory 
building 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) 
model 
Model used in 
this research 
Adaption to 
grounded 
theory 
connections 
between the 
categories 
(Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). 
construction of 
mini theories 
linked to the 
paradigm model. 
around the 
phenomenon of 
‘leadership 
characteristics 
and styles’.  
Stage 3 Selective 
coding: 
Selecting the 
core category 
and 
subcategories. 
Systematically 
relating them to 
other 
categories, 
validating the 
relationship and 
filling in 
categories that 
need further 
refinement. 
Selective 
coding: 
Asking questions 
such as: 
‘What is the idea 
presented in this 
research?’ 
‘What does this 
action/interaction 
seem to be 
about?’ 
‘How can I 
explain the 
variation 
between and 
among this 
data?’ (Corbin 
and Strauss, 
1990, p. 424). 
Selective 
coding: 
Adaption 
Adaption: 
Asking 
questions such 
as: 
‘Are there any 
links between 
the data and the 
leadership 
theories?’ 
‘Is there a 
variation in the 
data?’ 
‘Does the 
category link to 
one or more of 
the theories?’ 
It involves 
inductively 
gaining 
information that 
is apparent in 
the data and 
leads to the 
identification of 
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Stages of 
theory 
building 
Data 
analysis 
method 
Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) 
model 
Model used in 
this research 
Adaption to 
grounded 
theory 
the core 
category 
according to the 
paradigm 
model. 
Stage 4 Theoretical 
framework: 
Alternating 
between 
inductive and 
deductive 
reasoning. 
Theoretical 
framework: 
Inductively 
gaining 
information that 
is apparent in the 
data. 
Deductively 
turning away 
from the data to 
think rationally 
about what is 
missing and 
forming logical 
conclusions. 
Leads to the 
development of 
the substantive 
theory. 
Theoretical 
framework: 
Adaption 
Theoretical 
framework: 
Proposes 
linkages that 
validate and 
refine the 
unclear links to 
extant 
leadership 
theories within 
the paradigm 
model. 
 
Source: Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined and justified the use of the adapted grounded theory model in order 
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to analyse the influence of the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation) that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout during the research period, and to build a substantive theory of 
leadership in the banking sector. Grounded theory methodology was chosen for its 
appropriateness for the qualitative strategy adopted in this research. Following a review of the 
development of grounded theory methodology, the model used by Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
was adapted, allowing analysis of links to extant leadership theories to be used and, in so 
doing, enabled the research to develop without restrictions to predetermined outcomes. Such 
adaptions are justified within grounded theory, which is flexible in order for the researcher to 
choose and create methods as the inquiry continues (Charmaz, 2008). This research considers 
the fundamental question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout?’ As such, the grounded theory coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) is adapted 
at the axial and selective coding stages to allow for comparison between the collected data 
and the characteristics described in extant leadership theories. 
The next chapter considers the process of grounded theory building, starting with 
theoretical sampling, data collection and data analysis stages, and, finally, the development of 
the substantive theory. 
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Chapter 5 
Data Collection, Sampling and Chronology 
5.1 Introduction 
This research uses a qualitative, social constructionist approach based on a grounded theory 
methodology to consider whether the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the largest banks (by market capitalisation) are an influencing 
factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature and identified the fundamental research question. 
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed research design and methodologies, outlining the reasons for the 
chosen model. Having decided on the adapted grounded theory methodology (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008), this chapter outlines the process of grounded theory building and data 
collection along with the identification of the initial selective samples. 
5.2 Grounded Theory Building 
The grounded theorist initially has an open mind as to the kind of theoretical account likely to 
emerge from the investigation (Martin and Turner, 1986) which is conducted iteratively by 
analysing and collecting data simultaneously (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In its pure form, 
grounded theory is a jumble of literature review, data collection and analysis. This study 
suspends this reporting hallmark, presenting the literature review in Chapter 2 above. It now 
sequentially follows a similar process to that of quantitative methods, namely data collection, 
analysis, findings and discussion of results (Suddaby, 2006). It is important to bear in mind 
that the concepts that follow in the next chapters emerged from the data, together with the 
literature consultation. Appendix 4 shows the process of theory building for this study in 
more detail. 
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5.3 The Research Question and Propositions 
Social constructionism attempts to describe, explain and understand the lived experiences of 
a group of people (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). This study of leadership in the banking sector 
is based on the view that leadership is a socially constructed phenomenon (Fairhurst and 
Grant, 2010) intrinsically relational and social in nature (Ospina and Sorenson, 2006). As 
identified in Chapter 3, the crucial purpose of the researcher in this case is to gain insight and 
depth into the studied phenomena (Creswell and Clark, 2017). Reviewing technical literature 
on the problem area provides a good source of potential research questions (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990); the initial review of literature used in this study is outlined in Chapter 2 
above. Following this review, the research question at this stage is identified as: 
‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
Before the process of data collection and analysis begins, the research question is 
broken down into a series of propositions and premises (Pandit, 1996; Suddaby, 2006). These 
are: 
 Is there a prevalent leadership style or set of leadership characteristics found in the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in large banking institutions? 
 Is there a prevalent leadership style in those board members of banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout, and is this different from those that did not? 
 Is there a difference in the leadership styles and leadership characteristics between the 
identified board members? 
 Is this difference an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout? 
In order to address these propositions, the data collection and analysis needs to consider and 
understand the point of view, feelings and actions of those involved in leading the banks 
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during times of failure, recapitalisation or bailout (Charmaz and Belgrave, 2007). The section 
below outlines this process. 
5.4 The Data Collection Process 
Grounded theory methodology uses multiple data sources in a logically consistent set of 
simultaneous data collection and analytic methods to arrive at a developing theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). Data collection that best fits the actual research problem should be used 
(Thornberg and Charmaz, 2014). There is no clear break between the data collection and 
analysis with the researcher continuing to collect data until no new evidence appears. This 
enhances validity and reliability (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Yin, 2017) and also means that 
the data analysis shapes the data collection procedures (Charmaz and Belgrave, 2007). 
During this study, data was collected and analysed simultaneously through the methods 
outlined in the paragraphs below, which are shown sequentially for clarity. 
 
5.4.1 The Choice of Data Collection Method 
Qualitative research is inquiry aimed at describing and clarifying human experience as it 
appears in people’s lives (Polkinghorne, 2005). The aim of data collection in this case is to 
discover rich, detailed data that can reveal the feelings and actions of the subjects as well as 
the context and structure of their lives. 
Qualitative data is normally transient, understood within the context of the study 
(Collis and Hussey, 2013) with context also being important for the study of effective 
leadership in complex, adaptive systems (Elkington and Booysen, 2015). As the review of 
literature in Chapter 2 has shown, the context of this study is the banking sector and the 
investigation of the leadership characteristics and styles of identified members of the board 
(Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) (see Chapter 6 below). 
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In adopting a grounded theory methodology, this study will analyse data on the social 
situation of banking leaders and as such could use primary or secondary data (Suddaby, 
2006). 
Primary data is data collected for the specific research problem. This research 
question requires analysis of leaders’ actions and feelings. However, as access issues remain 
a difficulty (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005), primary data in the form of interviews would not be 
possible and may also involve a historical bias. 
5.4.2 Justification of Sources of Secondary Data 
Using secondary data presents a number of problems. Useful data sources must be located 
and retrievable. Then the data needs to be analysed to assess how well it meets the quality 
requirements and the methodological criteria of the research (Hox and Boeije, 2005). If the 
secondary data stems from a previous research project, the data will be subject to the original 
researcher’s choice of sample and methodology. This can impact the usefulness of future 
studies. How well the choices and limitations of the original research fit with the current 
research problem is a matter of judgement. 
In order to analyse the leadership characteristics and styles of the board members in 
banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, a method of data collection that allows 
access to the thoughts and feelings of the top executives was required (Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005). The review of existing qualitative research carried out in the literature review did not 
reveal any existing data sets that could be utilised for the current research problem. Forms of 
other documentary evidence were then considered and are detailed below. 
Documentary evidence: This can consist of written, oral, visual or cultural artefacts 
(Bowen, 2009). The use of documents as sources of secondary data was regarded as ‘the 
anthropologist’s informant or the sociologist’s interviewee’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 
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163); yet despite this, documentary evidence is underused in the field of leadership research 
where it is overlooked in favour of interview data. Notably, Hrynyshyn and Ross (2011) used 
policy documents and leadership statements to investigate how leaders define workers’ 
interests and how this then forms strategy. 
As this thesis investigates the meaning, intentions and actions of the top leaders in 
banks, documents used as secondary data sources could include transcripts, case histories, 
autobiographies, written descriptions of events, narratives and interviews (Charmaz and 
Belgrave, 2007). The possibilities for use, and constrains of these sources, are considered 
below. 
Annual reports: The use of annual reports in secondary data collection has generated 
interest since the early 1980s. They are a primary source of information for both institutional 
and individual investors (Epstein and Freedman, 1994; Hutchins, 1994), creditors, 
employees, wider stakeholders and governments (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998; 
Unerman 2007) and ‘a staggering amount of time, energy and money is invested’ in them 
(Hutchins, 1994, p. 315). 
However, their use as data sources is controversial, generating disagreement regarding 
objectives and credibility (Thomas, 1997). They have multiple audiences and varying 
objectives, ranging from questions of stewardship to promotion of the firm. They differ in 
content and scale with many investors regarding them as a poor source of information, 
glossing over bad news to make the leadership look good (Insch, Moore and Murphy, 1997). 
Early work focussed on how to improve their readability and design (Anderson and Imperia, 
1992; Fielden and Dulek, 1984), and Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley (2004) concluded that 
they are too technical to be of use to lay stakeholders. Attention then focussed on links 
between the readability of reports and the performance of companies, with findings 
supporting the view that management is less forthcoming about disclosing information when 
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a firm is performing badly (Bloomfield, 2002; Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2006), resulting in a 
‘Pollyanna’ hypothesis (Hilebrandt and Snyder, 1981) suggesting that regardless of company 
performance the language in the annual letter will be predominantly positive. 
The reliability of the Chair and CEO letters to investors as documents that reflect the 
writer’s views are particularly relevant to this study. The leaders may draft the letter, but it 
then typically goes to the CFO for revision before being sent to the organisation’s legal 
department for final revisions. Alternatively, the letter is drafted by the CFO and then sent to 
the CEO for revision. In all cases, the work is not that of one person but embodies the 
‘corporate speak’ representation of the top management of the company (Thomas, 1997) 
representing a textually mediated discourse used to send the right message and shape the way 
people feel about the organisation (Pettit, 2003; Preston, Wright and Young, 1996). Despite 
this, many Chairs and CEOs see the message as representing them personally (Winsor, 1993). 
As this research is looking at the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, the credibility of the use of the annual report, and in particular 
the Chair/CEO letter, to portray the individual characteristics of the leaders is questionable. 
However, the documents do serve as a starting point to ascertain the names and length of 
tenure of the directors (Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004) with the annual report and 
accounts being ‘the principal way in which shareholders and others keep themselves 
informed on the activities, progress and future plans of a company’ (p. 6). 
Transcripts of analyst conferences: In grounded theory, rich detailed data such as 
transcripts of interviews will reveal thoughts and feelings of the chosen subject, as well as 
providing structure and content (Charmaz, 2006). 
As outlined above, interviewing top executives, especially in banks that failed, is not 
feasible without the potential for significant historical bias (Prior, 2004). Using analyst 
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conference transcripts may represent a useful alternative. For listed organisations, analyst 
conferences provide opportunity for board members (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) to 
report on performance of strategy and crucially take questions from the participants. These 
conferences are live debates and are transcribed or recorded in real time. Although the 
questions asked may not be directly relevant to the research, these documents provide a 
useful and credible source of natural language spoken by the participants. They can be 
analysed (Chapter 6 below) to search for words and phrases that can reveal leadership 
characteristics and styles. These documents are transcripts with open questions. The 
exchanges are often heated and not pre-scripted, giving rich sources of natural vocabulary. 
Parliamentary, treasury and federal inquiry reports: In some cases, Chairs, CEOs and 
CFOs were involved in parliamentary, treasury or federal inquiries. The proceedings of the 
inquiries are published and include transcripts of interviews and records of conversations 
such as email and telephone conversations between the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
given at the time, rather than after the event. As with analyst transcripts above, although the 
questions asked are not directly relevant to the research, analysis of the discourse can also 
reveal rich insights into the leadership styles of those being interviewed. 
Press reports and media interviews: Banks release press reports on an ad hoc basis. 
These include, for example, information on a change of director and quarterly earnings 
statements. These documents are prepared by the communications departments of the 
organisation so cannot represent a clear picture into individual leaders’ characteristics; 
however, they can provide an additional source of information as to changes in the leadership 
structure. 
Media interviews and news reports: The prevailing influence of the social sciences in 
the study of mass communication has led to a nearly exclusive focus on the economic, 
political, social or psychological aspects of news processing. However, media discourses, 
139 
 
interviews and news reports represent an underutilised source of discourse which can be 
effectively analysed to highlight complex events within a social context (Van Dijk, 2013). 
The documents outlined above all yield ‘languaged data’, i.e. interrelated words 
combined into sentences and sentences into discourse (Polkinghorne, 2005, p. 138). The use 
of language to accurately show experience (in this case leadership experiences and how 
leaders make sense of their world) is not new. As early as 1902, Adam used documents to 
study religious experience (Adam, 1902). As this research deals with leadership influence, it 
is concerned with the ‘world as it is lived, felt, undergone, made sense of and accomplished’ 
(Schwandt, 2001, p. 84). The language used by leaders often includes metaphor and 
expressions which can expand the meaning contained in literal expressions. These can be 
used enhance our understanding, and the use of language remains our primary access to 
human experience (Ricoeur, 1977, 1984). 
In sum, the documents above have limitations as discussed, but also provide credible 
sources of data for this inquiry. Further discussion of their use and limitations in the analysis 
stage is given in Chapter 6 below. 
5.5 Initial and Specific Sampling 
Sampling in grounded theory is for theory construction, not for ensuring a representative 
sample within in certain demographic, and is the defining strategy of grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2008; Suddaby, 2006). It is sequential, starting with specific sampling (Thompson, 
1999) which comes from the general perspective of the problem, in this case banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. Once data is collected and coding begins, the process of 
theoretical sampling begins, i.e. sampling for the developing properties of a category (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). It involves gathering new data to check hunches, but, despite this, there is 
little guidance on how to implement theoretical sampling (Draucker et al., 2007). Theoretical 
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sampling is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 below. 
 
5.5.1 Specific Sampling 
Specific sampling evolves during the research process and comes from consideration of the 
initial general problem developed from the review of literature, i.e. why have past reforms 
been ineffective at curbing banking losses and failures? (Ball, 2009). The research process 
derived from the literature review initially identified a large number of banks that failed 
between 1999 and 2017. As detailed in Chapter 2 above, the literature is fragmented, 
detailing US, European, South American and Asian banking failures separately and not 
considering bailout, recapitalisation or takeover. In order to obtain an initial, manageable 
sample size that would address the research question, the largest banks to fail, need 
recapitalisation or bailout by market capitalisation were identified. The list can be found in 
Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1: Largest banks by market capitalisation that failed or received recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) 
Number Country Bank Market 
capitalisation at 
time of failure, 
recapitalisation 
or bailout 
Source Event and amount of intervention  
(where applicable) 
1 USA Lehman 
Brothers 
US$10 trillion LEMQ:US 
Bloomberg 2008 
Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy  
2 USA Washington 
Mutual 
US$307bn Washington 
Mutual Form 10-K 
SEC.gov 2008 
Filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
3 UK Royal Bank 
of Scotland 
£62.8bn 
 
RBS Group 
Accounts 2007 
UK Government bailout Oct. 2008 £45bn 
4 Europe Banco SA US$37.71bn Annual Report and 
Accounts Banco 
SA 2007 
Partly nationalised by the Spanish 
Government 
5 USA Merrill 
Lynch 
US$26bn Merrill Lynch 
Form 20-k-
SEC.gov 2007 
Bought by Bank of America 
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Number Country Bank Market 
capitalisation at 
time of failure, 
recapitalisation 
or bailout 
Source Event and amount of intervention  
(where applicable) 
6 USA Bear 
Stearns 
US$20bn BSC:US 
Bloomberg 2008 
Sold to JP Morgan March 2008 with loan 
of US$29bn from US Treasury 
7 Europe Bank of 
Ireland 
13bn Euros Bank of Ireland 
Annual Report 
2008 
Capital injection Jan. 2009 3.5bn Euros 
8 UK Halifax 
Bank of 
Scotland  
£7.75bn  HBOS Group 
Accounts 2007 
UK Treasury capital injection and 
takeover by Lloyds banking group 
Sept. 2008 £17bn 
9 Europe Allied Irish 
Bank 
7bn Euros AIB Annual Report 
and Accounts 2007 
Capital injection and nationalised Jan. 
2009 3.5bn Euros 
10 UK Northern 
Rock 
£5bn 
 
‘Run on the Rock’ 
HC 56-1. 26 Jan. 
2008 
Bank of England liquidity support Feb. 
2008 
11 Europe Fortis US$3.9bn Fortis Bank Annual 
Report 2008  
Sold to BNP Paribas May 2009 1.2bn 
Euros 
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Number Country Bank Market 
capitalisation at 
time of failure, 
recapitalisation 
or bailout 
Source Event and amount of intervention  
(where applicable) 
12 Europe Dexia  Dexia Annual 
Report 2007 
Recapitalised by French and Belgium 
governments. Sept. 2008 3bn Euros 
13 UK Alliance 
and 
Leicester 
£3.2bn Alliance and 
Leicester Annual 
Report 2007 
 Acquired by Santander Jul. 2008 £1.26bn 
14 UK Bradford 
and Bingley 
£3.2bn Bradford and 
Bingley Annual 
Report 2008 
Saving units and branches sold to 
Santander Sept. 2009 
15 Europe Anglo Irish 
Bank 
157m Euros Annual Report and 
Account 2008  
Capital injection. May 2009 39.3bn Euros 
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It is important to note that there were other US banks that took funding under the US 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 2008, the US Treasury established several 
programmes under TARP to help stabilise the US financial system, restart economic growth 
and prevent avoidable foreclosures. Eight of the largest US banks (Bank of America/Merrill 
Lynch, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, 
State Street and Wells Fargo) were encouraged by the US Treasury to take TARP funding 
regardless of their current capitalisation, in order to create a firewall and allow them to be in a 
position to buy troubled banks if necessary. Those banks that received TARP funding are 
therefore not included in the list of those taking bailout or recapitalisation. The authority to 
make new financial commitments under TARP ended in October 2010 and, as of May 2016, 
all relief has been paid resulting in a government profit of US$30.7bn. 
In order to consider possible reasons for banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, 
the initial research also identified the need for a second specific sample of the largest banks 
that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout. These banks are taken from the top 50 
largest banks by market capitalisation according to the Banker Top 1000 banks database, 
2017.1 The Banker Top 1000 database is used as it is the banking industry standard ranking, 
and market capitalisation is chosen as it is the value of a company that is traded on the stock 
market, which is calculated by multiplying the total number of shares by the present share 
price. It is not a direct measure of the value of the company assets or how much money the 
company makes, but is concerned with the value the financial markets put on the company, 
together with their sentiment about its future and strategy. It was chosen for this research over 
other ways of judging a company’s ‘size’, such as measuring its ‘book value’ (revenue and 
profit streams against its share price), as this simply implies the value of the company on its 
books, and is the accounting value once assets and liabilities have been accounted for by 
                                                          
1 www.thebankerdatabase.com 
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company auditors. This means that the accuracy of ‘book value’ as an assessment of a 
company’s value is determined by stock market investors who buy and sell the stock. Market 
capitalisation is therefore considered more meaningful as it is the price paid to own a part of 
the business, regardless of the book value stated. 
The list of top 50 banks by market capitalisation taken from the Banker Top 1000 
database 2017 can be found at Appendix 1. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the rationale and justification for the data collection methods and 
subsequent data collection undertaken. This study uses a grounded theory methodology to 
consider the research question ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout?’ As such, the data collection will be carried out using secondary data including 
annual reports, triangulated with analyst reports and parliamentary inquiry documents, which 
will start to allow the researcher to build a substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership 
Influence in Banking’. 
Initial selective sampling from the data collection outlines two samples. The first 
sample consists of the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout during the research period (1999–2017), and the second sample 
identifies the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation taken from the Banker Top 1000 
banks database 2017. Consistent with the grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin, 
2000), these samples will now be taken forward to the data analysis stage outlined in the 
following chapter (Chapter 6). 
146 
 
Part III 
Data Analysis, Findings and Conclusions 
Chapter 6 
Open Coding 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first in Part III of the thesis and is concerned with the analysis of the data 
collected in Chapter 5 above. This research uses a qualitative strategy based on a social 
constructionist paradigm within an adapted grounded theory methodology (Chapter 4) to 
consider the fundamental question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout?’ In accordance with grounded theory methodology, the data collection and data 
analysis stages occurred simultaneously (Strauss and Corbin, 2000) but are shown 
chronologically in this thesis for the sake of clarity (Suddaby, 2006). 
Secondary data was collected using annual reports, triangulated with analyst 
transcripts, conferences, parliamentary reports, treasury committee proceedings and federal 
inquiries as detailed in Chapter 5 above. This chapter describes the data analysis stage which 
leads to the development of a substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in 
Banking’. 
Data analysis is central to grounded theory building (Pandit, 1996). Following 
procedures outlined by Corbin and Strauss (1990), Strauss and Corbin (2002) and the 
adaptions outlined in Chapter 4, the collected data is constantly ‘broken down, examined, 
compared, contextualised and categorised analytically’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 61) 
using line by line content analysis (Mostyn, 1985). 
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This leads to the identification of four initial categories: ‘banks’ (Categories 1 and 2, 
‘leaders’ (Category 3) and ‘decision making’ (Category 4) which are then grouped into open 
codes or conceptual labels that ‘share common properties’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 45). 
They are identified as: 
Category 1: 17 largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
Category 2: 30 largest banks by market capitalisation that did not fail, need 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
Category 3: Board leaders, with conceptual labels: Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO. 
Category 4: Decision making in a complex, volatile environment, with conceptual 
labels: regulatory environment and financial innovation. 
The data is ordered chronologically to allow the researcher to determine causal events 
over time (Pandit, 1996). As detailed in Chapter 2 above, this study is longitudinal beginning 
in 1999. This date was chosen as it coincides with the Financial Services Modernisation Act 
(1999) in the USA, repealing the Banking Act (1933) and removing the barriers between 
investment and retail banking. It was also the year of the introduction of the European 
currency, together with the beginnings of the Financial Services Action Plan which proposed 
market freedom by 2005, both giving further stimulation to the integration of markets and 
increased competitiveness. These events followed deregulation of the UK financial services 
industry in 1986 (the Big Bang) and combined to allow the growth of the ‘mega’ banks in the 
US and Europe. The data was collected until saturation was reached (2017). 
During the axial coding stage (Chapter 7), the categories outlined above are analysed 
for words and phrases showing leadership characteristics or traits derived from the literature 
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review before being reassembled to show leaders sharing the same characteristics and traits. 
This data is then taken forward to the selective coding stage which groups the data according 
to existing leadership theories, with the comparison helping the researcher to interpret the 
emerging categories by defining their properties. 
This chapter gives a description of data analysis methods used for this study, the 
details of the collected data, and the presentation of the open coding processes. 
6.2 Qualitative Data Analysis in Grounded Theory 
This is a longitudinal study collecting data from 1999 until data saturation is reached (2017). 
This combination of data collection methods carried out over the life of the research project 
makes it possible to discover categories, understand their characteristics and build the 
relationships between them. 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, grounded theory has evolved into a ‘constellation of 
methods rather than an orthodox unitary approach’ (Charmaz, 2008, p. 161). It requires the 
researcher to be open to theoretical possibilities of what is happening in the empirical world 
rather than imposing a theoretical framework (Charmaz, 2008) and effective use of it depends 
on adopting early grounded theory guidelines (Strauss and Corbin, 2000). Accordingly, this 
study adopts comparative, interactive and analytic strategies using coding, memo writing, 
sampling and sorting. 
6.3 Methods of Data Analysis Used in the Study 
6.3.1 Document Analysis 
Document analysis is the systemic procedure for reviewing and analysing organisational and 
institutional documents (Bowen, 2009). It requires the data to be examined and interpreted to 
gain understanding and empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
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Document analysis emphasises how versions of the world, society and events are 
produced. It includes conversations, contrived talk such as interviews, emails and other 
written forms of communication exchanged between organisational members (Cunliffe, 
2008b), thereby allowing the researcher to investigate how language reflects reality. Saussure 
(1974) argues that language creates social identities and relationships that provide us with a 
perspective on the world we inhabit. It is concerned with exchanging information, making 
decisions and forming relationships (Johnson et al., 2004) with differences in communication 
less to do with cultural reasons and more to do with membership of different corporate and 
professional groups (Scollon, Scollon and Jones, 2011). 
Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires data 
to be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop 
empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Rapley, 2011). Documents contain text 
(words) and images that have been recorded without a researcher’s intervention and can be 
seen as social facts which are produced, shared and used in socially organised ways (Coffee 
and Atkinson, 1996). 
The analytic procedure entails finding, selecting, appraising and synthesising data 
contained in documents. This generates data, including excerpts, quotations or entire 
passages, that are then organised into major themes, categories and case examples 
specifically through content analysis (see para 6.4.1 below) (Labuschagne, 2003). Analysis of 
documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding and 
discover insights relevant to the research problem (Merrium, 2002). 
6.3.2 Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis covers a wide variety of approaches for the analysis of texts (Gill, 2000) 
and focusses on the strategies being used to achieve a particular outcome (Potter, 1997), e.g. 
150 
 
discourse analysis may be used to legitimise the power of a management group where the 
same person or groups discuss the same thing in many different ways (Wetherell and Potter, 
1988). 
There is considerable literature documenting its use in social sciences (Collis and 
Hussey, 2013). Notable to this study is research carried out by Hrynyshyn and Ross (2011), 
which defined workers’ problems and their solutions resulting in the leadership strategy on 
climate change (Hrynyshyn and Ross, 2011). The researchers used critical discourse analysis 
of union policy documents, and leadership statements with a view to uncovering motivations, 
both articulated or not. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that language users do not 
merely become conduits of socially constructed meanings and interests (Cunliffe, 2008a). 
It is important to acknowledge the editorial leaning of different media which can 
affect the choice of stories to be covered (or not covered), questions to be asked (or not 
asked) and textual detail (or lack of detail). This can collectively produce a systematic bias in 
what would otherwise appear to be a full and factual account of an important event. This 
thesis addresses this issue through triangulation of sources, which is discussed below. 
Although the subject of debate (Liu, 2017), discourse analytic approaches within 
organisational studies can show how reality is constituted through the ‘talk and text’ that 
appears in language (Grant, Iedema and Oswick, 2009). Discourse is a form of social practice 
that reflects how we see the world (Van Dijk, 2013), and integral to this approach is that 
discourse is linked to context (Liu, Cutcher and Grant, 2017). 
Discourse analysis for this thesis includes analysis of the collection of statements 
made by the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO of the sample banks (1999–2017) taken from 
analyst transcripts, treasury reports, federal inquiries and press releases as outlined in Chapter 
5 above. 
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6.3.3 Triangulation 
Discourse analysis is often used in combination with other qualitative research methods as a 
means of triangulation. Triangulation is simply the use of several data sources (Mathison, 
1988) defined as ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ 
(Denzin, 1970, p. 291). The researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different 
contexts (Denzin, 2012) and in doing so, is expected to draw upon at least two sources of 
evidence in order to seek corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods 
(Yin, 2013). In studying the effectiveness of the leader, this can be done through the use of 
documents, interviews, evaluating behaviour and performance (Jick, 1979). 
By triangulating data, the researcher attempts to provide credibility and validity of the 
process (Tellis, 1997). Through the examination of information collected through different 
methods, the researcher can corroborate findings across data sets and thus reduce the impact 
of potential biases which may exist in a single study. In this way, triangulation helps the 
researcher guard against the accusation that a study’s findings are simply an artefact of a 
single method, a single source or a single investigator’s bias (Patton, 1999). This study uses a 
combination of discourse and document analysis of multiple data sources as outlined in 
Chapter 5 above.  
6.4 Data Analysis 
In general qualitative data analysis, the researcher identifies topics about which they can 
write (Charmaz, 2008). However, in grounded theory, the coding goes deeper into the 
phenomenon and seeks to explain it. 
The three basic elements of grounded theory are categories, concepts and propositions 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). ‘Open coding’ is the first process of data analysis and considers 
the basic units of categories and concepts (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, 2008). This phase 
requires close reading and interrogation of the data (Pandit, 1996) and forces the researcher to 
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interact with it (Charmaz, 2008). It begins by comparing incidents using line by line, or 
paragraph by paragraph scrutiny. As this research study is concerned with whether the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an 
influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, the data collected from 
annual reports, analyst transcripts, parliamentary and treasury reports, together with 
conference proceedings is initially analysed using content analysis conducted on a line by 
line basis. 
6.4.1 Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been chosen for the analysis of the documents in this study. Described 
as ‘the diagnostic tool of qualitative researchers’ (Mostyn, 1985, p. 117), it is suitable for 
managing large amounts of data by reducing it into manageable amounts (Collis and Hussey, 
2013). Line by line analysis of narratives prompts the study of each line, which allows for 
greater understanding and increased credibility (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011). 
It is particularly relevant to documents, newspapers and broadcasts, with its first 
recorded use as early as 1740 (Mostyn, 1985). Notably for this research, Beck, Campbell and 
Shrives (2010) considered financial reporting literature, subdividing texts into constituent 
parts looking for the frequency of words (Beck, Campbell and Shrives, 2010), and 
Mehdizadeh (2010) used content analysis to examine traits of narcissism and self-esteem in 
students at York University (Mehdizadeh, 2010). 
Using content analysis of the collected secondary data also allows for the creation of a 
database providing a permanent record which can be examined many times by subsequent 
researchers (Yin, 2017). Content analysis is particularly useful for examining the 
characteristics and traits of strategic leaders as it is non-obtrusive, thereby avoiding the access 
issues outlined above (Pye, 2013) and biases from awareness or interest in the study. It is 
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therefore also useful when looking into leadership characteristics in both thriving and failing 
organisations (Pretorius, 2009). 
6.5 Open Coding 
As stated above, open or initial coding concepts are the basic building blocks in grounded 
theory construction (Pandit, 1996). Data collection and analysis go hand in hand, with initial 
interpretations guiding further data collection (Coffee and Atkinson, 1996; Kaplan and 
Maxwell, 2005). The process of coding involves the labelling and categorising of the 
phenomena in accordance with what emerged from the data (Charmaz, 2008). Open coding 
requires asking simple ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’ questions and makes comparisons. 
Having compared the data with similar incidents and grouped them together into categories, 
the next stage is to identify conceptual labels which are then taken forward to the axial coding 
stage. 
 
6.5.1 Category Development 
At this stage of the theory development, the central focus of this research is whether the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an 
influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. During the data collection 
stage outlined in Chapter 5 above, the researcher jointly collects, codes and analyses the data 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The data collection uses secondary data from annual reports 
together with transcripts of analyst meetings, parliamentary reviews and federal reports (as 
outlined in para 5.4.1 above) for the initial samples of banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout, and the largest banks by market capitalisation that did not. 
During this process of comparison and grouping, four initial categories are identified: 
Category 1: Banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout. 
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This category was taken from analysis of the initial sample which includes events and 
crucial incidents. The banks in Category 1 include the banks in initial sample 1 with the 
addition of Barclays as, although they did not receive government assistance, they did receive 
bailout funding from Qatar.  With a market capitalisation of £19bn at the time, they are 
ranked as the 7th largest bank to require assistance. Swiss Bank UBS is also considered in 
Category 1 due to the size of the two government bailout packages it received. With a market 
capitalisation of US$96.2bn, they are the 3rd largest bank by market capitalisation to receive 
a bailout. 
Table 6.1 below shows the banks in Category 1: Largest banks by market 
capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout. 
Table 6.1: Category 1: Largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017)  
Number Country Bank 
1 USA Lehman Brothers 
2 USA Washington Mutual 
3 Switzerland UBS 
4 UK Royal Bank of Scotland 
5 Europe Banco SA 
6 USA Merrill Lynch 
7 UK Barclays 
8 USA Bear Stearns 
9 Europe Bank of Ireland 
10 UK Halifax Bank of Scotland 
11 Europe Allied Irish 
12 UK Northern Rock 
13 Europe Fortis 
14 Europe Dexia 
15 UK Alliance and Leicester 
16 UK Bradford and Bingley 
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Number Country Bank 
17 Europe Allied Irish Bank 
 
Category 2: Largest banks by market capitalisation that did not fail, require 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). As the research question is concerned with the 
influence and prevalence of the leadership characteristics and styles of the board in banks that 
failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, those banks that do not have autonomous boards or 
are state controlled are discarded from the initial sample, leaving a total of 30 banks listed in 
Table 6.2 ordered by market capitalisation. 
Table 6.2: Largest banks by market capitalisation that did not fail, need recapitalisation 
or bailout (1999–2017) 
Number Country Bank 
1 USA JP Morgan 
2 USA Bank of America  
3 USA Citigroup 
4 USA Wells Fargo 
5 UK HSBC 
6 France Credit Agricole 
7 France BNP Paribas 
8 USA Goldman Sachs 
9 Spain Banco Santander 
10 Germany Deutsche Bank 
11 USA Morgan Stanley 
12 UK Lloyds Banking group 
13 France Societe Generale 
14 Italy Unicredit 
15 Spain BBVA 
16 France Credit Suisse 
17 Italy Intesa San Paolo 
18 France Credit Mutual 
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Number Country Bank 
19 Netherlands ING Bank 
20 Dutch Rabobank Group 
21 USA Standard Chartered 
22 Canada Royal Bank of Canada 
23 Italy Itau Unibanco Holding 
24 USA US Bank Corps 
25 USA PNC Financial Services 
26 Australia Commonwealth Bank Group 
27 Australia National Australia Bank 
28 Australia/New 
Zealand 
ANZ Banking group 
29 Canada Scotia Bank 
30 Canada Toronto Dominion Bank 
 
Source: The Banker Top 1000 banks (2017) 
Category 3: Leaders. As the potential influence of board leadership was in mind 
during the initial stages of this research, details of those leading the banks during the research 
period were recorded.  
Category 4: Decision making. The importance of strategic decision making as a 
function of the board is apparent from the existing literature. Initial review of memos and 
field notes also show it to be a recurring theme throughout the data (see Appendices 2 and 3 
detailed below). 
6.5.2 Concept Development 
As previously stated, the three basic elements of grounded theory are initial categories, 
theoretical concepts and propositions (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The initial categories 
detailed in paragraph 6.5.1 came from the perspective on the general problem, in this case 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. The next stage is to develop theoretical concepts, 
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which are the basic units of analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1990) and here the researcher is led 
in ‘all directions which seem relevant and work’ (Glaser, 2002, p. 46). 
Silverman (2013) argues that open coding as a theoretical base is unclear, with the 
conclusions drawn becoming trivial and of little consequence where the pre-selecting of 
words or phrases are only of interest to the study. This can result in large amounts of data that 
could aid deeper understanding being ignored (Silverman, 2013). Noting this point, the 
structures and procedures used in the coding stages of this study are clear, giving a high 
degree of validity and reliability to the results. 
This development of concepts follows an iterative and integrated approach across the 
range of triangulated data (Pandit, 1996). Through this process some concepts appear 
repeatedly and a constant comparison of meanings and interpretations is conducted until a 
final abstraction is reached. Concepts play a central role as they are groups of data (Blumner, 
1973) and can include ‘participants’ experiences, spoken words, actions, interactions, 
problems and issues’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p. 51). 
 
6.6 Data Ordering 
As this research is now concerned with the analysis of the influence of the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the conceptual labels of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
within the two categories of the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout and the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation that did not, the 
next step, and the one most intertwined with data collection, is to order the material according 
to the timeline for Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO tenures to allow the researcher to begin 
to determine causal events over time (Pandit, 1996). This process is also iterative and 
continues through both data collection and data analysis. 
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At this stage, following the literature review of extant studies into leadership 
characteristics, styles and traits in Chapter 2 above, it is clear that there is ‘a desperate need 
for longitudinal studies into leadership’ (Bennis, 2007, p. 4), and the review into the global 
banking sector (Chapter 2 above) suggests data collection for this study should start in 1999 
with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) which repealed the Glass-Steagall 
Act (1932) removing the separation of investment and retail banking which in turn led to 
growth of the financial markets. As there is no clear break between data collection and 
analysis in grounded theory, data will continue to be collected until no new evidence appears 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008) which is found to be 2017. 
The initial ordering phase of conceptual label coding is central to the process of 
beginning to gain an understanding of whether certain leadership characteristics and traits of 
board leaders were influential in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. As such, the 
collected data is now broken down by asking the following questions: ‘What happened to the 
bank?’, ‘Who were the leaders?’, ‘When were they in office?’, ‘Which decisions did they 
pursue?’, ‘Which country does the bank come from?’ (Sekaran and Bougie, 2016). 
The data is ordered over time with open coding field notes and memos for each 
category. Examples of memos can be found at Appendices 2 and 3. 
6.7 Identification of the Concepts 
Interestingly, further analysis of the field notes and memos (Appendices 2 and 3) show the 
category of ‘decision making’ to be internal (e.g. relating to changes within the board) or 
external (e.g. in response to changes in regulation or to financial innovation). 
When analysing the categories of banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, 
and comparing these with those that banks that did not, the presence of the Chair, CEO (or 
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Chair/CEO dual role) and CFO in every bank was noted, identified as concepts and given 
conceptual labels. The process is shown in Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6.3: Category and concept development 
Category 
number 
Open coding categories Concepts 
1 Banks  17 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–
2017) 
 30 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that did not fail, 
need recapitalisation or bailout 
(1999–2017) 
2 Leaders  Chair 
 Chair/CEO 
 CEO 
 CFO 
3 Decision making 
 
 Financial innovation 
 Regulatory environment 
 
6.8 Theoretical Sampling 
In the grounded theory process, it is important to construct rich categories that are related to 
each other (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and ensure that the concepts identified above as the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in each category, have proven theoretical relevance to the 
evolving theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
As outlined in para 5.6 above, the aim of theoretical data sampling is to sample events 
and incidents that are indicative of categories developed as part of the grounded theory 
process, so they can be developed and related to each other (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
Theoretical sampling should not be confused with sampling strategies used in other research 
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methods which occurs at the planning stage and concerns who, what and where to sample 
(Rapley, 2011). As outlined in Chapter 5 above, initial decisions (such as banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout, and those that did not) are allowed, but once the data 
collection begins, moving between the data collection and analysis takes over (Charmaz, 
2014). 
The theoretical sampling process is cumulative with the concepts and their 
relationships accumulating through the interplay of data collection and analysis. Data needs 
to be gathered in a systematic manner and should involve advanced planning, but also allow 
for flexibility in order to allow the theoretical relevance of the concepts to evolve (Charmaz 
and Bryant, 2011). Accordingly, this study uses three theoretical sampling types: 
- Open sampling is used in relation to the data analysis open coding phase and aids the 
development of relevant categories in order to discover the different dimensions 
within them. This is used to ascertain the categories of the 17 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and the 30 largest banks 
by market capitalisation (the Banker 2017) that did not fail, need recapitalisation or 
bailout, together with the conceptual labels allocated to the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO within the banks from 1999 to the data saturation point (2017). 
- Relational and variational sampling is used in relation to axial coding (considered in 
in Chapter 7 below), with the aim to ‘relate categories in terms of paradigm 
conditions, context, action, interaction and consequences’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, 
p. 185). 
- Discriminate sampling is related to the selective coding stage and is both directed and 
deliberate with the focus on the validation of the relationships discovered by the 
analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). 
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Theoretical sampling is the collection of data to clarify ideas and is conducted by moving 
between the literature and the collected data. Its analytic strength comes from its iterative 
process and this continues until the saturation point occurs, i.e. when no new data linked to 
the categories emerges (Charmaz, 2008; Strauss and Corbin, 1998b). It is a major strength of 
grounded theory and is used to check the properties of the categories, not to increase 
representativeness (Suddaby, 2006). 
6.9 Conclusion 
This research is concerned with the development of the substantive theory of ‘Strategic 
Leadership Influence in Banking’ and aims to answer the fundamental question ‘Are the 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing 
factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout during the research period (1999–2017)?’ 
Accordingly, the collected data was initially analysed to answer questions such as: Who were 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in each of the banks taken from Category 1: 17 largest 
banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and 
Category 2: 30 largest banks by market capitalisation that did not fail, need recapitalisation or 
bailout during the research period (1999–2017)? When were they in office? From this 
analysis, ‘banks’, ‘leaders’ and ‘decision making’ were found to be important categories that 
warrant further investigation. Accordingly, these categories and conceptual labels now form 
the basis for the axial coding stage (Pandit, 1996) which is outlined in Chapter 7 below. 
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Chapter 7 
Axial Coding 
7.1 Introduction 
This research is concerned with answering the fundamental question: ‘Are the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout during the research period (1999–2017)?’ 
This chapter presents the ‘axial’ coding analytical stage of grounded theory (Pandit, 
1996) and focusses on category developments in terms of their relationships applied in the 
paradigm model. 
The main purpose of the axial coding stage is to reassemble the data that was 
fractured in the open coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and is the second analytical 
stage in the grounded theory approach. Its focus is to identify the phenomenon under 
investigation and specify it in terms of the ‘conditions which give rise to it; the context in 
which it is embedded; the action/interaction strategies by which it is handled; and the 
consequences of those strategies’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 91). The process of axial 
coding focusses on relating the open coding categories of ‘banks’, ‘leaders’ and ‘decision 
making’, and the conceptual labels of ‘Chair’, ‘Chair/CEO’, ‘CEO’ and ‘CFO’, ‘regulatory 
environment’, and ‘financial innovation’ together to form a ‘more precise and complete 
explanation about the phenomena’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 125). 
The structure of the coding involves identifying the conditions that create the 
problems, issues, happenings or events under investigation, and the analytic process considers 
the response of those involved to these problems and issues. It is particularly concerned with 
the identification of the ‘phenomenon’ which shows ‘what is going on’ (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998, p. 125) and the application of the conditions that give rise to it (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990). The axial coding then becomes ‘the category’ with other components of the model 
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forming the ‘subcategories’. These subcategories continue to be analysed to look for answers 
to the ‘when’, ‘why’, ‘where’, ‘how’ questions, linking the ‘category’ with the 
‘subcategories’ to see how they are related (Charmaz, 2006). This process builds the ‘dense 
texture of the relationships around the “axis” of a category’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1987, p. 64). 
7.2 The Link between ‘Open’ and ‘Axial’ Coding 
In the open coding stage (described in Chapter 6 above), the ‘categories’ are generated in 
terms of their properties and dimensions which are then analysed using an integrated 
approach across the range of data in order to develop the ‘concepts’ (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008; Pandit, 1996) restated below: 
Category 1: Banks, with conceptual label: 17 largest banks by market capitalisation 
that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
Category 2: Banks, with conceptual label: 30 largest banks by market capitalisation 
that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
Category 3: Board leaders, with conceptual labels: Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO. 
Category 4: Decision making in a complex, volatile environment, with conceptual 
labels: regulatory environment, financial innovation. 
As outlined above (Chapter 5), open and axial coding naturally occur together 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) with open coding developing the properties and dimensions of the 
categories, and axial coding developing the relationships between them. This, in turn, 
enhances the density of the selective coding and the subsequent substantive theory which is 
outlined in Chapter 8 below. 
7.3 The Phenomenon 
The phenomenon is the central idea, event or happening and is found by asking questions 
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such as ‘What is the data referring to and what is the action/interaction all about?’ (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). Axial coding shows the relationship between the categories, concepts and 
the phenomenon and the focus is on ‘posing questions in terms of the conceptual labels 
themselves, and how one category may be related to another’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 
107). Consistent with grounded theory building, the data is then re-analysed to look for 
evidence, incidents and events that either support or refute the questions asked. 
The analysis of the data during the open coding stage (Chapter 6) shows ‘decision 
making’ to be dominant theme. These decisions then affect the overall strategy of the 
organisation. Leadership characteristics and styles also become evident through the data 
collection and analysis during both open and axial coding, and can also be seen in the field 
notes at Appendices 2 and 3. 
The phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristics and styles’ subsumes the open coding 
categories and concepts identified though the data collected from the annual reports, analyst 
transcripts, parliamentary, treasury and federal inquiries, and press reports. The following 
sections show how the components of the paradigm model contribute to the evolving 
phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristics and styles’ within banks. 
 
7.4 The Application of the Paradigm Model 
The aim of the open coding stage is to develop categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions. The axial coding stage now develops these in terms of their relationships within 
the paradigm model. The coding that was fractured during the open coding stage is now 
subsumed into five categories, each one representing a component of the paradigm model. 
This is done through relational and variational sampling (Chapter 5) and relates the 
categories identified in the open coding stage to each category of the paradigm model: causal 
conditions, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies and consequences 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Each step is outlined below. 
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7.4.1 Causal Conditions 
Causal conditions are ‘events, incidents or happenings that influence the phenomenon under 
investigation’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 131). Causal conditions are identified by asking 
questions such as ‘What are the incidents or events that are happening or lead to the 
occurrence of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
In order to determine the causal conditions and in accordance with the iterative 
process of grounded theory building (Pandit, 1996), the collected data for the Chairs, 
Chair/CEOs, CEOs and CFOs of the banks in both Category 1: 17 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and Category 2: 30 
largest banks by market capitalisation that did not (1999–2017) was re-analysed and the 
literature re-reviewed. 
The main categories of ‘banks’ and ‘leaders’ are used to answer this question. 
Content analysis of data taken from analyst transcripts, parliamentary reports and press 
releases was undertaken to show the events leaders were involved in, how they reacted and 
what they said. This can be seen in the sample of transcripts together with memos and field 
notes used in the axial coding stage, and can be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
This data analysis shows the link between those who were leading the banks at the 
time (i.e. the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO or CFO) and their role in the strategic decision making 
of the organisation. 
The process is shown in Figure 7.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Figure 7.1: The process for determining the causal conditions 
 
7.4.2 Context 
The context is a ‘specific set of conditions that intersect dimensionally at a time and place to 
create a set of circumstances or problems to which people respond through 
actions/interactions’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 132). It includes all situational factors 
inside and outside an organisation or the surroundings associated with the phenomenon (Pillai 
and Meindl, 1998) and can be identified by asking: ‘What are the sets of conditions under 
which banks fail, need recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
Analysis of the data shows the leaders’ responses to situational factors inside and 
outside the organisation. Further analysis shows the theme of ‘complexity’ linking these 
factors and can also be seen in the field notes and memos in Appendices 2 and 3. This is 
consistent with findings from the literature review of the banking sector (Chapter 2) which 
identifies ‘complexity’ as a key reason for banking failure (Crawford, 2011). 
The context is important as it draws out the relationship between the open coding 
category of ‘leaders’ and its concepts (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO), with the 
phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristics and styles’ and shines a light on the policy issue 
of why, when all the banks in this study were subject to the same situational factors, some 
failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, while others did not? 
Banks 
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Open coding 
categories
1: Banks that failed,    
needed recapitalisation 
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2: Banks that did not fail, 
need recapitalisation or 
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3: Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
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167 
 
 
7.4.3 Intervening Conditions 
Intervening conditions are the broader structural context around the phenomenon which can 
alter or mitigate the impact of the causal conditions on it (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 2008). 
Analysis of the data identifies regulation, deregulation and decision making as 
potential intervening conditions which can affect the influence of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO (causal conditions) on the strategic direction of the organisation. These conditions 
are seen in some cases to oppose each other, with regulation at times curtailing decision 
making from the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO. 
How the leaders under investigation dealt with the opportunities and threats of these 
intervening conditions is related to the phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristic and styles’ 
by way of their actions. 
Further ‘increased regulation’ in 2002, and then after the financial crisis of 2008, is 
identified as an intervening condition of the historical ‘boom and bust’ cycle which has 
plagued attempts to avoid financial crises in the past (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
Increased regulation in the form of Basel III tier ratios, Financial Reporting Council 
regulations, and the Dodd Frank Act (2009) are identified in the literature review as a central 
theme in the post-financial crisis banking landscape (FSB, 2017a). These regulations have 
also increased the complexity of the sector,  seen in the remark: ‘Which law do you want us 
to break?’ made by John Cryan (CEO Deutsche Bank 2016 to date) at the World Economic 
Forum, 2016.  
In sum, the intervening conditions of ‘increasing regulation’ and ‘deregulation’ are 
factors to which all the ‘leaders’ in the sector have to respond, and can alter the leaders’ 
168 
 
responses to strategy, which may have a bearing on whether the bank fails, requires 
recapitalisation or bailout. 
7.4.4 Action/Interaction Strategies 
The action/interaction strategies refer to the ‘deliberate acts that are taken to resolve a 
problem and in doing so, shape the phenomenon in some way’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 
133) and are devised to manage, handle, carry out and respond to the phenomenon (Corbin 
and Strauss, 1990). They are also affected by the causal, contextual and intervening 
conditions outlined above. The strategies are identified by asking: ‘What are the 
action/interaction strategies adopted by the banking sector in relation to banking 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout and within the causal, intervening and contextual 
conditions?’ 
The main category of ‘decision making’ is identified as answering this question. As 
asked above, why is it that some leaders respond to financial innovation, deregulation and 
regulation in different ways to others? Increased regulation since 2007 has not stopped the 
onslaught of banking scandals such as LIBOR, Forex, ISDAfix, mis-selling, money 
laundering, tax avoidance and industrial espionage, and people risk is seen as a key 
regulatory issue and one that hitherto has been difficult to evaluate (Pye, 2013). 
‘Decision making’ is embedded within the other components of the paradigm model 
and related to the phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristics and styles’ in the following 
ways: The review of leadership literature and open coding findings highlight ‘decision 
making’ as a vital role of the board (Selznick, 2011; Zaccaro, 2007) in banking organisations 
(causal conditions). It has a bearing on how the board deals with the complexity of the 
banking sector (context) and regulation, deregulation and financial innovation (intervening 
conditions). Strategic decision making is a deliberate act of the board leaders (Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) and affects the response of the organisation to all other factors, 
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finding support from Walker (2009) who comments that ‘how banks are run is a matter for 
their boards’ (p. 6). 
7.4.5 Consequences 
The final component of the paradigm model refers to the consequences which are the 
set of the outcomes of action and interaction strategies above (Corbin and Strauss, 1990) and 
can also be the result of a lack of action/interaction in response to an issue (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). They are identified here by the following question: ‘What were the 
consequences of the decision making of the leaders on the strategy adopted by the global 
bank in response to the intervening conditions of regulation, deregulation and financial 
innovation?’ 
Here the adoption of certain strategies linked to the phenomenon of ‘leadership 
characteristics and styles’ are investigated for links to banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout. Consequences are the output of the actions and interactional strategies and, in the 
context of this research, are the interplay between the individual board members (Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) and the failure, recapitalisation or bailout of the bank. Figure 7.2 
shows the application of the paradigm model to the phenomenon. 
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Figure 7.2: Application of the paradigm model to the phenomenon 
 
7.5 The Axial Coding Process 
In the axial coding stage, the categories identified in the open coding stage are further 
systematically developed in terms of their relationships (Charmaz, 2014). The framework of 
categories of banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and those that did not, 
together with the conceptual labels of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO within banks are 
used in the axial coding stage. In this case, connections were made with words and phrases 
found linked to leadership characteristics and traits that were identified in the review of 
leadership literature (Chapter 2). 
In this adaption to grounded theory (Chapter 4), the open-coded data is analysed to 
uncover relationships with characteristics and traits that occur within leadership roles 
identified from analysis of extant leadership theories (Chapter 2). Consistent with the 
simultaneous analysing of data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), the data collected from the annual 
reports, analyst transcripts and conference proceedings is revisited and re-analysed again 
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using line by line content analysis (Charmaz and Bryant, 2011) as described in Chapter 6 
above. Theoretical notes or memos about the data and conceptual connections between the 
categories are used (Patton, 2002) together with propositional coding units (Stemler, 2004) in 
order to break down the text to examine the underlying assumptions. The coding was done 
using short, simple and active words (Charmaz, 2006), and memos were used to highlight 
connections between the concepts, categories and leadership characteristics (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). Examples of the memos used can be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
The analysis uncovered two sets of leadership characteristics and traits. The first are generally 
positive and are shown below in Table 7.1. The second are generally negative and are shown 
in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.1: Axial coding linked to positive leadership characteristics and traits 
Case 
example 
Bank Leader, post and 
dates 
Example document analysis Axial coding linked to 
positive leadership 
characteristics and traits 
1 JP Morgan Marianne Lake, 
CFO 2012– 
‘She has all of the qualities of a great leader’, he said. 
Those include being demanding, drawing information 
out of people and recognising talent within the 15,000 
people she oversees. Dimon said she also challenges 
him when she believes he is wrong. 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-ceo-lake-insight/how-jpmorgans-
cfo-became-the-top-prospect-to-succeed-dimon-idUSKCN1LU2JR) 
Dominence, influence, 
confidence. 
2 Bank of 
America 
Ken Lewis, 
Chairman/CEO 
2001–2010 
All told, over the last five years, CEO Lewis has spent 
a stunning US$100bn on acquisitions. 
(https://hbr.org/2008/09/is-bank-of-americas-ken-lewis) 
Dominance, influence. 
2a Bank of 
America 
Ken Lewis, 
Chairman/CEO 
2001–2010 
‘I think I was very fortunate to be able to take some 
career risks during my time with the company’. 
(frontline/breakingthebank/interviews/Lewis) 
Driven by performance. 
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3 Citigroup Chuck Prince, 
CEO 2004–2007 
‘I don't feel the need to be a dominant force through 
talking first or talking the most. That’s not one of my 
needs.’ (Time, 28 Jan. 2008) 
Articulation, consciousness. 
3a Citigroup Chuck Prince, 
CEO 2004–2007 
Took responsibility for the failings, bowing deeply in a 
carefully choreographed act of contrition. (Tokyo Press Conference, 
25 Oct. 2004) 
Emotional stability, 
creativity. 
3b Citigroup Chuck Prince, 
CEO 2004–2007 
Citi’s chief hasn’t just stepped out of Sandy Weill’s 
shadow – he’s stepped out of his own as he strives to 
make himself into a leader with vision. 
(www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2006-02-19/rewiring-chuck-prince) 
Vision, confidence. 
4a Wells 
Fargo 
John Stumpf, 
Chair/CEO 2008– 
John Stumpf lives the Wells Fargo image. He doesn’t 
go to Davos. He doesn’t put on airs. On weekends, he 
babysits his grandchildren. (Silverman, FT, 16 Sept. 2016) 
Emotional stability, 
consciousness. 
4b Wells 
Fargo 
John Stumpf, 
Chair/CEO 2008– 
‘We are sorry. We deeply regret any situation where a 
customer got a product they did not request,’ Stumpf 
said, ‘There is nothing in our culture, nothing in our 
vision and values that would support that. It’s just the 
opposite. Our goal is to make it right by a customer 
every time 100 percent and if we don’t do that, we feel 
Vision, taking 
responsibility. 
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accountable.’ (https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/13/wells-fargo-ceo-john-
stumpf-says-he-will-not-resign) 
4c Wells 
Fargo 
John Stumpf, 
Chair/CEO 2008– 
I think the best thing I could do right now is lead this 
company, and lead this company forward. 
(https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/13/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpf-says-he-will-not-
resign) 
Confidence, dominance. 
5a HSBC Douglas Flint, 
CFO 1999–2009, 
Chair 2010– 
‘We’ve got a very good management team. You can be 
large as long as you’ve got a well articulated business 
model.’ (https://www.financialdirector.co.uk/2009/12/22/douglas-flint-and-
his-influence-over-the-regulators/) 
Confidence, dominance. 
5b HSBC Douglas Flint, 
CFO 1999–2009, 
Chair 2010– 
He is one of the few banking executives to have 
publically acknowledged that things need to be done 
differently now and has called for better banking 
supervision. (https://www.financialdirector.co.uk/2009/12/22/douglas-flint-
and-his-influence-over-the-regulators/) 
Desire to influence, 
articulation. 
6 Credit 
Agricole 
Georges Pauget, 
CEO 2006–2010 
I think the responsibility for the chief executive when 
you have a crisis is to take into account obviously the 
opinion of the shareholders but to take responsibility 
and to manage the company in the best interest of all 
the shareholders (www.ft.com/view from the top, 21 May 2008) 
Act from the heart, 
agreeableness. 
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7 BNB 
Paribas 
Michael Prebarau, 
Chair 2000–2003 
‘His plans to create France’s biggest bank so upset the 
status quo that the governor of the Bank of France, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, finally blocked the deal even 
though 43 percent of SocGen’s shareholders had 
agreed to the takeover’ (FT 18 June 2001). 
Desire to influence, 
confidence, drive. 
8 Goldman 
Sachs 
Lloyd Blankefien, 
Chair/CEO 2006– 
We had relationships with a number of business 
schools and a natural extension of that was to advance 
partnerships necessary to make the program a success. 
(IFC.org/WPS) 
Desire to influence, 
creativity. 
9 Banco 
Santander 
José Antonio 
Alvarez, CEO 
2015– 
But the focus of the world’s eighth largest bank, 
according to Alvarez, is developing the group as a 
collection of individual operations with a deep 
understanding of their local market, rather than as a 
global monolith. https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/cfo-interview-jose-
antonio-alvarez-santander-thinks-local-in-global-vision-20050926 
Articulation, consciousness. 
10 Deutsche 
Bank 
Josef Ackermann, 
Chair 2003–2011 
‘Ackermann was (...) fixed on the magic goal of a 
return on equity of 25 percent before taxes. At that 
time, however, this could only be achieved by 
accepting major financial and ethical risks.’ 
(www.handelsblatt.com/today/finance/blame-game-deutsche-bank-chief-
economist-lashes-out-at-former-ceo-ackermann) 
Dominance, desire for 
performance, drive. 
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11 Morgan 
Stanley 
Ruth Porat, CFO 
2010– 
Sees the importance of leadership that has courage 
based on experience and instinct. 
(Yale.edu/sites/Gartenporatinterview) 
Articulation, consciousness, 
emotional stability. 
12 Lloyds 
Banking 
Group 
Maarten Van de 
Bergh, Chair 
2001–2005 
‘Van den Bergh says his yardstick for Lloyds TSB is 
Citigroup, one of the world’s biggest financial firms. 
But he knows that to come anywhere near achieving 
that goal, he needs to pull off a major deal in the US or 
Europe, and quickly.’ (Money, 7 Sept. 2002) 
Articulation, confidence, 
drive. 
13a Societe 
Generale 
Daniel Bouton, 
Chair/CEO 2000–
2005 
‘He took it calmly but this is probably the first time for 
as long as I have known him that he clearly showed his 
emotions. He is a rather cold, calculated character who 
doesn’t lose his nerve easily.’ (FT, 25 Jan 2008) 
Emotional stability. 
13b Societe 
Generale 
Daniel Bouton, 
Chair/CEO 2000–
2005 
The creation of BNP Paribas had left the bullet-
headed, blue-eyed Mr Bouton facing claims that 
SocGen had been left without a strategy and would fall 
prey to a bigger bank. But Mr Bouton and his 
colleagues went on to prove the doubters wrong for the 
best part of a decade. Exploiting the French 
educational system’s talent for producing exceptional 
Vision, creativity, 
confidence. 
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mathematicians, SocGen built a world-class equity 
derivatives business (FT, 25 Jan 2008) 
14 Unicredit Levan 
Hammertzoumian
Chair/CEO 2001– 
Prudence and modest conservatism is always a good 
way to treat things. UniCredit Bulbank has always 
been slightly more conservative than the market, 
which allowed us to support our clients during the 
worst months and years of the crisis better than some 
of our competitors. 
(https://www.novinite.com/articles/128717/UniCredit+Bulbank+CEO+Levon+Ha
mpartzoumian%3A+We+Are+the+Preferred+Financial+Partner+of+Italian+Busin
esses+Eyeing+Bulgaria) 
Emotional stability, vision, 
confidence. 
15a Credit 
Suisse 
David Mathers, 
CFO 2010– 
Approximately is never exact enough for David 
Mathers: the Credit Suisse finance boss is known to 
punch the buttons of his calculator long enough to give 
a very precise answer – even when roughly would be 
good enough (Vogeli, 2018) 
Attention to detail. 
15b Credit 
Suisse 
David Mathers, 
CFO 2010– 
David Mathers is shrewd and politically adept, and he 
knows where all the bodies are buried at Credit Suisse 
(mainly because he buried most of them) (Davies, 2015) 
Good communicator. 
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15c Credit 
Suisse 
David Mathers, 
CFO 2010– 
His value to the bank is that he has gone the extra mile 
for Credit Suisse when the bank needed it most. 
Unflappable and dazzlingly smart, Mathers seemed to 
excel in stressful situations like 2008, when the Swiss 
bank – like most of its European rivals – went hunting 
for money (Vogeli, 2018) 
Emotional stability. 
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Table 7.2: Axial coding linked to negative characteristics and traits 
Case 
example 
Bank Leader, post 
and dates 
Example document analysis Axial coding linked to 
negative leadership 
characteristics and traits 
1 Lehman 
Brothers 
Erin Callan, 
CFO 2007 
During Lehman’s first quarter conference call with 
investors, Callan said the company had about US$38.7bn 
of hard-to-value assets known as ‘level 3’ assets. When 
the company filed its quarterly results with regulators, it 
revised that figure upward to US$40.2bn. 
(https://seekingalpha.com/article/22480-lehman-brothers-f4q06-qtr-end-11-30-06-
earnings-call-transcript) 
Manipulation, unethical 
decision, deception. 
2 Washing
ton 
Mutual 
Kerry 
Killinger, 
Chair/CEO 
2000–2007 
WaMu failed primarily because of Killinger’s pursuit of a 
high-risk lending strategy that included liberal 
underwriting standards and inadequate risk controls. 
Killinger failed to adequately control and disclose high 
risk of default on the securitised prime and sub-prime 
loans it sold to investors. (https://www. articles/161469/senate-
investigation-finds-fraud-at-wamu) 
Drive, arrogance, unethical 
decisions. 
3 UBS Peter Wuffi, 
CFO 1999–
Wuffi had led the bank on a steep growth path, using its 
global reach and sophistication to attract investments 
Blind drive, arrogance. 
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2002, CEO 
2003–2006 
from the world’s rich while executing a string of 
acquisitions that lifted UBS to the rank of No. 5 
worldwide in terms of market value. 
(https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ubs-ceo/ubs-replaces-ceo-wuffli-
idUKMOL62208220070706) 
4 Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Fred Goodwin, 
CEO 2001–
2008 
‘Sir Fred, if the opportunities available to you are so 
exciting – and if everything’s going so well at the bank 
– why has the share price fallen 35% since you started 
speaking?’ (https://www.ft.com/content/dbcc20aa-02a0-11de-b58b-
000077b07658)  
Arrogance, deception. 
5 Barclays Robert 
Diamond, 
CEO 2011–
2012 
‘Frequently leaping to his feet, grabbing a golf club or a 
wad of bills from his wallet. He’s theatrically dismissive 
of past failings and resolute about a future that will prove 
him right.’ (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-10-11/bob-
diamond-s-misadventures-in-africa) 
Arrogance, hubris. 
6 Bear 
Stearns 
James Cayne, 
Chair/CEO 
2000–2007 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report singled 
out Cayne, noting that some senior executives sharply 
criticised him and that Cayne’s hands-off management 
style led him to miss critical events that foreshadowed the 
meltdown. (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011. The financial crisis 
inquiry report: The final report of the National Commission on the causes of the 
Lack of care, lack of 
knowledge. 
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financial and economic crisis in the United States including dissenting views. Cosimo, 
Inc.)  
7 Halifax 
Bank of 
Scotland 
James Crosby, 
CEO 2001–
2006 
James Crosby led an aggressive, high-risk growth 
strategy, prioritised optimism over prudence and 
sanctioned too many big loans to a small number of 
borrowers. The bank was too optimistic over bad debts 
and did not take ‘reasonable care’ to control its affairs. 
(Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013, ‘An Accident Waiting to 
Happen’: The Failure of HBOS) 
Arrogance, blind drive, lack 
of consideration. 
8 Northern 
Rock 
David Jones, 
CFO 2006–
2008 
In 2010, Jones was handed a lifetime ban and fined 
£320,000 by the FSA for allowing the bank to report 
mortgage arrears figures that were lower than they should 
have been. (https://www.financialdirector.co.uk/2018/09/15/lehmans-10-years-
on-where-are-the-financial-crisis-cfos/) 
Deception, unethical 
decisions. 
9 Dexia Axel Miller, 
CEO 2006–
2008 
Axel Miller seems to have turned a blind eye to market 
dislocations and mounting pressures in the financial 
system. (Docherty and Viort, 2014, p. 180) 
Blind drive, arrogance. 
10 Anglo 
Irish 
Bank 
David Drumm, 
CEO 2005–
2008 
The former chief executive of Anglo Irish Bank has 
received a six-year prison sentence after his conviction 
for a 7.2bn Euro fraud and false accounting 
Deception, unethical 
decisions 
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at Ireland’s failed lender. (https://www.ft.com/content/4c7b56de-74a4-
11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287) 
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These categories are then further analysed in relation to the conceptual labels identified in 
para 6.5.2 above, the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the banks in each category, and 
analysed to uncover links to the leadership characteristics and traits identified above. Table 
7.3 shows the relationship between the leadership characteristics and the leadership styles.  
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Table 7.3: Relationship between the paradigm model and the phenomenon 
Case 
example 
Causal 
condition: 
Causal 
condition: 
Action/interaction: Deliberate responses to a situation Phenomenon: Leadership 
characteristics and traits 
Bank Leader Examples of document analysis                                              
Consequence 
1 Lehman 
Brothers 
Dick Fuld, 
Chair/CEO 
1993–2008 
‘Yes,’ he said, referring to commercial and residential 
mortgage assets. ‘Am I worried about it? No. If you have 
some repricing of these things will we lose some money? Yes. 
Is it going to kill us? Of course not.’ 
(https://www.ft.com/content/2d66031a-395a-11dd-90d7-0000779fd2ac) 
Arrogance, 
hubris. 
Filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy 
2 Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Fred 
Goodwin, 
CEO 
2001–
2008 
John Cryan wrote to Sir Fred warning him about ABN’s 
exposure to sub-prime: ‘There is stuff in here we can’t even 
value.’ Sir Fred replied saying: ‘Stop being such a bean 
counter’. 
(https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8947530/RBS-
investigation-Chapter-2-the-ABN-Amro-takeover.html) 
Arrogance, 
hubris, lack of 
attention to 
detail. 
Government 
bailout £45bn 
3 UBS Marcel 
Ospel, 
CEO 
1999–
‘Top management was too complacent, wrongly believing that 
everything was under control, given the numerous risk reports, 
internal audits and external reviews almost always ended in 
positive conclusion. The bank did not lack risk consciousness, 
Complacency, 
arrogance, lack 
of controls 
US$6.09bn from 
the state and 
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2001, 
Chair 
2001–
2008 
it lacked healthy mistrust, independent judgement and strength 
of leadership.’ (Straumann, 2010) 
US$54bn from 
the central bank 
4 Barclays Matthew 
Barrett, 
Chair 
2002–
2007 
Matt Barrett, the flamboyant chief executive of Barclays 
Bank, says he does not believe in destiny. But barely 10 days 
ago in typical wisecracking style he was joking that ‘if all the 
planets were in the right quadrant’, he would do a deal in the 
mortgages and savings market. (https://www.managementtoday.co.uk/andrew-
davidson-interview-matt-barrett/article/407273) 
Overconfidence, 
lack of 
preparation, 
lack of attention 
to detail. 
Cash injection of 
US$4bn  
5 Northern 
Rock 
Matt 
Ridley, 
Chair 
2004–
2007 
Business plans set ever-increasing targets for profit growth in 
the corporate arm – and targets were increased during the first 
half of 2007 to ‘imprudent’ levels as the group looked to the 
corporate division to make up for the underperformance of the 
retail arm. Ridley turned his back on finance after Northern 
Rock needed emergency funds, resigning three days after a 
humiliating grilling by members of parliament who exposed 
his lack of banking knowledge. (HC Treasury Select Committee, 2008) 
Blind drive, 
ambition, lack 
of 
understanding 
and knowledge. 
Bank of England 
liquidity support  
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6 Halifax 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Dennis 
Stevenson, 
Chair 
2001–
2008 
On merger in 2001 of Halifax and Bank of Scotland, Dennis 
Stevenson stated: ‘The merger combination gives scale where 
it was needed, balance sheet and funding support where 
growth would have been inhibited and a new scale of earnings 
power driven by product and services propositions that attack 
the entrenched competition. Rarely can two great brands and 
two great organisations have combined with so much potential 
for extraordinary growth.’ (McConnell, 2014)   
Ambition, drive. UK Treasury 
capital injectiof 
£17bn and 
takeover by 
Lloyds banking 
group  
7 Allied 
Irish 
Eugene 
Sheehy, 
CEO 
2005–
2009 
‘Okay. We breached it (Basel 1 Tier ratio) and it was … as 
soon as it was identified, you know, it was reported and 
discussed with the regulator, so, if you like, it was a breach in 
open sight, it wasn’t something that was hidden. The regulator 
acknowledged the breach, didn’t remove the limit, you know, 
but at the same time acknowledged that we were working on 
the Basel II process, which was going to look at it in a 
different way.’ https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/hearings/eugene-sheehy-former-
group-chief-executive-allied-irish-bank/ 
Breaking rules, 
risk taking, 
honesty. 
Capital injection 
and nationalised 
Jan. 2009 3.5bn 
Euros 
8 Fortis Count 
Maurice 
Lippens, 
Chair 
On the takeover of ABN AMRO (with RBS) and after a 
second, unannounced capital increase, Lippens was 
interviewed on Flander TV: Lippens: ‘Actually, we decided in 
difficult circumstances, I would say extremely difficult 
Drive, ambition, 
lack of 
Sold to BNP 
Paribas May 2009 
1.2bn Euros 
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1990–
2008 
circumstances, to strengthen our position once again. So, 
Fortis is even stronger than in the past.’ Interviewer: ‘Actually 
you bought something you could not afford.’ Lippens: ‘I am a 
lawyer and I cannot count, but in this case I can count better 
than you can.’ Interviewer: ‘Your shareholders are paying for 
this expensive takeover.’ Lippens: ‘They must hold on to their 
shares; they must have more confidence in a company which 
has the courage not to take popular decisions but to consider 
the good of the company at large. The shareholder, the big 
shareholder, the small shareholder says “yes, but my shares 
are only worth 10 euros”. Look at Barclays, look at the others, 
they are not worth that much either. They have also had a 
difficult time, everybody has. We have acquired a real gem. 
[...]. I would say, ladies and gentlemen, invest as quickly as 
you can.’ (Limbos and Philips, 2010) 
transparency, 
lack of honesty 
9 Bradford 
and 
Bingley 
Steven 
Crawshaw
, CEO 
2004–
2008 
Crawshaw, 47, who has been chief executive for just four 
years, has been the target of most of the criticism because a 
month before the rights issue he strongly denied B&B had any 
such plans (https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/markets/article-1632047/BampB-
chief-Crawshaw-to-quit-as-profits-dip.html) 
Lack of 
honesty, 
manipulation. 
Saving units and 
branches sold to 
Santander  
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10 Anglo 
Irish Bank 
Séan 
FitzPatrick
, CEO 
1986–
2005, 
Chair 
2005–
2008 
In 1986, Séan FitzPatrick became chief executive of a small 
Irish commercial lender known as the City of Dublin Bank. 
Over the course of the next 18 years, FitzPatrick oversaw the 
growth of the City of Dublin Bank into the 3rd largest bank in 
Ireland. By May 2007 the bank, now known as the Anglo Irish 
Bank, reached a peak value of €13 billion with a share price of 
€17.60. (Carswell, 2011) 
Ambition, drive, 
risk taking. 
Capital injection 
May 2009 39.3bn 
Euros  
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the axial coding process. The aim of axial coding is to put the data that 
was fractured during the open coding process back together, linking to the categories and 
determining how they are related. 
This stage has taken the categories of the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation 
that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and the 30 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that did not, and grouped them around the conceptual labels of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in each bank. During the open coding stage, secondary data from 
annual reports, analyst transcripts, parliamentary and treasury inquiries and press releases 
was analysed in order to identify leadership characteristics and traits. The axial coding stage 
then groups each Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO with the identified leadership 
characteristics to form a picture of leadership characteristics and traits for each of the 
conceptual labels: Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO. Relational and variational sampling is 
then undertaken which relates the categories to paradigm conditions, context, 
actions/interactions and consequences. The following chapter now takes the relationships 
outlined above into the selective coding process (Corbin and Strauss, 1990), which identifies 
the core category and its relationship to subcategories in order to develop the paradigm 
model. 
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Chapter 8 
Selective Coding 
8.1 Introduction 
As detailed in previous chapters, this research is concerned with answering the fundamental 
question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout during the research 
period (1999–2017)?’ 
The study uses a qualitative approach within a social constructionist paradigm with an 
adapted grounded theory methodology (as outlined in Chapter 5). Secondary data was 
collected from annual reports triangulated with analyst meeting transcripts, parliamentary, 
treasury and federal inquiry reports, and press releases for the 17 largest banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout during the research period, together with 30 largest banks 
that did not, taken from the Banker Top 1000 (2017). The data was analysed following the 
open coding and axial rules (Chapter 5) adapted for grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). 
This chapter outlines the selective coding stage which is the final analysis of the 
process (Pandit, 1996). Selective coding is based on the findings from the open and axial 
coding stages presented in Chapters 6 and 7 above. It involves the process of selecting the 
core category, and ‘systematically relating it to other categories, and validating those 
relationships’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 116). 
During the open coding stage, the data analysis focussed on generating categories in 
terms of dimensions and properties. The axial coding stage draws all the parts of the analysis 
together, developing the categories in terms of their relationship to the phenomenon, i.e. 
‘leadership characteristics and styles’, and the paradigm model. This then becomes the axis of 
the theory building, but it is not until the ‘major categories are finally integrated to a larger 
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theoretical scheme that the research findings take the form of a theory’ (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998, p. 43). 
Selective coding focusses on integrating the categories by identifying the core 
category and subcategories. It is achieved by integrating the axial categories to other 
categories that have been developed to form the initial theoretical framework (Pandit, 1996). 
It pulls together all the strands in order to offer an explanation of the behaviour under study 
(Goulding, 2005). 
This chapter begins with the identification of the properties and dimensions of the 
core category which is based on the data collection and analysis of the initial categories. It 
then goes on to verify the relationship between the core category and the subcategories again 
through the use of the paradigm model, before concluding with the presentation of the 
substantive theory. 
8.2 The Selective Coding Process 
Selective coding aims to identify the core category and develop it in relation to the 
subcategories on the basis of the axial coding analysis described in Chapter 7 (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). The axial coding categories were identified as ‘banks’, ‘leaders’, and 
‘decision making’ which were linked to the phenomenon of ‘leadership characteristics and 
styles’ through the paradigm model. These all emerged from the data and were developed 
with the core category in mind (Howell, 2012). Selective coding then focusses on refining the 
conceptual relationships between the main categories built during the axial coding process. 
This requires a combination of both inductive and deductive thinking where the researcher 
moves between asking questions, generating hypotheses and making comparisons (Corbin 
and Strauss, 1990). 
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Selective coding is therefore the integration of the analysis at the open and axial 
coding stages to form an initial theoretical framework of ‘What is board leadership in global 
banking?’ The story line is then generated around the central narrative of why some banks 
failed and others did not, which in turn becomes the central phenomenon of the study (Pandit, 
1996). When analysed it becomes the core category. 
The categories that emerged during the open coding stage were: ‘banks’, ‘leaders’, 
‘decision making’, ‘regulatory environment’ and ‘financial innovation’. 
These were subsumed into the axial coding main categories: ‘leaders’ (causal 
conditions); ‘globalisation and complexity’ (context); ‘regulation/deregulation’ (intervening 
conditions); and ‘decision making’ (action/interaction strategies) with the consequences being 
whether the bank failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout. In order to identify the core 
category, the data is further analysed by asking questions such as ‘What does all the 
action/interaction seem to be about?’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Although leadership characteristics and styles were in mind during the open and axial 
coding stages, the intricate relationships between the individual characteristics and extant 
leadership theories is only confirmed in the selective coding stage. This occurred by the 
further analysis of the individual characteristics and traits compared to those found in extant 
leadership theories. 
The next section shows how the analysis of the data contributes to this by the use of 
discriminate sampling which is the theoretical sampling stage associated with the selective 
coding stage as outlined in Chapter 6 above, and its focus is to validate the relationships 
discovered by the previous analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
 
8.3 Discriminate Sampling 
The aim of discriminate sampling is to verify the storyline and the relationships between the 
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categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Pandit, 1996). In this adaptation of grounded theory 
(Chapter 5), the statements analysed during the axial coding stage were developed further and 
related to those characteristics and traits found within extant leadership theories taken from 
the review of literature in Chapter 2. The data was ordered according to the initial categories 
of the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout 
(1999–2017) and the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation that did not. Details of the 
samples linked to the findings are shown below. 
 
8.3.1 Sample 1: Banks that Failed, Needed Recapitalisation or Bailout 
Table 8.1 below shows examples of the discriminate sampling for Category 1: 17 largest 
banks by market capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
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Table 8.1: Discriminate sampling and selective coding for banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) 
 Bank Leader Example of Document analysis Axial coding 
(discriminate sampling) 
Selective coding 
Example 
case 
Example 
bank 
Example 
leader 
Leadership 
characteristic/trait 
Leadership style 
1a Lehman 
Brothers 
Dick Fuld, 
Chair/CEO 
1994–2008 
When Richard ‘Dick’ Fuld took 
charge of Lehman Brothers in 1994, 
the firm was famous on Wall Street for 
the bitter internal feud between traders 
and investment bankers that had cost 
Lehman its independence a decade 
earlier. Fuld, who had sided with 
fellow traders, knew he would have to 
make peace with the bankers and 
create a culture based on teamwork. 
Self-confidence, passion, 
bravery 
Charismatic 
leadership (House 
and Howell, 1992, 
Shamir et al., 1993) 
1b Lehman 
Brothers 
Dick Fuld 
Chair/CEO 
1994-2008 
As I quickly discovered, nobody 
personified this vaulting ambition 
more clearly than Dick Fuld ... Even 
when in a relatively upbeat mood he 
seemed to take pleasure in violent 
imagery. Lehman was ‘at war’ in the 
Blind drive, arrogance, 
aggression  
Dark side (Rosenthal 
and Pittinsky, 2006) 
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market, he would say. Every day was a 
battle, employees were troops. At an 
investment banking conference in 
London last spring, I saw him astonish 
several hundred of his managing 
directors with a blood-curdling threat 
aimed at investors who were selling 
Lehman shares short – depressing the 
price. ‘When I find a short-seller, I 
want to tear his heart out and eat it 
before his eyes while he’s still alive,’ 
the chairman declared. Histrionics, 
maybe – but with a purpose. Fuld had 
used this aggression to consolidate his 
reputation as the most successful chief 
executive in the banking business and 
one of the most respected corporate 
leaders in America. (Gower, 2010) 
2 Washinton 
Mutual 
Kerry 
Killinger, 
Killinger set about building on a grand 
scale with a string of acquisitions that 
transformed the Seattle-based WAMU 
Hubris, blind drive Charismatic dark 
side (Conger, 1989; 
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Chair/CEO 
1992–2008 
into the national largest thrift, seventh 
largest banking corporation, and 
mortgage powerhouse that tops both 
services and origination sides of the 
house .... ‘This is a company that 
doesn’t make mistakes, says 
Killinger’. (Cocheo, 2001) 
Rosenthal and 
Pittinsky, 2006) 
3 Royal 
Bank of 
Scotland 
Fred 
Goodwin, 
CEO 2001–
2008 
‘Within RBS itself, Goodwin’s 
domination was maintained by 
economic violence. The RBS’s 
internal culture has been characterised 
as a “culture of fear”, specifically by 
200 senior staff on an away-day in 
2001 – to which the 6ft 3in Mr 
Goodwin responded “You’re not 
afraid of little me”.’ 
 
‘There were for example rituals of 
humiliation when managers, watched 
by Goodwin had to give karaoke 
performances. Morning management 
Hubris, blind drive, focus 
on performance, lack of 
empathy 
Charismatic dark 
side (Conger, 1989; 
Rosenthal and 
Pittlinsky, 2006) 
Transactional-
management by 
exeption (Burns, 
1978) 
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meetings, known as “morning prayer”’ 
or “morning beatings”, were also used 
to humiliate senior managers.’ (Kerr and 
Robinson, 2012) 
4 UBS John Cryan, 
CFO 2008–
2011 
‘Our sense of needing much more 
capital is somewhat visceral, [UBS] is 
a company that lost SFr50 billion 
[$49.2 billion] over three years, that 
had to be supported by the national 
authorities. It was ignominious. “We 
have been de-risking for two years and 
raised capital four times. Remember 
that we have a SFr1.5 trillion balance 
sheet; we are responsible for another 
SFr2 trillion of invested assets and 
another approximately SFr1 trillion of 
custodial and other client assets; we 
run three big pension funds and 
employ 64,000 people. What 
happened before must never happen 
again. Is SFr28 billion of core capital 
Empahsis on corporate 
structure, and doing 
things correctly, honesty, 
responsibility 
Transactional 
(Burns, 1978b; Bass, 
1991; Spahr, 2014; 
Yukl, 2008) 
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enough? We think it should be SFr45 
billion to SFr50 billion.”’ 
(https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kndts07qp
k4/deutsche-bank-cryan-finally-steps-into-the-
limelight?copyrightInfo=true) 
5 Merril 
Lynch 
Stanley 
O’Neil, 
CFO 1999–
2002, 
Chair/CEO 
2002–2005 
O’Neal put Merrill through a 
comprehensive restructuring program, 
cutting costs and significantly 
reducing the work force. As CEO, 
O’Neal faces the challenge of 
changing the company’s signature 
‘Mother Merril’ culture into a 
performance-driven and meritocratic 
one, while facing resistance and 
criticism from inside Merrill and Wall 
Street. (Thomas and Kanji, 2004) 
Arrogance, dominance,  
focus on performance, 
contingent reward 
Charismatic dark 
side (Rosenthal and 
Pittinsky, 2006); 
Transactional 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 
1991) 
6 Barclays Matthew 
Barrett, 
Chair  
1999–2003 
‘Certainly he was talking a good talk, 
and saying all the things people 
wanted to hear, you know like 
increasing focus on productivity, cost 
cutting, diversification and e-
Not trying to change the 
status quo. Focus on 
productivity and 
financials, emphasis on 
corporate structure, doing 
this correctly 
Transactional 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 
1991; Spahr, 2014; 
Yukl, 2008) 
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commerce.’ (Analyst Transcript CNN and 
Fitch, 2002) 
7 Bear 
Stearns 
James 
Cayne, 
Chair/CEO 
2000–2007 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission report singled out Cayne, 
noting that ‘some senior executives 
sharply criticized’ him. Cayne’s 
hands-off management style led him to 
miss critical events that foreshadowed 
the meltdown. (Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011) 
Lack of leadership, 
management by 
exception – passive 
Transactional 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 
1991) 
8 Northern 
Rock 
Adam 
Applegarth, 
CEO, 2001–
2007  
‘Applegarth, bullet-headed chief 
executive of mortgage lender Northern 
Rock, is a deeply competitive man … 
he combines a relentless memory for 
detail with a rare ability to see the 
bigger picture. ‘ (Davidson, 2005)  
Need for achievement, 
ambition, detail and 
process 
Charismatic dark 
side (Schaubroeck et 
al., 2007; Sheard et 
al., 2013) 
Transactional 
(Spahr, 2014) 
9 Dexia Pierre 
Richard, 
CEO 2000–
2003, 
Chairman 
2003–2008 
‘Dexia will continue to strengthen its 
position through geographical 
expansion of innovatove and varied 
product.’ (Dexia Annual report and accounts, 2007).  
 
Drive, ambition, need for 
achievement, 
overconfidence 
Charismatic dark 
side (Schaubroeck et 
al., 2007; Sheard et 
al., 2013) 
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‘Whereas most banks were limiting 
loans, Dexia was still agressively 
growing in 2008 when 48% more 
credit was provided compared to 2007, 
showing misplaced confidence and 
misunderstanding of the fast 
apporaching external risk.’ (Woods and 
Linsley, 2017) 
10 Anglo 
Irish 
David 
Drumm 
From court hearing, taped 
conversations between Drumm and 
John Bowe re: bailout funds: ‘I am 
going to keep asking thick questions. 
“When is the cheque coming?” and 
later in the conversation, if we show 
up with horrible numbers, at least it 
will look like we put up a fight.’ (18 Sept. 
2008) 
Manipulation, deception, 
arrogance 
 
Charismatic dark 
side  (Kakabadse and 
Kakabdse, 1999; 
Rosenthal and 
Pittlinsky, 2006)  
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8.4 Review of Discriminate Sampling: Banks that Failed, Needed Recapitalisation or 
Bailout 
The overall findings of the discriminate sampling are then broken down according to the 
categories in order to gain further insight into the initial framework of ‘what is leadership in  
banking?’ These are detailed below. 
 
8.4.1 Chairs in Banks that Failed 
For the initial category of Chair, the data was broken down into those leaders in office pre- and 
during failure, recapitalisation or bailout, and those afterwards where applicable. 
Chairs pre- and during failure: This sample consisted of 24 Chairs in 14 of the banks that 
failed or were nationalised/taken over. The predominant leadership style found in the Chairs 
leading banks pre- and during the failure, recapitalisation of bailout was found to be 
‘transactional (contingent reward)’ and this was found in all 24 Chairs. 
 
8.4.2 Chairs in Banks that Were Recapitalised or Received Bailout Funds 
Five Chairs were identified in three banks that required recapitalisation/bailout and avoided 
merger, sale or nationalisation. These banks were Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and UBS 
and the predominant leadership style was also ‘transactional (contingent reward)’. 
The five Chairs appointed post the recapitalisation or bailout were also found to be 
predominantly transactional with the notable exceptions of David Walker (Barclays) and 
Howard Davies (Royal Bank of Scotland), both found to show secondary characteristics of 
‘transformational (idealised influence)’ (Bass, 1996), and John McFarlane (Barclays) was 
found to be ‘charismatic’ with ‘transactional’ characteristics. 
The findings therefore show that the predominant leadership style of Chairs in banks 
that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout was ‘transactional (contingent reward)’. 
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8.4.3 Chief Executive Officers 
CEOs pre- and during failure, recapitalisation or bailout: The predominant leadership style of 
the CEOs leading the banks in the preceding years before failure, need for recapitalisation or 
bailout was found to be ‘charismatic’ with ‘dark side’ traits such as ‘blind drive’, ‘arrogance’ 
and ‘entitlement’ which was found in 10 of the 14 CEOs that were leading banks before failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. The other 4 CEOs were found to have a ‘transactional’ leadership 
style. 
 
8.4.4 CEOs Appointed after the Recapitalisation or Bailout 
The predominant leadership style was found to be ‘transactional’ with secondary 
‘transformational’ characteristics. Notably, one CEO was found to be ‘authentic’ (Antony 
Jenkins, Barclays) and one to be ‘transactional’ with secondary ‘authentic’ characteristics (Jes 
Staley, Barclays). 
These findings show that there was a prevalent leadership style in the CEOs leading 
the banks pre- and during failure, recapitalisation or bailout and this was found to be 
‘charismatic’ with ‘dark side’ traits. 
The findings also show a predominant leadership style in banks after recapitalisation 
or bailout, and this was found to be ‘transactional’ with ‘transformational’ characteristics. 
 
8.4.5 Chief Finance Officers 
CFOs pre- and during failure, recapitalisation or bailout: The predominant leadership style 
found in the CFOs who were leading the banks at this time was ‘transactional’, shown in all 
CFOs. Six CFOs were also found to have ‘charismatic dark side’ traits and notably these CFOs 
were found in banks that had combined Chair/CEO roles. 
CFOs post recapitalisation or bailout: The predominant leadership style of the CFOs 
in the banks post recapitalisation or bailout was found to be ‘transactional’ with two notable 
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exceptions in Nathan Bostock (RBS) and Chris Lucas (Barclays) who also show 
characteristics associated with ‘charisma’. Interestingly, Erin Callan (Lehman Brothers, 
2007–2008) was found to be ‘transactional dark side’ while at Lehman and ‘authentic 
transactional’ post the Lehman failure. 
The findings show the predominant leadership style in CFOs in banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout was ‘transactional’. 
The consolidated findings are shown in Table 8.2 below. 
Table 8.2: Consolidation of prevalent leadership styles in Category 1: Banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) 
Conceptual labels Leadership style: Most prevalent Secondary style 
Chair Transactional Charismatic dark side 
Chair/CEO Charismatic dark side Charismatic 
CEO Charismatic dark side Transactional 
CFO Transactional Charismatic dark side 
 
These findings provide a clear answer to the first research objective of this thesis 
which is to consider whether there is a prevalent leadership style or set of leadership 
characteristics found in the Chairs, Chair/CEOs, CEOs and CFOs in banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout. This was found to be positive with the prevalent leadership styles 
shown for each role, i.e. the Chairs and CFOs were found to be ‘transactional’ with 
‘charismatic dark side’ traits, the Chair/CEOs were found to be ‘charismatic dark side’ with 
secondary ‘charismatic’ traits, and the CEOs were found to be ‘charismatic dark side’ with 
‘transactional’ traits. 
The next section considers the second research objective which is to consider whether 
the prevalent leadership characteristics and styles found in those banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout differed from those that did not. 
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8.5 Review of Discriminate Sampling for Banks that Did Not Fail, Need Recapitalisation 
or Bailout 
This section discusses the analysis of banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout 
(1999–2017). In total, statements from 82 Chairs, 26 Chair/CEOs, 51 CEOs and 36 CFOs were 
analysed in this way and the findings are summarised below. 
 
8.5.1 Chairs 
Chairs: The study reviewed data for 82 Chairs and the analysis identified three prevalent 
leadership styles. The most prevalent was found to be ‘transactional’ occurring in all the Chairs. 
‘Transactional’ combined with some elements of ‘transformational (idealised influence)’ and 
‘individual consideration’ also occurred in 12 of the 82 Chairs. Notably, Ana Botin (Banco 
Santander) was also found to have elements of ‘charisma’. 
This shows a prevalent leadership style amongst the Chairs which is identified as 
‘transactional’ with secondary ‘transformational’ characteristics, and is found to be different 
from Chairs leading banks that did fail, need recapitalisation or bailout, which was 
‘transactional’ with secondary ‘charismatic dark side’ traits. 
 
8.5.2 Chair/CEOs 
Chair/CEOs: Twenty-six leaders held the dual role of Chair/CEO in 14 banks. All 26 leaders 
were found to show characteristics of ‘transactional’ leadership, with three also showing 
characteristics of ‘charisma’. These were Jamie Dimon (JP Morgan); Sandy Weill (Citigroup) 
and Charles Prince (Citigroup). 
This shows a prevalent leadership style amongst Chair/CEOs in this category, which 
is identified as ‘transactional’. This is found to be different from those in banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout, which was identified as ‘charismatic dark side’. 
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8.5.3 Chief Executive Officers 
CEOs: Fifty-one CEOs were identified in this sample and four leadership styles were 
identified. The prevalent leadership style was ‘transactional (contingent reward’) occurring in 
40 CEOs found to have characteristics such as a ‘focus on short term goals’ and ‘favour 
structures and policies’. ‘Transformational (idealised influence)’ and ‘individualised 
consideration’ characteristics were found to be the prevalent leadership characteristic in ten 
CEOs, five of whom also possessed secondary characteristics of transactional. 
Notably, Jayne Anne Gadhia of Virgin Money was found to possess authentic 
leadership characteristics such as a ‘concern for personal morals’, together with 
‘transformational (idealised influence and inspirational motivation)’ and ‘transactional’ traits. 
These findings show a prevalent leadership style exists amongst CEOs in banks that 
did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout and is found to be ‘transactional (contingent 
reward)’. This is different to the CEOs in banks that did fail which was found to be 
predominantly ‘charismatic dark side’ with secondary ‘transactional’ characteristics. 
 
8.5.4 Chief Finance Officers 
CFOs: There were 65 leaders in this group. The predominant leadership style was found to be 
‘transactional (contingent reward)’ which was found in 56 leaders. Notably, traits of ‘charisma’ 
(‘skilled at public speaking’, ‘dominance’ and ‘desire to lead’) were identified in five CFOs, 
all of whom went on to become either CEOs or Chairs. Interestingly, the data showed a 
difference in the nine female CFOs who were found to be predominantly authentic with 
elements of ‘transactional’ combined with ‘transformational’. 
This shows a predominant style of ‘transactional (contingent reward)’ in this group 
which notably is found to be the same as those in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or 
bailout. However, when the secondary characteristics are considered, there is a difference, 
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with this group showing ‘transformational’ characteristics and those CFOs in banks that 
failed showing characteristics associated with ‘charismatic dark side’. 
The summary table (Table 8.3) below shows the most prevalent and secondary 
leadership characteristics and styles of the leaders in the banks that did not fail, require 
recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). 
Table 8.3: Consolidation of prevalent leadership styles in Category 2: Banks that did 
not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) 
Conceptual 
labels 
Leadership style characteristics: 
Most prevalent 
Leadership style characteristics: 
Secondary style 
Chair Transactional Transformational (idealised 
influence) 
Chair/CEO Transactional Charismatic 
CEO Transactional(contingent reward) Transformational (idealised 
influence and individual 
consideration) 
CFO Transactional (contingent reward) Transformational 
 
The data provides a clear answer to the second research objective which is to consider 
whether there is a prevalent leadership style found in those banks that did not fail, need 
recapitalisation or bailout. This is found to be positive with Chairs found to be predominantly 
‘transactional’, Chair/CEOs found to be predominantly ‘charismatic’, and CEOs and CFOs 
found to be ‘transactional’. 
Having established that there are predominant and secondary leadership styles in each 
sample, the third research objective is to consider whether there was a difference between the 
leadership styles in the banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and those that did 
not. This was also found to be positive with the results shown in Table 8.4 below. 
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Table 8.4: Differences between leadership styles of board members 
Conceptual 
labels 
Banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout: 
Prevalent and secondary 
leadership styles 
Banks that did not fail, need 
recapitalisation or bailout: 
Prevalent and secondary 
leadership styles 
Chair Predominant: Transactional 
Secondary: Charismatic dark side 
Predominant: Transactional 
Secondary: Transformational 
(idealised influence) 
Chair/CEO Predominant: Charismatic dark side 
Secondary: Charismatic 
Predominant: Transactional 
Secondary: Charismatic 
CEO Predominant: Charismatic dark side 
Secondary: Transactional 
Predominant: Transactional 
(contingent reward) 
Secondary: Transformational 
(idealised influence and individual 
consideration) 
CFO Predominant: Transactional 
Secondary: Charismatic dark side 
Predominant: Transactional 
(contingent reward) 
Secondary: Transformational 
 
Notably, the predominant style of the Chairs in both samples was found to be 
‘transactional’ with the differences becoming apparent in the secondary characteristics. Those 
Chairs in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout showed ‘charismatic dark side’ 
characteristics, whereas those in banks which did not showed ‘transformational (idealised 
influence)’ characteristics. 
Similarly, the Chair/CEOs in both samples were shown to be ‘charismatic’ in the 
secondary styles. Chair/CEOs in those banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout are 
shown to possess predominantly ‘dark side’ characteristics whereas those in banks that did 
not fail, possessed predominantly ‘transactional’ characteristics. 
These findings will be explored further in Chapter 9 below. 
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8.6 Shared Leadership 
The discriminate sampling is also used to consider the fourth research objective: Is 
there a difference in leadership characteristics and styles between the identified board 
members? To answer this, the leadership characteristics and styles within the relationship of 
the shared leadership roles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO was considered and 
interestingly, a predominant relationship can be seen. In Sample 1: In the banks that failed, 
needed recapitalisation or bailout, those banks with a separate Chair were found to have the 
following predominant relationship: 
Chair: ‘transactional’, CEO: ‘charismatic dark side’ and CFO: ‘transactional’. 
Where the Chair/CEO was combined, this changed to: 
Chair/CEO: ‘charismatic dark side’ and CFO: ‘transactional’. 
In Sample 2: In the banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout, this relationship 
differed. In the banks with a separate Chair, the relationship was found to be predominantly:  
Chair: ‘transactional’, CEO: ‘transactional’ and CFO: ‘transactional’. 
Where the Chair and CEO were combined, it was found to be: 
Chair/CEO: ‘transactional’ and CFO: ‘transactional’. 
The relationship and its potential impact on the research question is explored in Chapter 9 
and the results are tabulated for clarity in Table 8.5 below: 
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Table 8.5: Comparison of the relationship between the shared leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
Sample 1: Banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout  
Chair  Chair/CEO  CEO CFO 
Predominant leadership style Transactional 
 
Charismatic dark 
side 
Charismatic dark 
side 
Transactional 
 
Secondary leadership style Charismatic dark 
side 
Charismatic Transactional Charismatic dark 
side 
 
Sample 2: 
Banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or 
bailout 
Chair  Chair/CEO  CEO CFO 
Predominant leadership style Transactional 
 
Transactional 
 
Transactional 
(contingent reward) 
 
Transactional 
(contingent 
reward) 
Secondary leadership style Transformational 
(idealised influence) 
Charismatic Transformational 
(idealised influence 
and individual 
consideration) 
Transformational 
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8.7 Identification of the Core Category 
As discussed above, the selective coding phase identifies the core category and develops it 
in relation to the subcategories in the process which analyse the data by asking the question 
‘What does all the action/interaction seem to be about?’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
The core category represents the central phenomenon of the study. The categories 
created during the previous coding stages emerge from the data and are formed from the 
iterative process of simultaneous data collection, analysis and theoretical sampling (Pandit, 
1996). The open and axial coding processes form the basis for the selection of the ‘core 
category’, but the role of selective coding is to verify its characteristics in relation to the 
subcategories in order to achieve the integration needed for substantive theory development 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
The statements analysed above lead to the identification of the core category which is 
found to be: ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ and is used to answer the research 
question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout?’ 
8.7.1 The Linking of the Core Category to the Subcategories 
The next stage in the coding process is to verify the link between the core category of 
‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’, and the subcategories of ‘banks’, ‘leaders’, and 
‘decision making’ (Chapter 7) (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Table 8.6 below shows the link between the selective coding and the core category. 
 
 
Table 8.6: Selective coding linked to the core category 
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Subcategory Relationship to core category of 
‘Strategic Leadership Influence in 
Banking’ 
Paradigm component 
Leaders  Statements from all Chairs, 
Chair/CEOs, CEOs and CFOs 
analysed  
Causal conditions 
Global complexity All bank leaders were responsible for 
the strategic direction of the banks 
from within the context of the same 
complex, volatile sector 
Context 
Regulation/deregulation 
and financial innovation 
All bank leaders were subject to the 
intervening conditions of regulation, 
deregulation and financial innovation 
Intervening conditions 
Decision making All bank leaders were responsible for 
individual and shared decision 
making  
Action/interaction 
Influence on whether 
bank failed, needed 
recapitalisation or 
bailout, or not 
Analysis of the leadership 
characteristics and styles shows a 
difference between those leaders 
leading banks that failed, needed 
recapitalisation or bailout, and those 
that did not 
Consequences 
 
The application of the paradigm model to link to the core category is explained in more 
detail below. 
I Causal conditions of ‘strategic leadership’ (leaders: Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO, CFO) 
The causal conditions are those incidents and events that influence whether the bank fails, 
needs recapitalisation or bailout and are determined to be the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO 
on the board (Chapter 7). The Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are linked to the core category 
of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ as they are responsible for the direction and 
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decision making of the organisation as a whole (Zaccaro, 1996) and the analysis of the data 
supports this, showing changes in strategic direction when a new leader is appointed. 
 
II Contextual conditions (globalisation and complexity) 
The contextual conditions are the situational factors inside and outside an organisation, or the 
surroundings associated with the phenomenon (Pillai and Meindl, 1998), and in this research 
are associated with answering the question ‘What are the sets of conditions under which  
banks fail, need recapitalisation or bailout?’ (Chapter 7). Globalisation and complexity are 
cited as reasons for the global banking crisis (Crawford, 2011). However, this thesis shows that 
they are just one element of a range of factors that influence banking failure, recapitalisation 
and bailout. The core category of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ is linked to 
globalisation and complexity through the decisions made by the leaders (Chair, Chair/CEO, 
CEO and CFO), either individually or collectively. This is shown to vary according to the 
individual leader’s characteristics and styles, and the shared relationships between strategic 
leaders. 
 
III Intervening conditions (regulation/deregulation) 
Intervening conditions are the broader structural context around the phenomenon (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008) which can alter or mitigate the impact of the causal conditions on the 
phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this research, they are found to be the industry 
surroundings of ‘regulation’, ‘deregulation’ and ‘financial innovation’ (Chapter 7). The core 
category of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ is linked to these conditions through 
the leadership decisions the leaders make in response to changes in regulation and the 
opportunities presented by financial innovation. 
IV Action/interaction strategies (decision making) 
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The action/interaction strategies refer to the ‘deliberate acts that are taken to resolve a problem 
and in doing so, shape the phenomenon in some way’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 133). They 
are answered in this research by asking the question ‘What are the action/interaction 
strategies adopted by the banking sector in relation to banking failure, recapitalisation 
or bailout?’ ‘Decision making’ is identified at the axial coding stage as answering this 
question. This is linked to the core category of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ as 
it is the key process through which leaders influence the strategic direction of the business. The 
data shows a correlation between the decisions taken (linked to the causal, intervening and 
contextual conditions above) and the leadership characteristics and styles of the leaders. 
 
V Consequences 
These are the output of the action/interaction strategies (above) and are the consequences of 
the decision making of the leader (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) which influence whether 
the bank fails, needs recapitalisation or bailout. This is linked to the core category of ‘Strategic 
Leadership Influence in Banking’ through the leadership characteristics and styles which were 
identified during the data collection, open and axial coding stages. This is shown in Figure 8.1 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Identification of the core category 
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In sum, the selective coding process has taken the open and axial coding and linked the 
statements of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO to extant leadership theories around the 
core category of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’. The core category has been 
verified in terms of its relationship to the components of the paradigm model (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). 
 
8.8 Towards the Substantive Theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ 
Core 
Category
Strategic 
Leadership 
Influence in 
Banking
Charismatic 
dark side 
leadership
Charismatic 
leadership
Transactional 
leadership
Transformational 
leadership
Shared  
leadership
Authentic 
leadership
Banks that failed, 
needed 
recapitalisation or 
bailout
Banks that did 
not fail, need 
recapitalisation 
or bailout 
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The main objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. The substantive theory developed from the analysis of the data 
through the open, axial and selective coding stages begins to achieve this by determining the 
existence of prevalent leadership characteristics and styles (the phenomenon), through 
investigation of the causal conditions (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO), within the context 
of globalisation and complexity (contextual conditions), regulation, deregulation and financial 
innovation (intervening conditions) which lead to the ‘consequences’ of whether the bank fails, 
needs recapitalisation or bailout. The substantive theory helps our understanding of banking 
failure, recapitalisation and bailout. Identifying these risks is a major global policy issue, which 
to date has been addressed through increased domestic and international regulation. The 
substantive theory developed here shows that the leadership characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are crucial to, and hitherto a missing part, of understanding 
the risk of banking failure and a significant factor to consider if we are to avoid the continuous 
cycle of boom and bust (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
The substantive theory is the result of systematic, simultaneous coding, categorisation 
and analysis of data (presented sequentially for clarity) collected from the speeches and 
statements made by the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFOs of the 17 largest banks by market 
capitalisation that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and the 30 largest 
banks by market capitalisation which did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017), 
taken from annual reports, triangulated with analyst transcripts, parliamentary, treasury and 
federal inquiry reports, interviews and press releases. The theory is grounded in the data and 
captures the complexities and issues faced by leaders within the banking sector. It demonstrates 
the interaction between the leaders, the complexities of the industry and the actions/interactions 
of the regulators, central banks and governments. 
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The substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ (SLIiB) 
addresses the objectives of this thesis and can be summarised as follows: 
a) In considering the research objective ‘Is there a prevalent leadership style or set of 
leadership characteristics found in the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in large 
banking institutions?’, the substantive theory shows a prevalence of characteristics and 
styles within the boards of banks, and how they affect the strategic decision making of 
the board. 
b) In considering ‘whether there is a prevalent leadership style in those board members of 
banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and whether this differs in those 
that did not’, the substantive theory finds prevalent leadership characteristics and styles 
and a difference between these in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, 
and those that did not. 
c) In considering whether there is a difference in the leadership styles and leadership 
characteristics between the identified board members, the substantive theory shows 
that the shared leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO differ between those banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, and 
those that did not, suggesting that this may be an important factor in whether the bank 
fails, needs recapitalisation or bailout, or not. 
In addition, 
d) The substantive theory suggests that certain leadership styles (or mixes of styles) 
decrease or increase the risk of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
e) It shows that leadership characteristics and styles determine how the board responds to 
the contextual factors of globalisation and complexity. 
f) Leadership characteristics and styles are shown to determine how the board responds 
to banking regulation, deregulation and financial innovation. 
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g) Understanding the significance of the leadership characteristics and styles of the key 
board members provides an additional tool with which regulators, policy advisors and 
governments can view the risk of bank failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
8.9 Conclusion 
This study takes a social constructivist view within a grounded theory methodology to answer 
the fundamental question: ‘Are the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout 
(1999–2017)?’ On the bases of the open and axial coding stages (Chapters 6 and 7), this chapter 
presents the final coding procedure of grounded theory building (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) 
which is to identify the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions, and validate 
the relationship between the core category and its subcategories. This took place by analysing 
the speeches, transcripts and statements made by each leader and comparing the words and 
phrases found within those with extant leadership theories, thereby building a picture of the 
leadership characteristics and style of the leader. Although the core category of leadership 
styles was in mind during the open and axial coding stages, in this adaption to grounded theory 
(Chapter 4), it was developed and linked to the subcategories of globalisation and complexity 
(decision making, regulation/deregulation and financial innovation), at the selective coding 
stage. 
This chapter has utilised inductive line by line content analysis as part of the grounded 
theory process to link the collected data to existing leadership theories (Berg, Lune and Lune, 
2004). Consistent with grounded theory, memos used during the analysis enriched and 
supplemented the findings and added to the development of the properties and dimensions of 
the core category which was visualised through the model of strategic leadership in banking, 
linked to the subcategories by way of the paradigm model. 
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Finally, the substantive theory was presented. The substantive theory is the result of the 
coding, categorisation and analysis of the data collected from speeches and statements made 
by the leaders in annual reports, analyst meetings, responses to parliamentary, treasury and 
federal inquiries, conferences, interviews and press releases and embedded in the context, 
conditions and actions/interactions within the global banking sector. 
The substantive theory shows that the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout and is embedded within a framework considering globalisation, complexity, regulation, 
deregulation and financial innovation. 
The next chapter explains the substantive theory in terms of extant leadership theories 
to give formality. 
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Chapter 9 
The Substantive Theory 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ 
and links it to the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It revisits the influence 
of board leadership in banks, showing a clear difference in the characteristics and styles of the 
Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in those banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout, 
and those that did not. Significantly, the substantive theory shows both prevalent and secondary 
leadership styles found those leaders; for example Jamie Dimon, Chairman/CEO of JP Morgan 
is found to have predominantly ‘charismatic’ leadership characteristics but with significant 
secondary ones associated with ‘transactional’ leadership. This pattern of predominant and 
secondary styles is replicated through the data set. Finally, the interaction of the leadership 
styles between the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO is explored and found to be a significant 
factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
9.2 Formal Grounded Theory Building 
The objective of this section is to discuss the substantive theory in relation to the aims and 
objectives of the research which are: 
i. To increase knowledge and understanding of the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the 30 largest banks (by market 
capitalisation) 
ii. To develop and test a theoretical model to explore leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in these organisations. 
iii. To explore whether specific leadership characteristics and styles are influencing 
factors in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout during the research period. 
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iv. To develop a substantive theory of strategic leadership influence in the 
international banking sector. 
The substantive theory increases knowledge of leadership within banking by contributing to 
the literature in a number of ways which are detailed below. Linking the substantive theory to 
formal theory in this way allows the research to find its place within the current literature 
(Charmez, 2006). 
Firstly, the literature review (Chapter 2) shows that to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, there is no comprehensive study of the influence of board leadership 
characteristics and styles on banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout to date. The literature 
on banking failures reveals the increasing attention that banking crises have received from 
both academics and policy makers since the mid 1980s (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), but is 
shown to be predominantly quantitative, concerned with financial prediction models which, 
while useful for prescribing previous events, do not provide useful predictors for the 
avoidance of future failures. This framework is also incapable of considering banking failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout from the perspective of the board members at the time, as the bank 
either ceases to exist, is recapitalised with a change of leader or is taken over. Traditional 
qualitative studies struggle with access issues, with any dialogue with leaders of failed banks 
subject to historical biases (Pye, 2013; Shepherd, Wiklund and Haynie, 2009). These studies 
can also miss the nuances within language that provide key insights into leader behaviour. 
Previous studies concerning the corporate governance of banks and its role in preventing 
banking crises do not offer effective models through which to understand and prevent future 
banking scandals (Kirkpatrick, 2009). By using grounded theory to create a model to 
qualitatively explore board leadership in both banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or 
bailout and those that did not, this research was able to explore the influence of board 
leadership within the context of previously cited causes of failure, i.e. complexity, changes in 
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regulation and financial innovation. In doing so, the substantive theory of the ‘Strategic 
Leadership Influence in Banking’ (SLIiB) provides a comprehensive analysis of leadership 
characteristics and styles of the most influential leaders (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO) 
in banks pre-, during and post failure, recapitalisation or bailout, taking into account the 
context of the industry. 
The remainder of this chapter will summarise the main findings of the research and 
the relevance of the substantive theory to research on banking failures and crises. 
9.2.1 Relevance of the Substantive Theory to Research on the Reasons for Banking 
Failure and Financial Crises 
As discussed above, previous literature concerning banking failure and crises is concerned 
with looking into what happened with a view to stop it happening again. Current literature 
suggests corporate governance failures, moribund regulation and deregulation as substantive 
reasons. The SLIiB model provides an alternative lens through which to view these events, 
taking into account these previous cited causes. 
The use of a grounded theory model links the extant theories of leadership to the 
previous cited reasons for failure, and in doing so provides an insight into why leaders 
behaved as they did. It provides an answer to the question: ‘Why, when all the banks under 
investigation were operating in the same complex, volatile environment, and dealing with the 
same issues of financial innovation, did some banks fail, need recapitalisation or bailout, and 
others did not?’ 
The leadership theories are described in terms of characteristics and styles providing a 
suitable structure to analyse the strategic leadership within the banks. 
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9.2.2 Relevance of the Substantive Theory Linking Board Leadership with Banking 
Failure and Financial Crises 
As the review of literature has shown, understanding business failure presents an enormous 
theoretical challenge which still fundamentally remains to be met (Pretorius, 2009), and there 
is limited research considering the influence of the board in banking failure, recapitalisation 
and bailout. Emerging literature (Liu, 2015; Salz and Collins, 2013) considers leadership 
involvement but is limited to individual banks or countries. The extant literature suggests the 
main causes of banking failure are macro policies affecting liquidity along with a poor 
regulatory framework (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson and Lee, 2008), falling interest rates and 
the housing boom (Kirkpatrick, 2009). The substantive theory extends this by showing a clear 
difference between the leadership characteristics and styles of those leading the banks pre- 
and during failure, recapitalisation or bailout, and those leading the banks that did not. In 
doing so, it argues that leadership characteristics are a key and hitherto overlooked 
influencing factor. The substantive theory takes into account the context of the banking 
industry with increasing globalisation and complexity, and by way of intervening factors, 
takes account of the regulatory environment and opportunities from financial innovation. 
The following section explores the substantive theory in relation to the strategic 
leadership literature. 
9.3 Reviewing the Substantive Theory within the Framework of Existing Strategic 
Leadership Literature 
This section considers the findings of the substantive theory (Chapter 8) utilising extant 
leadership theories. The SLIiB model shows leadership influence in terms of characteristics 
and styles linked to extant theories of ‘charismatic leadership’, ‘charismatic dark side’, 
‘transactional’, ‘transformational’ and ‘authentic’ leadership. Notably, the shared interaction 
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between the triadic relationship of the leaders and their leadership characteristics is also 
considered. 
9.3.1 Analysing Strategic Leadership Influence 
The findings support the view that top-level leaders have a direct and significant impact on 
corporate performance (Day and Lord, 1988). Critical reviews (Boal and Hooijberg, 2001; 
Cannella and Monroe, 1997; Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009) suggest the 
traditional focus is on demographic and background characteristics of CEOs, rather than 
leadership styles. There is also limited integration between ‘charismatic’ and 
‘transformational’ theories (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999) with Boal and Hooijberg (2000) 
arguing that for real progress to be made, researchers must be willing to learn from other 
theories. The substantive theory presented in this thesis notably finds the leaders investigated 
show a mixture of predominant styles with secondary characteristics. For example, the CEOs 
of banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or bailout, show a mixture of ‘transactional’ 
leadership, with its regard of process, together with the ‘transformational’ leadership 
characteristics of ‘vision’, ‘team building’ and ‘creativity’, supporting Bass’s view that the 
most effective leadership style is a mixture of ‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ 
leadership styles (Bass, 1996), but extending it to show how ‘charismatic’ leadership and 
‘transactional’ leadership combine together to be effective. 
 
9.3.2 Analysing the Causes of Banking Failure, Recapitalisation or Bailout 
The findings show that the leadership characteristics of a ‘charismatic dark side’ CEO or 
Chair/CEO is a key variable in whether a bank fails, needs recapitalisation or bailout. All the 
CEOs or Chair/CEOs in the banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout had this 
leadership style which was not present in those banks that did not. This supports the work of 
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) who consider the power of the CEO and impact on bank 
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performance in the Fortune 500 during the period 1992–1999, but provides a wider 
perspective, considering the influence of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in 30 of the 
largest banks during the time frame 1999–2017. It also supports the work of Crossland and 
Hambrick (2007) who found leader egos affect the behaviour of firms, and the early work 
acknowledging management decisions as a key contributor in the rise in US banking failures 
during the 1980s (Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1994). 
This new lens through which to view banking failure also answers the criticisms of 
previous research in the area by allowing investigation of banks that were recapitalised, 
merged or bailed out, rather than just those that failed, which previous studies using 
predominantly financial ratios and multivariate techniques do not address (Martin, 1977). 
Alternative academic and policy approaches compare the characteristics of the banks that 
failed with those that did not (Jones and Pollitt, 2016), often focussing on individual banks 
such as RBS and HBOS (Fraser, 2015; Martin, 2013), but do not address the characteristics 
of the leaders of the banks at the time. 
9.3.3 Analysing the Shared Leadership, Corporate Governance and Board Leader 
Relationships 
On a micro level, the literature concerning leadership in banking failure is generally 
concerned with board governance (Alexander, Coleman and Li, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
The emerging literature considering failure attributed to leadership generally involves the 
interviewing of bank staff (Gond et al., 2014) resulting in little knowledge about the 
effectiveness of governance within banking (Adams and Mehran, 2012), and the extant 
literature on corporate governance issues linked to bank performance is largely concerned 
with the impact of risk (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). This thesis goes beyond the existing 
literature comparing the interrelationship between the leadership characteristics and styles of 
the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO and finding a clear difference between banks that 
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failed, required recapitalisation or bailout and those that did not. 
Notably, the substantive theory shows a link between the relationship of ‘charismatic 
dark side’ characteristics in the CEO or Chair/CEO in the banks that failed, required 
recapitalisation or bailout together with ‘transactional’ styles found in the Chair and CFO. 
This supports the argument that ‘transactional leadership’ can lead to egotistical behaviour 
(Avolio and Locke, 2002) and suggests that this can occur alongside ‘dark side charismatic’ 
traits of ‘hubris’, ‘arrogance’ and ‘drive for personal gratification’. The substantive theory 
shows that when these leadership styles occur together in the context of the banking sector, 
they may be a predictor of potential failure, recapitalisation or bailout, and in doing so 
provides better understanding of bank boards and their linkages (Wilson et al., 2010). 
The substantive theory also shows the relationship between the board members to be 
important. In considering the shared relationship at the apex of the organisation, it shows that 
where the relationship between the leaders is based on ‘transformational leadership’ 
characteristics such as ‘fostering a team spirit’ and a ‘strong sense of mission and purpose’ 
(Hater and Bass, 1988), together with ‘transactional’ characteristics such as ‘honesty’, 
‘responsibility’ and a ‘wish to do things correctly’ (Spahr, 2016; Yukl, 2008), the banks did 
not fail. Notably, this is also the case where a mixture of ‘transactional leadership’ 
characteristics and ‘authentic leadership’ characteristics such as ‘relational transparency’, 
‘balanced processing’, ‘creating a trusting relationship’ and ‘self- regulation’ (Avolio and 
Gardner, 2005; George, 2007; Walumbwa et al., 2008) were found, for example in Jayne Ann 
Gadhia, CEO of Virgin Money, and Sallie Krawcheck, CFO of Citigroup. 
The substantive theory also takes the theories of ‘transactional’, ‘transformational’, 
‘charismatic’ and ‘authentic’ to a level not considered by traditional ‘heroic’ leadership 
theories themselves. ‘Heroic’ leadership is generally concerned with the leader’s effect on the 
follower, not the organisation. By looking at a ‘post heroic’ view of shared leadership 
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contextualised within the existing theories, the substantive theory provides a new perspective 
on how leaders affect banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, and gives support to the 
argument that, in the 21st century, there are too many stimuli and executives are under too 
much pressure to be able to weigh up situations objectively (Hambrick, Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2005). In this case, the relationship between the Chair/CEO becomes pivotal (Boal 
and Schultz, 2007; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Pye, 2013) and a more 
collective approach is more practical (Crevani, Lindgren and Packendorff, 2010). 
The substantive theory also highlights the influence of leadership duality, i.e. the 
combined Chair/CEO role. Extant literature on duality shows a variation in views, with 
evidence showing that in some cases the market responds favourably to a split role with 
performance declining after the dual role is adopted (Dahya, Lonie and Power, 1996), but 
where the split role is due to investor pressure, subsequence performance has then dropped, 
as has the contribution to shareholder wealth (Dey, Engel and Liu, 2011). The substantive 
theory considers the leadership influence of the Chair/CEO role alongside those of the Chair, 
CEO and CFO and finds that 5 of the 17 banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout 
had duality in the Chair/CEO pre-, during and/or post the time of the study, compared with 14 
of the 30 banks that did not, with 5 of these banks having both duality and a split role for a 
period of time. This supports the argument that optimal board composition changes over time 
(Dahya and Travlos, 2000). Notably, the leadership style of the dual Chair/CEO in banks that 
failed, required recapitalisation or bailout was found to be ‘charismatic with dark side 
characteristics’, which was also found in the CEOs in the same sample, but differed from the 
‘transactional’ characteristics found in the Chair where the role is split. 
For the 14 banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or bailout, the leadership 
characteristics of the Chair/CEO were found to be ‘transactional with ‘charismatic 
characteristics’. This supports the conclusion that corporate governance regulations and 
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political proposals to split the role warrant further careful consideration. The extant research 
is generally concerned with US companies (Dahya and Travlos, 2000; Duru, Iyengar and 
Zampelli, 2016). The substantive theory finds 7 of the 12 banks that did not fail, require 
recapitalisation or bailout were US originated, and therefore contributes to the call for more 
research into the effect of duality on performance in an international context. 
9.3.4 Analysing the Strategic Leadership Theories 
i) ‘Charismatic’ and ‘dark side’ characteristics 
The substantive theory shows that ‘charismatic’ leadership is found in some Chairs, 
Chair/CEOs and CEOs in banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout, and a clear 
link to ‘charismatic dark side’ characteristics is found in those CEOs or combined Chair/CEOs 
in banks that did fail, require recapitalisation or bailout. As the substantive theory considers 
the context of the banking industry, this supports the view that ‘charismatic’ leaders must have 
qualities relevant to the situational context (Bass et al., 2003; Waldman and Yammarino, 1999). 
The substantive theory also finds characteristics of ‘dominance’, ‘a desire to 
influence’, ‘self-confidence’, and ‘strong moral values’ (which are an integral part of what it 
means to be ‘charismatic’) in leaders in banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or 
bailout, and notably found ‘dark side charismatic’ characteristics in each of the CEOs or 
Chair/CEOs of banks that did fail, require recapitalisation or bailout. This supports the view 
that ‘charismatic’ leaders can move to ‘dark side characteristics’ such as ‘blind drive to 
achieve a personal ambition’ in target-driven environments (Conger, 1989; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 1999; Yukl, 1999). Interestingly, the substantive theory also identifies 
characteristics of ‘narcissism’, ‘arrogance’ and a ‘sense of entitlement’ which the literature 
suggests are found in many powerful leaders (Rosenthal and Pittinsky, 2006), but, 
significantly, only finds them in leaders of banks that failed, required recapitalisation or 
bailout. 
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ii) ‘Charismatic’ combined with ‘transactional’ leadership characteristics 
The substantive theory highlights the existence of purely ‘charismatic’ characteristics of 
‘dominance’, ‘desire to influence’, and a ‘drive for personal performance’ (House and 
Howell, 1992; McDonald, 2009) supporting the view that ‘charisma’ is a theory in its own 
right, rather than integrated into to ‘transformational’ leadership (idealised influence) (House, 
1977; Bass, 1990). This is a significant finding as the extant literature does not find links 
between purely ‘charismatic’ characteristics and ‘transactional’ leadership, it is only 
identified as part of ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ leadership (Bass et al., 2003; Bass 
and Riggio, 2006; Hater and Bass, 1988). The significance of this is discussed below. 
 
iii) ‘Transformational’/‘transactional’ leadership 
As discussed above, the substantive theory considers the leadership characteristics and styles 
found in the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO of the 17 largest banks by market 
capitalisation identified as failing, requiring recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and 
compares them with those in the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation with board 
autonomy during the same time period. The substantive theory considers the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the leaders before contextualising them in terms of extant 
leadership theories, and in this way highlights combinations of leadership styles that are only 
partly addressed by extant literature (discussed in (ii) above). The extant leadership theories 
do support a link between the ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational’ leadership characteristics 
being the most effective combination (Bass, 1996). In finding the combination of 
‘transactional’ characteristics such as ‘recognition of followers’, ‘following rules’, and ‘doing 
things correctly’ (Judge et al., 2002; Spahr, 2016), together with ‘transformational’ 
characteristics of ‘vision’, ‘confidence’, ‘fostering team spirit’ and notably, ‘encouraging 
innovation’ (Bass, 1996; Hater and Bass, 1988) in those leaders (Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO, 
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CFO) in banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or bailout, and not in those leaders in 
the banks that did, the substantive theory supports the argument that the combination of 
‘transformational’ and ‘transactional’ leadership is effective in the strategic leadership of 
large banks. 
 
iv) ‘Authentic’ leadership 
The substantive theory finds characteristics to support the existence of ‘authentic leadership’, 
such as ‘self-awareness’, ‘self-regulation’, ‘positive modelling’, ‘strong values’ and 
‘relational transparency’ (Avolio and Gardner, 2005; George, 2007; Luthans, Norman and 
Hughes, 2006; Walumbwa et al., 2008), but interestingly only in the few female leaders 
(Chairs, Chair/CEOs, CEOs and CFOs) in the banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation 
or bailout. This supports the existing argument that authentic leaders help to ‘build enduring 
relationships and create long-term value for shareholders’ (George, 2003, p. 9). However, the 
authentic leadership characteristics are not found in isolation and are notably only found 
together with the ‘transactional leadership’ characteristics of an ‘emphasis of corporate 
structure’ and ‘doing things correctly’ (Spahr, 2016; Yukl, 2008), or with the characteristics 
of ‘charismatic’ leadership such as ‘dominance’, ‘skill at public speaking’ and ‘being driven 
by personal performance’ (Bass, 2008; Conger, 1989; House and Howell, 1992; McDonald, 
2009). 
9.4 The Formal Substantive Theory 
In light of the discussion above, the substantive theory (SLIiB) can now be restated formally 
with leadership theory underpinning it as follows: 
The substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’ (SLIiB) 
suggests that the ‘leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout’. 
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 It shows how the leaders respond to the context of the banking industry with its 
complex, volatile environment, cycles of regulation, deregulation and financial 
innovation. 
 It shows the importance of the shared relationship between the leaders in terms of the 
interaction of the leadership characteristics and styles, highlighting that within the 
banking sector, the dual role of combined Chair/CEO is not a contributory factor in 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout but highlights the importance of the dominant 
leadership style of ‘charismatic/dark side’ CEOs or Chair/CEOs in combination with 
predominantly ‘transactional’ Chairs and CFOs. 
 It shows ‘authentic’ leadership characteristics found in combination with 
‘transactional’ characteristics within banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or 
bailout. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the substantive theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Global 
Banking’ presented in Chapter 8 in the light of the extant strategic leadership theories, and 
discusses its role in providing an alternative lens through which to analyse the causes of 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. 
Explaining the substantive theory in terms of extant leadership theories is not 
designed to turn the substantive theory into a formal theory, but rather to make it a formal 
substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
The substantive theory is interpreted in terms of strategic leadership theories from 
three perspectives: firstly, it interprets leadership in banking as a social process and shows it 
can be analysed in its wider context, and within an institutional environment. Secondly, it 
confirms that the decisions of the strategic leaders are influenced by their leadership 
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characteristics and styles. Thirdly, it shows how these decisions affect the collective board 
response to environmental factors such as complexity, regulation/deregulation and financial 
innovation. 
The final chapter of this thesis presents the conclusion, academic and policy 
contributions of the research, limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion and Contributions and Further Research 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has investigated whether the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout. The study was conducted longitudinally from 1999 to the data saturation point of 
2017. The thesis is based on an inductive, social constructionist approach within a grounded 
theory methodology that analysed the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in 17 largest banks by market capitalisation identified as failing, 
requiring recapitalisation or bailout during the research period, compared with the 30 largest 
banks by market capitalisation with autonomous boards, taken from the Banker Top 1000 
(2017). A substantive theory of strategic leadership in banking was developed through 
continuous, systematic data collection and analysis. 
This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the thesis, together with the 
contributions to knowledge, limitations and directions for future research. 
10.2 Conclusion of the Thesis 
The thesis achieved the objectives of the study to build a substantive theory of strategic 
leadership in banking, and in doing so answered the research question ‘Are the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017)?’ It shows the existence of prevalent 
and secondary leadership styles, and identifies a key difference between the leadership styles 
present in the banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, and those that did not. In 
using a grounded theory approach, with the techniques of coding, comparative analysis and 
theoretical sampling, the thesis considers banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout within 
the context of globalisation and complexity, the intervening factors of regulation, 
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deregulation and financial innovation and provides an answer to the question: ‘Why, in the 
same complex, volatile environment, did some banks fail, require recapitalisation or bailout, 
while others did not?’ The substantive theory is grounded in the data which used line by line 
content analysis of publically available documents and discourse (annual reports, analyst 
transcripts, parliamentary and federal inquiries and press releases) to identify the leaders, 
their role in the bank and their leadership characteristics during the research period. In an 
adaption of the grounded theory process, the characteristics were analysed further in terms of 
extant leadership styles. The substantive theory recognises that leadership is a social 
phenomenon which is affected by the institutional environment in which it is embedded. The 
open coding stage allows the development of the ‘categories’ of banks that failed, required 
recapitalisation or bailout, and those that did not, together with the identification and time in 
office of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO. It also identifies the importance of decision 
making within a complex, global environment. The axial coding stage re-arranged these 
‘categories’ and linked them by way of the paradigm model. Finally, the selective coding 
stage utilised the collected data and linked it according to characteristics found in extant 
leadership theories, identifying the core category of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in 
Banking’. Using the extant leadership theories as a theoretical framework, the thesis 
constructed a formal grounded theory that can be summarised as follows: 
 The substantive theory is about the influence of the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the strategic board members on whether the bank fails, requires 
recapitalisation or bailout, or not. As such, it finds a prevalent set of leadership 
characteristics and styles in banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, 
which was different from those found in the banks that did not. 
 It is about the shared relationship between the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in 
terms of leadership characteristics and styles and how this is also an influencing factor 
in whether the bank fails, requires recapitalisation or bailout, or not. 
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 The substantive theory is about the leader’s decision making and responses to 
previous reforms in banking standards, increased regulation following deregulation 
and the opportunities presented by financial innovation. By considering the leadership 
characteristics and styles of the board members identified above, within the complex, 
volatile, regulatory environment, it provides a new lens through which to consider 
banking reform. 
10.3 Contributions of the Thesis 
This study makes a number of contributions at theoretical, methodological and practical 
levels. These are summarised below. 
 
10.3.1 Using Grounded Theory to Explore the Phenomenon of Leadership Influence in 
Banking Failure, Recapitalisation or Bailout 
The literature review undertaken in Chapter 2 identified a gap in the body of knowledge 
concerning leadership in banking failures, recapitalisation or bailout. The review found that 
empirical and theoretical work covering leadership influence in banking failure is scant. On a 
micro level, modern studies of banking failure use financial ratios as early warning prediction 
models for banking failure but cannot cope with those banks that were recapitalised or bailed 
out (Jin, Kanagaretnam and Lobo, 2011; Martin, 1977; Oshinsky and Olin, 2006). Further 
academic and policy considerations compare the characteristics of banks (Jones and Pollitt, 
2016) or show insight into the inner workings of individual banks (Salz and Collins, 2013; 
Walker, 2009), but do not consider the influence of the leadership styles of those leading the 
banks in failure, recapitalisation or bailout. By using a qualitative design, considering board 
leadership influence across the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation that failed, required 
recapitalisation or bailout, and comparing with the 30 largest banks by market capitalisation 
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that did not, this thesis extends the knowledge in this area by widening the criteria to allow a 
comparison between banks. 
As a longitudinal study using discourse and document analysis rather than 
quantitative prediction models, this research also adds to the extant literature by allowing a 
comparative method to analyse those banks that did not fail, but needed recapitalisation or 
bailout, and also provides a way to gain insight into the decision-making processes of those 
leading the banks at the time, while avoiding the issues with access and historical bias (Pye 
and Pettigrew, 2005; Shepherd, Wiklund and Haynie, 2009). 
On a macro level, the literature shows almost universal agreement that the causes of 
banking failure were due to moribund regulation and expansive monetary policy (Blundell-
Wignall, Atkinson and Lee, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Although academic and policy 
questions were raised concerning the behaviour of banks (Acharya and Richardson, 2009; 
Standards, 2013), there is no robust literature to date. By identifying the influence of the 
leadership styles of those leading the banks at the time on failure, the need for recapitalisation 
or bailout, this research adds to the academic knowledge and policy debate on reasons for 
banking failure and financial crises. 
Consistent with the grounded theory approach, this research considers the 
phenomenon of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout in the context of the industry 
environment. The literature review (Chapter 2) shows periods of deregulation and regulation 
as key policy responses to the cycles of banking boom and bust (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2011) and there is a growing body of academic and practical literature considering the impact 
of culture and risk in the sector (Power, Ashby and Palermo, 2013; Ring et al., 2016) with the 
focus on rebuilding trust and confidence in the banks (Wheatley, 2012). By showing the 
leadership characteristics and styles of those leading the banks to be an influencing factor in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or failure, this thesis extends this research and makes a 
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significant contribution to knowledge in this area by providing an alternative lens through 
which to address future responses. 
As a grounded theory methodology, this thesis also considers the industry 
environment, looking at the intervening factor of financial innovation. As this research is a 
longitudinal study from 1999–2017, it covers the development of derivatives which, coupled 
with the deregulation of the time, led to increased risk taking cited as a major cause of the 
GFC (Crawford, 2011; Thain, 2009), to the development of Fintech 3.0 and the rise of the 
shadow banking sector (Arner, Barberis and Buckley, 2015). The literature review (Chapter 
2) highlights this as an area where the current literature is lacking. By considering the 
leadership influence of the board members in response to financial innovation, this thesis 
adds to the academic knowledge in this area by showing the leadership characteristics and 
styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, both individually and collectively, to be an 
influencing factor in the decision making in response to the financial innovations of the past, 
and suggests a new lens through which to consider the subsequent decision making and risk-
taking behaviour of banks in the future. 
10.3.2 Leadership Influence in Banking Failure, Recapitalisation or Bailout 
The paragraph above considers the contribution of the thesis to the macro approach to 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. On a micro level, it also makes a significant 
contribution concerning the leadership influence of the boards of banks. The literature 
governing the influence of the board in failure, recapitalisation or bailout is primarily within 
the area of corporate governance and risk culture, generally focussing on failures of 
management and, due to access issues, confined to interviewing bank staff rather than board 
members (Birkinshaw, 2010; Gond et al., 2014; Liu, 2015). Those studies that do exist 
consider board size and composition (De Andres et al., 2012) and, despite weak corporate 
governance being identified as a major cause of the GFC (Kirkpatrick, 2009), most studies of 
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board effectiveness exclude financial institutions and are scattered across academic 
disciplines. This results in the need for better understanding of how banks are governed, with 
more research on bank boards and their linkages considered crucial in order to evaluate recent 
changes in regulation (Adams and Mehran, 2012; De Haan and Vlahu, 2016; Molyneux, 
2018). By showing the influence of the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO both individually and collectively, this thesis provides a 
significant contribution to the academic and policy literature concerning the understanding of 
how banks are governed. 
 
10.3.3 Contribution to Strategic Leadership Literature 
This thesis is concerned with strategic leadership in banks. Theories of strategic leadership 
have focussed on those who have overall responsibility for the organisation and the 
traditional focus has been on demographic and background characteristics of CEOs with 
limited integration between theories (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Gardner et al., 2010). This 
lack of research has led to a call for integration, connecting strategic leadership theories to the 
impact leader character has on strategic decision making, risk taking and firm performance. 
By analysing the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and 
CFO within the context of decision making, this research makes a significant contribution in 
this area. Leadership styles of ‘transactional’, ‘transformational’, ‘charismatic’ and 
‘authentic’ are all considered and notably both predominant and secondary styles are found. 
This is the most wide-ranging study connecting leadership theories, characteristics 
and styles to date. The findings of ‘charismatic dark side’ traits to be the predominant 
influencing leadership style in banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout give 
important insight into bank leadership and risk. The findings of different predominant and 
secondary leadership styles in those banks that did not fail is also a significant factor, 
238 
 
showing that leadership styles can affect strategic decision making, and adding weight to the 
overall argument of the thesis, i.e. that the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO are an influencing factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or 
bailout. 
10.3.4 Contribution to Leadership Characteristics and Traits 
The review of literature (Chapter 2) shows contextual reviews of leadership to consider 
characteristics and traits rather than roles. The academic attention on the personal leadership 
characteristics of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO, together with their board 
relationships has been sparse, with those that do exist limited to charismatic, transformational 
and visionary perspectives (Crossan, Vera and Nanjad, 2008; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and 
Knyght, 2010b). 
Academic work considers the personality of CEOs (Khurana, 2002) and the decision 
making power of CEOs in terms of corporate performance (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 
2005; Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1994; Crossland and Hambrick, 2007), but does not consider 
leadership styles, the shared relationships between the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in 
terms of those styles, or the influence on decision making which can lead to failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout. By considering the shared relationship of leadership influence in 
relation to whether the bank fails, requires recapitalisation or failure, or not, this thesis makes 
a significant contribution to the academic knowledge in this area. It also addresses the call for 
real progress to be made in strategic leadership theory (Boal and Hooijberg, 2000) by 
incorporating ‘charismatic’, ‘transformational’, ‘transactional’ and ‘authentic’ theories in a 
formal grounded theory of ‘Strategic Leadership Influence in Banking’. 
10.3.5 Contribution to Strategic Leadership Theories 
This thesis is the only body of work to consider leadership influence across multiple existing 
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theories. It includes the ‘heroic’ theories of ‘charismatic’, ‘transactional’, ‘transformational’ 
and ‘authentic’ and the emerging ‘post heroic’ theory of ‘shared leadership’. As the literature 
review shows, extant empirical literature is confined to the consideration of one leadership 
style. The ‘heroic’ theories are essentialist in their outlook and largely positivist in their 
approach (Bolden and Kirk, 2009; Grint, 1997). As this research is a qualitative, social 
constructivist paradigm within a grounded theory methodology, it situates the research in its 
institutional context answering criticisms levied at extant positivist approaches which pay 
insufficient attention to such context (Grint, 2005; Gronn and Ribbins, 1996). It also allows 
the nuances of the dialogue concerning leadership issues to be captured. In doing so, this 
research extends the body of work in this area and in each of the theories. The contribution to 
each ‘heroic’ theory is considered below. 
 
I Charismatic 
Early consideration of ‘charismatic’ leadership focusses on the traits and characteristics of 
charismatic leaders, with it then being seen as interchangeable with ‘transformational 
leadership (idealised influence)’ (Bass and Riggio, 2006; Boal and Hooijberg, 2001; House 
and Aditya, 1997). As this thesis finds evidence of both purely ‘charismatic’ leadership and 
‘charismatic’ traits linked to ‘transformational’ leadership in leaders in banks that did not fail, 
require recapitalisation or bailout, it extends the academic work in this area by providing 
empirical evidence that ‘charismatic’ leadership can exist both in isolation and as part of 
‘transformational’ leadership. Significantly, it also finds ‘charismatic’ leadership with 
secondary ‘authentic’ characteristics in nine leaders in banks that did not fail, require 
recapitalisation or bailout and, as such, makes a significant contribution to the growing body 
of ‘authentic’ leadership literature in this area. 
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Despite the extant literature finding generally positive qualities in ‘charismatic’ 
leaders, the literature review (Chapter 2) also finds academic (Yukl, 1999) and opinion work 
considering the negative effect of ‘charismatic dark side’ traits on successful organisational 
outcomes (Ciampa, 2016; Mayo, 2017). By finding a clear link between ‘charismatic dark 
side’ traits in CEOs in banks that failed, required recapitalisation or bailout, which was not 
present in those leaders in banks that did not, this research significantly adds to the academic 
knowledge in this area. 
II Contribution to transformational leadership theory 
Transformational leadership and its effect on the efficiency of organisations has attracted a 
large amount of academic attention from both theoretical and empirical perspectives since 
2001 (Gardner et al., 2010). However, these studies are largely confined to considering 
‘transformational’ leadership in isolation or together with ‘transactional’ leadership (Lowe, 
Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam, 1996). Studies applying ‘transformational’ leadership to the 
performance of banks do exist (Geyery and Steyrer, 1998), but focus on reports from branch 
managers rather than the members within the board. The literature review reveals no studies 
to date that empirically consider ‘transformational’ leadership characteristics with leadership 
styles other than ‘transactional’. By finding ‘transformational’ leadership characteristics 
together with ‘authentic’ leadership, nine of the leaders under investigation, and within the 
‘shared relationship’ between the board members in banks, this thesis contributes to the 
literature in this area. 
 
III Contribution to transactional leadership theory 
The literature considering ‘transactional’ leadership is generally concerned with leader 
influence over the followers and alongside transformational leadership (above) (Bass, 1996; 
Howell and Avolio, 1993). As this thesis considers ‘transactional’ leadership characteristics 
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found in the strategic leaders in banks, it extends the understanding of leadership in this area. 
By contextualising it in terms of banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, it also makes a 
contribution to the scant literature finding ‘transactional’ leadership to be effective in crisis 
situations (Odumeru and Ifeanyi, 2013). By considering ‘transactional’ leadership alongside 
‘charismatic leadership’ as pure theory, rather than within ‘transformational’ leadership, this 
thesis also adds to the emerging argument that the lack of charisma within ‘transactional’ 
leadership can lead to resentment (Ames and Flynn, 2007) and to immoral behaviour in 
target-driven environments (Yukl, 2008). In showing the relationship between the 
‘transactional’ leadership styles in CFOs and Chairs alongside ‘charismatic dark side’ CEOs 
as a factor in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout, the thesis is also the first study to 
find links between ‘transactional’ leadership and other styles within shared board leadership. 
By finding ‘transactional’ characteristics alongside ‘authentic’ leadership characteristics in 
leaders in banks that did not fail, require recapitalisation or bailout, this thesis extends the 
body of literature on ‘authentic’ leadership outlined below. 
 
IV Contribution to authentic leadership theory 
As the literature review (Chapter 2) shows, the theory of authentic leadership is a relative 
newcomer to the leadership literature. Work on defining the concept is still ongoing with 
current academic and practical definitions centring around the concept of being true to 
oneself (George, 2010; Ladkin and Taylor, 2010; Walumbwa et al., 2008). Empirical studies 
are scant and consider the models of authentic leadership, such as the authentic leadership 
development theory (ALD), in isolation with no comparative studies utilising other leadership 
theories to date. As this thesis considers ‘authentic’ leadership characteristics in comparison 
with other theories (‘charismatic’, ‘transactional’ and ‘transformational leadership’) it 
extends the empirical work in this area. 
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10.3.6 Contribution to ‘Post Heroic’ Literature: Shared Leadership 
As the literature review (Chapter 2) highlights, the emerging leadership literature begins to 
challenge the unitary command perspective of the ‘heroic’ theories outlined above, arguing 
that leadership is too demanding and complex to be undertaken by one person (Crevani, 
Lindgren and Packendorff, 2007; Pearce and Manz, 2005). The extant literature on shared 
leadership is generally confined to considering how leadership is shared throughout the 
organisation, rather than between members of the board. Where the current concept of shared 
leadership is applied to top management teams, it seeks an understanding of leadership in 
terms of collaboration between two or more people (Pearce and Sims, 2000). 
By finding a significant link between the leadership styles within the shared 
relationship of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banks, linked to organisational 
success or failure, this thesis extends knowledge in this area and notably contributes to the 
work of Lambert (2002) who argues that shared leadership can help prevent immoral actions 
as co-leaders can control each other. 
10.4 Policy Contributions 
The utility of the research can be seen in its application to real life decision making. This 
thesis provides practical contributions to policy makers and regulators which are summarised 
below. 
 
10.4.1 Current Policy Uses for the Substantive Theory of ‘Strategic Leadership 
Influence in Banking’ 
The substantive theory has identified leadership characteristics and styles as influencing 
factors in the failure, recapitalisation or bailout of large banks. It has taken into account the 
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contextual industry factors of complexity, regulation and decision making in response to 
financial innovation. These findings have already been of use to the government and policy 
makers with the findings presented to the Westminster Business Forum on Culture and 
Conduct in Financial Services seminar in April 2018, and published as written evidence in  
the ‘Women in Finance’ Treasury Committee inquiry report 2018.1 Following this, the 
findings on ‘authentic’ leadership were presented to the policy committee of the Banking 
Standards Board in May 2018, and the findings on leadership influence and decision making 
around the opportunities presented by Fintech 3.0 and blockchain, together with issues 
concerning the unregulated nature of the shadow banking sector, are due to be presented to 
the board in November 2018. 
These findings are also of interest to the Fixed Income, Commodities and Currency 
Standards Board (FICC) and are due to be presented to the board in November 2018. 
The findings on leadership influence and decision making linked to potential failure, 
recapitalisation or bailout are also part of ongoing discussions with the All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Fintech.2 
10.4.2 Potential and Future Policy Use for the Substantive Theory of ‘Strategic 
Leadership Influence in Banking’ 
This thesis has discussed how leadership characteristics may influence the board reaction to 
regulation, and provides a new perspective through which to consider the prediction of 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout. As such, it may be of use to the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the Bank of England One Bank policy group. 
                                                          
1 parliament-2017/women-in-finance-17-19/ 
2 https://appgfintech.org.uk/ 
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As the substantive theory considers leadership in banks in the UK, US, Europe, 
Australasia and South America, the findings may be of use to regulators and policy makers 
around the world, including the US Federal Reserve, and as it provides an alternative lens 
through which to predict financial stability, the International Monetary Fund. 
10.5 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of this study include generalisability, the time period, use of secondary data 
sources and the sample of directors. 
 
10.5.1 Generalisability of the Findings 
This study is a qualitative, social constructionist account of leadership influence in banking 
failure. As such, it takes the view that people interpret and construct reality within industry 
norms. Generalisability in this case comes from the recognition of patterns in which the 
reader (rather than the researcher) judges the generalisability (Larsson, 2009). The 
substantive theory and findings should not be seen as objective reality, but rather a working 
model which takes into account local, industry conditions (Patton, 2002). 
As a grounded theory study, the generalisability of the substantive theory is not 
required as contributions to knowledge are made in broader terms. In this case, the original 
contribution comes by offering a fresh and deeper understanding of leadership influence in 
banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout: ‘Grounded theorists can contribute to a speciality 
field and simultaneously extend general theoretical interpretations that cut across those fields’ 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 153). 
10.5.2 Time Period 
This is a longitudinal study, collecting data from 1999 to 2017. This time frame was chosen 
as it saw important changes in deregulation in the USA with the final repeal of the Banking 
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Act (1933) leading to growth strategies characterised by merger and acquisition post the 
recessions of the 1990s. It was also the year of the introduction of the European currency, 
together with the beginnings of the Financial Services Action Plan which proposed market 
freedom by 2005, both giving further stimulation to the integration of markets and increased 
competitiveness. This may lead to the involvement of participants who have since left the 
industry but this limitation was minimised due to the recurring relevance of leadership styles. 
 
10.5.3 Secondary Data 
The study uses secondary data to mitigate issues of access found in previous studies. Data 
sources included annual reports, analyst transcripts, parliamentary inquiries, treasury reports 
and press releases. While a study using primary data would have allowed the researcher to 
frame standard questions, access to all the leaders in the sample was not possible. Issues with 
secondary data were minimised by the use of triangulation of sources. 
 
10.5.4 Sample of Leaders 
The study considered the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO 
and CFO in banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout and those that did not. These 
leaders were chosen as they occur in every board in the sample of banks. Chief Risk Officers 
or Operations Directors could have been included but they do not occur on every board so 
constancy would have been an issue. 
Secondary sources including annual reports, analyst transcripts and 
parliamentary/treasury inquiries were available for the majority of the leaders. There was 
some lack of information from interviews and press reports for CFOs but this limitation was 
minimised by the amount of data that could be collected, i.e. analyst transcripts and inquiry 
reports. 
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10.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
The substantive theory considers the leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, 
Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in the 17 largest banks by market capitalisation identified as 
failing, requiring recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017) and compares them with the 30 
largest banks by market capitalisation with autonomous boards that did not during the same 
time period. Further suggestions for research are given below. 
 
10.6.1 Further Exploration of the Differences between Female and Male Leadership 
Characteristics and Styles 
The main objective of this research is to contribute to understanding of the influence of 
leadership characteristics and styles of the Chair, Chair/CEO, CEO and CFO in banking 
failure, recapitalisation or bailout (1999–2017). The substantive theory shows a difference in 
leadership characteristics and styles of female leaders and male leaders, with female leaders 
being shown to be predominantly ‘authentic’ with ‘transactional’ or ‘charismatic’ 
characteristics. It is noted that, due to the lack of women in board positions in the banks 
under investigation, this study was limited to 12 female leaders compared with 188 male 
leaders. Further research which looks at a wider group of female leaders, for example CEOs 
and CFOs in UK banks, would give a wider sample and increase the credibility of the 
findings. 
10.6.2 Further Use of the Substantive Theory and Secondary Data in Differing 
Industries 
The substantive theory uses secondary data from publically available documents (annual 
reports, analyst reports, parliamentary and federal inquiries and press releases) which are 
used to gain access to top leadership teams and extend the research into organisational failure 
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by providing a way of avoiding both access issues and historical bias. This research only 
considers leadership influence in banking failure, recapitalisation or bailout and could be 
extended to provide a new lens to view organisational failures in the public sector (e.g. the 
NHS) and other industries to provide an alternative view of failures in corporate governance 
(e.g. cases such as the collapse of Carillion3). 
  
                                                          
3 ROGERS, D. 2018. Not-so-sudden death: How Carillion disguised its ailing finances just enough. Construction Research 
and Innovation, 9(2), 44–47. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Largest Banks by Market Capitalisation 
Rank Bank Name Yearend Country  
1 ICBC 12/17 China   
2 China Construction Bank 12/17 China   
3 JP Morgan Chase & Co 12/17 US   
4 Bank of China 12/17 China   
5 Bank of America 12/17 US   
6 Agricultural Bank of China 12/17 China   
7 Citigroup 12/17 US   
8 Wells Fargo & Co 12/17 US   
9 HSBC Holdings 12/17 UK   
10 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 03/17 Japan   
11 Credit Agricole 12/17 France   
12 BNP Paribas 12/17 France   
13 Barclays 12/17 UK   
14 Goldman Sachs 12/17 US   
15 Banco Santander 12/17 Spain   
16 Deutsche Bank 12/17 Germany   
17 Bank of Communications 12/17 China   
18 RBS 12/17 UK   
19 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 03/17 Japan   
20 Morgan Stanley 12/17 US   
21 Mizuho Financial Group 03/17 Japan   
22 Lloyds Banking Group 12/17 UK   
23 Groupe BPCE 12/17 France   
24 Societe Generale 12/17 France   
25 UniCredit 12/17 Italy   
26 BBVA 12/17 Spain   
27 Credit Suisse Group 12/17 Switzerland   
28 China Merchants Bank 12/17 China   
29 Norinchukin Bank 03/17 Japan   
30 Intesa Sanpaolo 12/17 Italy   
31 Credit Mutuel 12/17 France   
32 ING Bank 12/17 Netherlands   
33 China Citic Bank 12/17 China   
34 UBS 12/17 Switzerland   
35 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 12/17 China   
36 Industrial Bank 12/17 China   
37 Rabobank Group 12/17 Netherlands   
38 China Minsheng Bank 12/17 China   
39 Standard Chartered 12/17 UK   
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40 Royal Bank of Canada 10/17 Canada   
41 Itau Unibanco Holding 12/17 Brazil   
42 US Bancorp 12/17 US   
43 Sberbank 12/17 Russia   
44 PNC Financial Services Group 12/17 US   
45 Commonwealth Bank Group 06/17 Australia   
46 National Australia Bank 09/17 Australia   
47 ANZ Banking Group 09/17 Australia   
48 Scotiabank 10/17 Canada   
49 Banco do Brasil 12/17 Brazil   
50 Toronto Dominion Bank 10/17 Canada   
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Appendix 2 
Examples of Memos and Field Notes for Banks that Failed, Needed Recapitalisation or 
Bailout 
Category 1: Banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout 
Bank: Lehman Brothers 
Subject: Dick Fuld Chair/CEO 
Transcript Interview 10 Jan. 2007 
When Richard “Dick” Fuld took charge of Lehman Brothers in 1994, the firm was famous on 
Wall Street for the bitter internal feud between traders and investment bankers that had cost 
Lehman its independence a decade earlier. Fuld, who had sided with fellow traders in the 
battle, knew he would have to make peace with the bankers and create a culture based 
on teamwork if the firm wanted to compete in a new era of integrated financial services. 
 
 
Fuld joined Lehman – a legendary firm with roots as a commodity broker in the pre-Civil 
War south – in 1969, when pay at many Wall Street companies revolved around a star system 
with top performers earning outsized compensation. Those who put in the longest hours and 
became ruthless competitors reaped big payouts. The kind of team building necessary to meet 
the complex needs of major clients today was of little value back then, Fuld explained in a 
recent Wharton Leadership lecture. 
 
 
‘The early Lehman Brothers was a great example of how not to do it,’ he said. ‘It was all 
about me. My job. My people. Pay me.’ Today, a stellar performance by one person is not 
enough to make a difference on Wall Street. ‘No one individual can deliver the whole firm to 
any given client.’ 
 
 
‘Bobbie’ Lehman, the senior partner who steered the firm through the stock market crash of 
1929, the Great Depression and into the 1950s, was ‘masterful’ at pitting employees against 
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one another, said Fuld. As a result, Lehman staff rarely shared ideas or helped build 
relationships that might benefit the firm as a whole. ‘He got people to work hard, but it took 
all the glue out of the partnership.’ 
 
 
The failure to work as a team led to the demise of the firm in 1984, after traders and bankers 
could not agree on a future direction for Lehman Brothers. As a result, the firm was sold to 
American Express, which folded Lehman into its Shearson division. ‘We lost the firm. 
Capital markets and banking couldn’t come together,’ said Fuld. ‘I was just as guilty as 
anyone. I couldn’t reach over to embrace the bankers.’ 
 
 
Everyone Is an Owner 
 
 
Fuld got a second chance when American Express spun off Lehman in 1994 and tapped him 
to run the company. He had not set out to become the top manager at the firm, but the 
leadership ranks were thin after many defections during the Shearson years. ‘I was the only 
one left standing,’ he said. 
 
 
The night the head of American Express asked him to take over the company, which at that 
point was called Shearson Lehman Hutton, Fuld had a full-blown anxiety attack – he stopped 
breathing for 45 seconds. ‘I realized I was it. I didn’t want the job and I wasn’t looking for 
the job. But once I had it,’ he continued, ‘I came in the next day with terrific resolve.’(not 
wanting responsibility at this stage) 
 
 
He restored the company’s name, Lehman Brothers, and began to rebuild. The new 
team focused on diminishing its dependence on Lehman’s powerful fixed-income 
trading business and began to extend deeper into investment banking.(Decision making) 
 
 
Shares of Lehman have risen 800% over the past decade, and Fuld said it is now difficult to 
see the line between the capital markets and banking operations at the firm. Led by bond 
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trading, Lehman ended 2006 with a record $4 billion in earnings, and today it is the fourth-
largest US securities company. 
 
 
In fiscal 2006, equities sales and trading, asset management, brokerage services, mergers and 
acquisitions and stock underwriting accounted for 44% of Lehman’s revenue, up from 41% a 
year ago, the highest since 2001. The company’s stock rose 19% in 2006, although it trailed 
competitors: Goldman Sachs was up 55%, Morgan Stanley 39%, Bear Stearns 35% and 
Merrill Lynch 32%. 
 
 
One of the most important elements of Fuld’s plan to develop a culture of teamwork at 
(Decision and teamwork) Lehman Bros. has been to link compensation to the overall performance 
of the firm through equity awards. Indeed, recent regulatory filings created a stir when they 
showed that Fuld would earn an extra $186 million over the next 10 years based on share 
grants he received a decade ago. 
 
 
Fuld said he and other partners who agreed to accept the new equity pay structure are now 
reaping the benefits of the cultural change at Lehman. He said there are now more than 200 
people at the firm with at least $10 million in stock. ‘They were all there in the early days. 
They have earned it.’ 
 
 
Establishing a culture built on teamwork leads to the best business decisions for the 
firm as a whole, and paying employees in stock helped reinforce that culture, he said. ‘I 
wanted them all to think and act and behave like owners.’ (Decision and employee recognition) 
 
 
Hiring New Leaders (and an Old Veteran) 
 
 
Fuld was asked how Lehman will be able to compete against much larger investment firms 
and international banks such as Citigroup. He responded that the size of a firm is not as 
important as its understanding of risk tolerance. While Lehman could support six or seven 
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major deals a year, it will instead focus on three or four that can most benefit from Lehman’s 
expertise, said Fuld, who cautioned that the global financial system remains awash in 
liquidity that could dry up suddenly. If that were to happen, Fuld does not want Lehman to be 
overextended. (Risk adverse here) 
 
 
Going forward, Fuld said his first goal for the firm is to raise Lehman’s share price, 
which hit a 52-week high of $78.89 a share in October, to $150 a share. (vision, strategy) He 
also said he wants Lehman to rank first or second in targeted business segments. Currently, 
Lehman ranks eighth among merger advisers and tenth among arrangers of global equity 
sales, according to Bloomberg. 
 
 
He also hopes to help the firm grow internationally. Lehman earned 37% of its 2006 revenue 
from outside the U.S., up from 36% last year. Fuld said Lehman’s business is strong in much 
of Europe but could be improved in the U.K. He added that the company needs to begin to 
build in Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. In Asia, he noted, most of Lehman’s business 
has focused on the sale of distressed assets but now is focused on new business in Korea, 
Japan and China. ‘I think we’re only scratching the surface in Asia’, he said.( Strategy and decision 
making. Also responding to external environment) 
 
 
In investment banking, the company is strong in the media, power and chemical sectors, but 
needs to improve in consumer products and retail, he said. 
 
 
Fuld told the audience he is pleased with Lehman’s strategic direction. Now he needs the 
right people to carry it out. ‘The vision is to hire terrific people who will be the next 
generation of leaders and the people who will take this firm to the next level.’ His  (Vision, 
attitude to employees and decision making ) formula for inspiring a culture of teamwork includes hiring 
people who can work together and giving them all the tools and training they need to do their 
jobs. Workers need to be held accountable and paid fairly, he added. 
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Indeed, Lehman is hiring new employees faster than rivals. According to CIBC World 
Markets, Lehman grew its work force by 8.1% in 2006, compared with 1.3% at Merrill 
Lynch and 2.1% at Morgan Stanley. In August, Fuld hired 78-year-old Felix Rohatyn, the 
veteran Wall Street deal-maker, as an adviser to Lehman. 
 
 
Source: https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ceo-richard-fuld-on-lehman-brothers-evolution-
from-internal-turmoil-to-teamwork/ 
Memo II 
Category 1: Banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout 
Bank: Allied Irish 
Subject: Michael Buckley CEO 2001–2005 
 
Allied Irish Offloads US Scandal-Hit Bank for £2bn 
 
Michael Buckley, the chief executive of Allied Irish, said the two banks had been in 
discussions since October  
By Helen Dunne Associate City Editor 
12:01AM BST 27 Sept. 2002 
Allied Irish Banks yesterday unveiled the sale of Allfirst, (Decision making) its American 
subsidiary where rogue trader John Rusnak lost $691m, to Pennsylvania’s M&T Bank in a 
transaction valued at $3.1 billion (£1.95 billion). 
AIB will take a 22.5pc stake in M&T, Pennsylvania’s sixth-largest bank which has 
headquartered in Buffalo, New York, and receive $886m in cash. It plans to return $450m to 
shareholders. 
The transaction will create America’s 18th largest bank with over 700 branches in six states 
and combined assets of $49 billion (£31 billion). AIB said it expected its stake to be ‘earnings 
‘enhancing’ within a year. 
Michael Buckley, chief executive of AIB, said that the two banks had been in discussions 
since October last year, several months before the discovery of Mr Rusnak’s unauthorised 
trading activities. 
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He said the talks had started after AIB’s board gave him a mandate last September to 
‘secure the long-term position of our regional bank, and to increase the earnings 
momentum’. (Responsibility for strategy) 
Mr Buckley said: ‘In M&T I saw exceptional management with a very long-term track 
record, which had delivered shareholder value at a rate greater than that of its peer group.’ 
He added that M&T has enjoyed compound annual growth of 25pc in cash earnings per share 
since 1983, and has the highest share price appreciation of any of America’s top 100 banks 
over the same period. (strategy)  
‘I was convinced over the last 12 months that AIB had much greater earnings growth 
potential if we could merge with M&T,’ Mr Buckley said, adding that the two banks shared 
the ‘same view of life and on the type of bank we want to be’. 
He refused to be drawn on the relative failure of similar business structures, saying: ‘One of 
the beautiful things of doing business is that you don’t start with a textbook premise of how 
to put together an agreement’. 
Mr Buckley dismissed suggestions that AIB had a time limit on holding its stake in M&T, 
where legendary fund manager Warren Buffett also owns 7pc, and said a sale ‘was not in 
contemplation now or at any time in the future’. 
He added: ‘We are at pains to say that we intend to have a very long-term relationship with 
M&T.’ 
Both sides admitted that the discovery of Mr Rusnak’s activities had ‘delayed the 
implementation of our plans’ but rejected suggestions that the price tag for Allfirst had fallen 
as a result. Indeed the discussions on ‘clear numbers’ only started in recent weeks. 
John Wilmers, chairman of M&T, said that he had been impressed with the ‘quality of people 
at Allfirst. We believe that Rusnak was an isolated incident which has no bearing on the way 
we do business’. 
AIB will gain four seats on the board of M&T, while Mr Wilmers will join AIB as a non-
executive director. Mr Buckley will now take a permanent seat on M&T’s board executive 
committee, which meets fortnightly. 
Eugene Sheehy, who was transferred from Dublin to take over as chairman of Allfirst in the 
wake of an investigation into Mr Rusnak’s activities, will become chairman and chief 
executive of M&T’s Maryland and Pennsylvania regions. 
However, the Allfirst name will be lost. Mr Wilmers said that American banking customers 
were used to consolidation in the industry, and to seeing the names of their banks change. 
Shares in AIB rose 105 cents to Eu12.55. 
 
Source: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2828387/Allied-Irish-offloads-US-scandal-hit-bank-for-
2bn.html 
 
Memo III 
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Category 1: Banks that failed, needed recapitalisation or bailout 
Bank: Barclays 
Subject: Matthew Barrett  
 
Andrew Davidson Interview: Published: 1 June 2002 
 
Britain’s highest-paid bank CEO came out of near-retirement to pull Barclays from the mire. 
His Irish-Canadian charm obscures a perfectionist determination to promote talent in his 
own meritocratic image and to jack up profits by opportunist expansion. (Attention to detail, 
determination, vision, confidence) 
The lights have gone out at Barclays. Matt Barrett, the bank’s Irish-Canadian boss, seems to 
be taking this remarkably calmly. He’s shifted our interview to the coffee room, more an off-
corridor hallway, where some sunshine seeps in. An electrical fault elsewhere on the fifth 
floor of Barclays’ London head office has wiped out much of the circuitry, pitching other top 
brass into darkness. Maybe they’re being robbed? If so, Barrett, lounging on a sofa with a 
filter-tip freshly lit, appears more amused than troubled by the predicament. 
But then he would, you suspect, remain pretty calm even if the ceiling fell in. Leisurely 
insouciance is one of his cloaks. (Calm, emotional stability) At 57, tall, trim, oozing charm, he looks 
like the ageing matinee idol your mother might fall for: clipped moustache, lived-in face, 
thick greying hair pulled back, dark eyes twinkling – Omar Shariff meets Harold Macmillan 
via Liffey Street. On meeting him, you wouldn’t for a moment think he is running one of the 
best-known banks in the world. But then part of him, he admits, can’t believe it 
either.(Humble?) 
He was, so the story goes, working out his retirement year at the Bank of Montreal when the 
call from Barclays chairman Sir Peter Middleton came. Barclays had lost both its previous 
chairman and its chief executive following a very public feud over strategy, then the first 
choice as CEO replacement had quit after one day in the job on health grounds (he’s now 
running the Bank of Hawaii – more congenial, you imagine). Barclays seemed in a bit of a 
mess. Middleton, with the deftness of a conjurer pulling a pigeon from his coat, suddenly 
emerged with Barrett as the bank’s new boss. 
Matt who? Many in Canada, where he was well-known as one of their most charismatic 
business leaders, were just as surprised. He was supposed to be retiring to his condo in 
Florida. What on earth, money aside – yes, he has two lots of alimony to pay – would 
persuade him to move to gloomy old London? 
The reason, says Barrett, taking another languid puff, was not money, it was just that 
he couldn’t resist the offer. ‘I am in the trade, Barclays is a magical name, a wonderful 
brand. That was the big attraction. Also, I wondered if what had worked for me in the 
North American context would work in the UK. So, curiosity and intellectual challenge, 
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I guess.’ (Likes a challenge, curious, possible flattery at being asked to take the job) And Middleton wanted an 
experienced banker with a bit of mileage left on the clock. The match was made. 
That was two and a bit years ago. And since then, Barrett’s Irish-Canadian lilt and folksy 
eloquence have become music to the ears of Barclays’ shareholders.(Public speaking, 
agreeableness)The share price has risen (pounds 16 to pounds 21), the profits have come in on 
target (up 9% to pounds 3.3 billion last year), the retail businesses are performing solidly, the 
Woolwich – the building society that he bought for pounds 5.4 billion in year one – has 
been efficiently subsumed.(Decision making) Middleton says he hired Barrett to push on four key 
issues: to articulate strategy, to build a strong centre that would add value for the group, to 
push through a pay policy everyone understood, linked to business performance, and 
establish a system of internal succession, so that when he left, Barclays would not be 
scouring the world again for a new boss. All are on track. 
So is everyone happy? No, of course not, because this is a bank and we all have difficult 
‘issues’ with banks these days, not least how much they charge their customers, how much 
profits they say they need to make – more than one politician would like to take a chunk of 
those – and how much they reward their bosses. Barrett is now Britain’s highest-paid bank 
CEO, earning pounds 1.8 million last year before pension contributions of pounds 425,000. 
He is sitting on a share option scheme that could net him many, many millions more. You 
have to ask: what is he going to do with all that money – buy more of Florida? 
Well, no, pounds 35,000 a week is just what it costs to employ a North American banker 
these days, but so long as Barclays performs, investors, doubtless, are happy. And as Barrett 
points out, that covers pretty much all of us, via pension funds, unit trusts, whatever. 
‘Banks are not owned by half a dozen plutocrats,’ he says, crouching forward on the sofa. ‘In 
the age of pension fund capitalism, our profits are securing the retirements of millions of 
ordinary men and women – that’s what makes me get up in the morning. Our biggest 
contribution to the public good is not what we do in terms of philanthropy but what we 
do creating wealth for the ordinary men and women who own Barclays, through mutual 
funds and unit trusts and pension funds invested in us. Politicians sometimes forget that.’ 
(Influence, banking contribution) 
So has he pointed this out to Gordon Brown? 
Barrett smiles smoothly. ‘Yes, but I don’t think he gets up in the morning waiting to 
hear what I said last.’ And then he chuckles, raising his eyebrows wryly, as if the idea of 
him, an uncomplicated lad from County Kerry, influencing the chancellor of the 
exchequer is quite the silliest notion in the world. (Desire to influence, confidence) 
There is a quality about Barrett, a low-key magnetism, a charismatic calmness that is 
unusual among bosses, and virtually unseen among bankers. Maybe that’s because he is in 
pretty much a no-lose situation here. Like those Hollywood stars now cramming London 
theatres, if he wins, he adds bottom to a glittering career. If he fails, he can put it down to Brit 
idiosyncrasies and get back on the plane to Miami, somewhat richer than when he was 
booking the same flight from Montreal. 
Yet the key, perhaps, is that he doesn’t believe he is going to fail. He has, according to those 
who worked with him in Canada, changed his style considerably from the young man in a 
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hurry who would do any job, however unpromising, to impress his bosses as he worked his 
way up the Bank of Montreal. Now he has the confidence of an executive who has done it all 
before – much of the UK banking market is developing after the North American pattern – 
and the assurance of a leader who is playing to his strengths.(Confidence) 
‘This really is the perfect job for Matt,’ says Gary Dibb, the organisational psychologist who 
Barrett brought with him from Canada to head up Barclays human resources. ‘It requires the 
two great attributes he has: a head for strategy and the ability to communicate.’ No 
wonder he oozes insouciant charm. 
That calm confidence under pressure is being fed down the line too, as Barrett has spent 
much of his first two years talking to the troops, getting his message over to the employees, 
who have traditionally been among the bank’s less receptive listeners, continually downsized, 
threatened by technology and the consolidating market. And here Barrett has another great 
advantage over many of banking’s fast-tracked senior cadre: he never went to 
university. He worked his way up from the bottom, and appears to have an affinity with 
his workforce that is pretty unusual even in this day and age of CEO canteen get-
togethers, shopfloor flesh-pressing and the rest.( Confidence under pressure, teamwork, agreeableness) 
Barrett even makes jokes about what his recruitment at Barclays has done to top 
management’s intelligence quotient. ‘I've brought down their average IQ level by about 
10 points,’ he chortles. In fact, like many of his generation who have worked their way from 
bottom to top in banks, he has been running in front of the waves of graduate entry all his 
career, and likes nothing better than working harder, making himself more available, than his 
higher-educated rivals. It is a point he makes repeatedly to any juniors foolish enough to tell 
him that a prospective job move doesn’t fit their intended career direction. ‘Career path 
planning? Absurd idea!’ 
Why? Because that wasn’t how Barrett progressed his own career: he was the jack-of-all-
trades who offered himself for anything, especially those jobs that others didn’t want. ‘It’s the 
immigrant mentality,’ he smiles. 
Born the only son of a successful Kerry bandleader, he left Ireland aged 18 to find work in 
London. He had wanted to be a writer. ‘I didn't have a disposition towards business at all, I 
was very unambitious as a youngster, an unmitigated disaster at school.’ But his Dad had had 
a wartime job at the Bank of Montreal in London while studying music, and fixed him up 
with the same as somewhere to start. He never left. 
Barrett says he was both repelled and fascinated by what he found in banking. He hated 
the hierarchicalism of the profession, the don’t-think and do-what-you’re-told. (Dislike of 
authority)It was too similar to the doctrinaire religion with which he had been brought up, sent 
to a Catholic school where you got belted by the teachers if you misbehaved, and belted just 
in case you were thinking of it. ‘Nowadays,’ he adds as an aside, ‘you would sue them.’ 
Yet he also found that banking was about people. ‘And when you are dealing with people and 
money you see all aspects of the human condition.’ He was hooked. ‘It’s like a narcotic, you 
miss it when you are away from it. That’s why I love branches, and why my sympathies are 
more with front-line staff than with anyone else, because I remember working there and how 
emotionally laden the work is.’ 
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But aren’t branches disappearing? ‘No,’ he laughs, ‘they're like cheques. They’ve been 
talking about the disappearance of the cheque for the last 30 years, and you know what? 
They’re still here!’ 
He was lucky, he thinks, that he wasn’t at a British bank, where promotion – in those days – 
would have been barred because he hadn’t been to the right school or had the wrong accent. 
When the Bank of Montreal (two branches in London, set up initially just to pay troops in the 
war) suggested he transfer to Canada and build a career, he jumped at the chance. Once in 
Canada, he says, he was ‘blown away’ by the opportunities available. ‘It was a total shock 
how young people were in managerial positions. It was a country of immigrants. I felt at 
home there.’ 
More pertinently, he felt he could make real progress. ‘I was struck by the fact that ability 
and achievement were all that mattered. It was about what you do, what you produce. All 
those excuses I had used about being poor and Irish, I couldn’t make them any more. I 
accepted that I could make my own life, I could overcome anything through effort.’ 
And those writing ambitions? Out the window. His father had died when he was just 19 and 
he was left as the only breadwinner for his mother and elder sister back in Ireland. That 
event, more than anything, changed his life and, he thinks, his personality. He grew up fast, 
became more serious, more intent on success. (Personal ambition) 
And he found he was a good manager. Why? Maybe genes played a part. He liked 
organising, just as his father had loved running his two bands, one a jazz dance group, 
another the quartet where he played piano accordian for ceilidhs. More importantly, he 
picked up his father’s communication skills. This, he feels, has played a real part in his 
business success. 
‘One of the things you commonly see is that CEOs are terrified of public speaking, and I 
never was. I attribute that to seeing my father on stage and on TV, and I just thought, that’s 
what people do, get up and talk. For some reason I had no fear of it.’ 
Others have noted just how well Barrett can manipulate an audience – Barclays non-
exec Sir Nigel Rudd, who heads the board’s remuneration committee, describes him, 
intriguingly, as like ‘a conductor with an orchestra’. 
It’s the same application he showed on his way up through the Bank of Montreal, taking on 
the jobs others didn’t want. He came to senior management’s notice for turning round one 
branch where the systems had collapsed. Dibb, who worked with Barrett at the bank, says 
that marked the young tyro’s card. ‘They were asking: who is this Irish kid who has turned 
round this spectacular mess with so much panache?’ 
By the age of 45 he was CEO, and he went on to become one of Canada’s most conspicuous 
business leaders. ‘You get to mouth off on political issues as they affect economics and I 
guess that gets you noticed,’(wish to influence) he laughs softly. But he also garnered headlines 
when he divorced his wife, by whom he has four kids, and remarried a former glamour 
model. That second marriage hit the rocks too, leaving Barrett with something of a reputation 
as one of those bosses who totes his complicated, high-profile private life around with him. 
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So what does he want to do strategically? He’s set targets that look ambitious: double the 
value of the group every four years, reduce business costs by pounds 1 billion, push 
Barclays into the world financial top 10. By organic growth or acquisition? ‘You have to 
look at merging or buying,’ he says, ‘but I think it is prudent to build a strategy on an 
organic growth basis, then you are in good shape to benefit from the continuing 
consolidation and transformation of the industry worldwide.’ 
Opportunistic, in other words. He, like every other bank boss, also wants to be an ‘employer 
of choice’ too, so he’s pushing hard to make Barclays a better place to work; setting up a 
‘virtual university’ internally where staff can retrain or learn new subjects, coaxing more 
women out of ‘pink-collared’ ghettoes into senior roles. ‘In my last company,’ he says, ‘we 
went from 4% of senior executives being women to 35% in 10 years. Here we are about 11%, 
so we’ve a long way to go, but the good news is we have all this talent we can tap into ...’ 
And certainly, on the limited evidence an outsider can glean, staff seem to have bought into 
it. If reports are correct, many appear shiny-eyed from meetings with him. His style with 
senior executives is equally sure-handed. He delegates well, keeps above the detail – ‘on the 
chairmany-side of CEO,’ sums up Middleton. ‘He doesn’t try and have a detailed knowledge 
of every business.’ 
Barrett’s only weakness, say those who know him, is that beneath the attractively laid-
back persona that he cultivates, he is actually driven by a perfectionist zeal that makes 
him push himself and others too hard. He works long hours, sleeps little, consumes the 
business. (Perfectionist, drive, personal ambition) 
But in a sense that’s what you expect from a FTSE-100 boss. That – dare I say it? – is what 
you pay them for. So his shift to Florida is on hold. He won’t retire to Ireland, he says; 
though his sister is still there, his mother is now dead. He has an Irish passport and a 
Canadian one, but he’s not sure where his roots are. ‘You'll never take the Paddy out of me 
entirely, I guess, but I am a man of a lot of countries now.’ 
Most of all, he wants to prove first that he can make it in Britain as well as Canada. ‘No-
one’s headed a major bank on both sides of the Atlantic, because you’re normally too old 
before you get there!’ 
It’s also, maybe, a bit of unfinished business from the days when he left Britain, when boys 
from Dublin would encounter dreadful discrimination and landladies would advertise rooms: 
‘No Irish, dogs or blacks’. 
To come back as one of the Kings of the City, that must be deeply satisfying. Barrett looks 
slightly unnerved when I put that to him, and sidesteps it. Instead, he breaks into oratory 
about ‘the exciting journey’ they are all on at Barclays. 
He finishes: ‘The best you can hope to do as a CEO is ask yourself: did I leave the place 
better than I found it? Did I build capacities and capabilities in the organisation that 
will equip it to survive and grow in the future? If you can answer both of those in the 
affirmative, then the labourer is worthy of his hire.’ (Decision making, legacy) 
The eyes twinkle, the smile broadens, the audience sighs. Some labourer. 
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Appendix 3  
Examples of Memos and Field Notes for Banks that Did not Fail, Need Recapitalisation 
or Bailout 
Memo I 
Category 2: Banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout 
Leader: Daniel Bouton Chair/CEO  
Bank: Societe Generale 
Source: Financial Times 
Man in the News: Daniel Bouton 
Adam Jones, 25 January 2008. 
 
In 2000, the year in which a young graduate called Jérôme Kerviel took a lowly job behind 
the scenes at Société Générale, many people doubted that his new boss, Daniel Bouton, 
would be able to maintain the French bank’s independence for long. The year before, the 
SocGen chairman and chief executive had tried to buy Paribas, a French competitor. 
However, this friendly alliance had been unsoldered by a hostile bid for both companies by 
BNP, a French rival. Michel Pébereau, BNP’s boss, succeeded in tearing Paribas out of Mr 
Bouton’s grasp – and narrowly missed out on conquering SocGen. The creation of BNP 
Paribas had left the bullet-headed, blue-eyed Mr Bouton facing claims that SocGen had 
been left without a strategy and would fall prey to a bigger bank.(Determination) But Mr 
Bouton and his colleagues went on to prove the doubters wrong for the best part of a decade. 
Exploiting the French educational system’s talent for producing exceptional 
mathematicians, SocGen built a world-class equity derivatives business.(Strategy, vision. 
Creativity) Specialising in complex bets on market movements, this division was so profitable 
that Mr Bouton could convincingly argue that size was not everything in banking and 
that SocGen could remain aloof from consolidation (Strategy, vision. Creativity) This strategy 
began to look less compelling at 8am Paris time on Thursday. That was when the bank 
revealed that €4.9bn ($7.2bn) had been lost because of unauthorised trading that it blamed on 
a rogue trader, later identified as Mr Kerviel, alongside a €2bn hit from the US mortgage 
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crisis. Less than a decade after it escaped BNP’s grasp, SocGen’s independence is now the 
subject of renewed speculation, while the 57-year-old Mr Bouton’s reputation for odds-
defying leadership is gravely damaged. Unlike Mr Kerviel, Mr Bouton arrived at SocGen 
with a swagger. (confidence). The French like to call it entering “par la grande porte”, or 
“through the main door”. Mr Bouton gained a degree in political science and his agile brain 
won him entry to the elite Ecole Nationale d’Administration. After graduating from Ena, he 
was reputed to have been the youngest ever member of the Inspection Générale des Finances 
when he entered this elite corps of civil servants in the early 1970s, before progressing to 
such plum jobs as running the ministerial cabinet of Alain Juppé. Having shone in the public 
sector, Mr Bouton attracted the attention of Marc Viénot, a fellow énarque who had led 
SocGen through its privatisation in 1987. Mr Bouton left the ministry of finance to join 
SocGen in 1991, becoming chief executive in 1993 and then adding the title of chairman in 
1997 as Mr Viénot gave up his executive duties. Mr Bouton’s professional style is more 
self-contained and shy than that of his debonair and languid predecessor. However, his 
hobbies are convivial – fine wine, cigars, golf, opera – and his guests eat well at the bank’s 
executive dining room, located high in one of the skyscrapers SocGen occupies on the 
outskirts of Paris. (One of the ways in which the bank differentiates itself from BNP is 
through architecture – BNP Paribas’ bankers are housed in low-slung buildings in the centre 
of town; Mr Bouton even said once that he fancied being an architect if he had not been a 
banker.) Some find Mr Bouton’s manner to be direct to the point of brusqueness. ‘Bright 
and arrogant’ was the character summary offered up by a French business leader, who did not 
give the impression of seeing these traits as undesirable in a successful banker. This 
confidence underpinned Mr Bouton’s decision to break ranks with the French 
establishment and give SocGen’s support to Lakshmi Mittal, the Indian steel billionaire, 
in his battle to take over Arcelor, the steelmaker. One colleague says Mr Bouton’s 
habitual coolness gave way to rare emotion as he digested the enormity of the losses. ‘He 
took it calmly but this is probably the first time for as long as I have known him that he 
clearly showed his emotions. He is a rather cold, calculated character who doesn’t lose 
his nerve easily. This destabilised him somewhat.’ Partly motivated by his duty to staff – 
who hold about 6.5 per cent of SocGen’s share capital – Mr Bouton quickly regained his 
composure, the person added. He threw himself into the task of arranging a €5.5bn capital 
increase to repair the group’s balance sheet. However, he appeared shell-shocked at the 
unruly press conference he hosted on Thursday morning. The veteran banker has temporarily 
renounced his salary as he tries to clean up the mess. However, the rejection of his offer of 
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resignation does not mean that his position is safe. The SocGen board decided that the bank’s 
short-term position would have been weakened by replacing him with a new broom from 
outside, according to a person familiar with the discussions. This hardly amounts to a 
mandate to lead. While no boss can be aware of all deeds committed by rank-and-file staff, 
they are responsible for ensuring effective internal controls are in place. As both chairman 
and chief executive of SocGen, this responsibility is twofold in Mr Bouton’s case. His 
position is further undermined by the fact that he is also head of the French banking 
association and a former adviser to the government on corporate governance. (Desire to 
influence) As such, his reputation needs to be more pristine than most. He already faced a tough 
2008 due to a forthcoming money-laundering trial involving SocGen and other banks. At the 
very least, Mr Bouton may face pressure to split the role of chairman and chief executive. 
There might also be calls to remove any hint of cosiness on SocGen’s board (independent 
non-executive directors include Patrick Ricard, the boss of Pernod Ricard, for instance; Mr 
Bouton’s wife, Nicole – an experienced banker herself – was recently appointed to the 
Pernod board). Yet his fate may hinge on Nicolas Sarkozy, whose business influence is not 
confined to state-owned companies. SocGen’s news embarrassed Sarkozy’s government in 
front of the global elite at Davos and clouded a presidential trip to India. If he is unseated, it 
will not be because of one of the external threats that seemed so menacing at the start of the 
21st century, and which Mr Bouton has been so adept at neutralising. Instead, his potential 
nemesis was on the SocGen payroll the whole time. 
https://www.ft.com/content/00d5a556-cb61-11dc-97ff-000077b07658 
Memo II 
 
Category 2: Banks that did not fail, need recapitalisation or bailout 
David Mathers CFO Credit Suisse 
FInews.com 
Wednesday, 6 March 2019 06:58 | Written by Jeffrey Vögeli 
 
Finance boss David Mathers is the only Credit Suisse top executive to survive years of 
restructuring. He knows every inch of the Swiss bank – which makes him virtually 
irreplaceable 
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Approximately is never exact enough for David Mathers: the Credit Suisse finance boss is 
known to punch the buttons of his calculator long enough to give a very precise answer – 
even when roughly would be good enough. 
The 53-year-old Briton’s obsession with detail is a huge part of what endeared him to former 
CEO Brady Dougan, who in 2010 tipped him for the finance job. Nine years later, 
Mathers proved his versatility by smoothly handling the dicey wind-down of Credit Suisse’s 
bad bank.  
Burying Bodies 
That was one reason Mathers held onto his job in a management purge when current 
CEO Tidjane Thiam took over in 2015: He ‘knows where all the bodies are buried at Credit 
Suisse (mainly because he buried most of them)’, analyst Dan Davies remarked 
acerbically after Mathers survived as one of the only Dougan-era allies in top 
management. 
Mathers was left unscathed by last month’s shuffle of top management, illustrating his 
indispensability to Thiam. He is now one of European banking’s longest-serving finance 
chiefs – and one of the few holdovers from the financial crisis of 2008–09. 
Crisis Response Architect 
The Cambridge-educated banker’s extensive knowledge of Credit Suisse goes further back 
than when he was lifted into top management in 2010: Mathers spent the three years prior to 
this as finance and operating chief at Credit Suisse’s investment bank, then an influential 
credit player on Wall Street.  
Dougan is widely credited for navigating Credit Suisse through 2008 without 
government help – but Mathers also had a key role in keeping the investment bank from 
avoiding a UBS-sized wipeout on subprime mortgage securities. The banker, who rose in 
Dougan’s wake, was also the architect of a restructuring of Credit Suisse’s investment 
bank in autumn of 2008. (Creativity, complexity and drive) 
Mathers internally referred to the 2008 reorganization that shored up the securities unit’s 
profits in the following years as ‘Plan E’: he had apparently already shredded Plans A, B, C, 
and D in his fevered efforts to stave off the crisis. 
Excelling in Crisis 
His value to the bank is that he has gone the extra mile for Credit Suisse when the bank 
needed it most. Unflappable and dazzlingly smart, Mathers seemed to excel in stressful 
situations like 2008, when the Swiss bank – like most of its European rivals – went hunting 
for money.  
Mathers, who was plucked out of equity research by the late Paul Calello in 2007 and 
subsequently drew the attention of then-CEO Dougan, also fulfills another key function for 
Thiam that no one else can. The CFO is one of the few direct links back to the investment 
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bank for Thiam, whose ties to Credit Suisse’s Wall Street faction remain 
somewhat tenuous after a rocky start. 
Shuns Limelight 
His other key merit to management is that while he is keenly aware of his powers, he 
doesn’t like the limelight. Most recently, Mathers successfully wound down Credit Suisse’s 
bad bank in three years after Thiam ordered their disposal in 2015, to little fanfare. 
He also claimed little credit for a 2012 cash call effectively prescribed by the Swiss 
National Bank (Mathers also took little of the heat when the central bank publicly singled out 
Credit Suisse for its thin capital cushion). 
Close Ties to Olayan and Norges 
The dismantling of Credit Suisse’s so-called strategic resolution unit was a leisurely three-
year project, but others were down to the wire. In 2012, it took Mathers one month to collect 
enough cash including from Norway’s sovereign wealth fund Norges to satisfy the SNB 
(the bank had originally fended off the SNB’s highly unconventional order). 
The cash calls are why Mathers maintains very close ties to the Saudi Arabian Olayan Group, 
also a major Credit Suisse shareholder which pumped money into the bank in 2012 as well as 
2008.  
Picking up fresh money was one of Thiam’s first tasks when he began restoring Credit Suisse 
four years ago; thus, only natural that he would tap the talents and contacts of Mathers, the 
holdover CFO, to do so. 
Carrying Out Orders 
For Mathers to hold onto his job when Thiam set about disassembling Dougan’s apparatus 
isn’t just due to his cool under crisis and in-depth knowledge of the bank. The finance chief 
has also been a remarkably nimble. 
Mathers didn’t blink in 2015 when he went from reporting to Dougan, a nerdy, 
analytical workaholic investment banker, to Thiam, a much more impetuous 
personality who enjoys the limelight far more than his predecessor did. As a banker 
who worked with Mathers for years put it, the CFO doesn’t question the boss’ orders – 
he just carries them out.  
Managing Up 
Little is known of the 20-year Credit Suisse veteran who lives with his family in a ritzy 
lakeside suburb of Zurich and shields his private life fiercely. He is known for managing 
upwards – CEO and board – extremely well, and for making huge demands of his own 
troops.  
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To be sure, Mathers is also credited with bringing a more civil tone to Credit Suisse of 
late, even if, like Thiam, he has little patience for those whom he perceives to be of 
inferior intelligence. Thus, opinions are split on his leadership style. 
Wings Clipped 
As long as Mathers doesn’t cast around for another job, perhaps where he has more creative 
freedom, he is indispensable enough to keep his job as long as he wants. He has already put 
up with having his wings clipped – only slightly – by Thiam.  
Before 2015, Mathers had acted as finance and operating chief in one, the same job he held 
previously at the investment bank. But Thiam installed a long-time associate, Pierre-Olivier 
Bouée, in the COO role. 
Mathers ceded the technology and operations part of his job to Bouée. Thiam also installed an 
investor relations head of his own choosing: In 2016 he gave that job to another close 
associate, Adam Gishen. 
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Appendix 4 Detail of process of grounded theory building 
Process used for grounded theory building 
Initial review of literature 
 
Identification of research question, propositions and premises 
 
Data collection 
 
Data analysis 
 
Theoretical sampling 
 
Tentative theory development 
 
Source: Adapted from Pandit (1996) 
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